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FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE



LEO H. GRINDON.

W.S. Martin

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
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
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FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE.



FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE,

Its Origin and Constitution.

BY

LEO H. GRINDON,

AUTHOR OF "MANCHESTER BANKS AND BANKERS;" "THE TREES OF OLD
ENGLAND;" "THE LITTLE THINGS OF NATURE;" "LIFE: ITS
NATURE, VARIETIES, AND PHENOMENA,"
AND OTHER WORKS.

JAMES SPEIRS,
36 BLOOMSBURY STREET, LONDON,

1879.



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PREFACE.

THOUGH now placed for the first time before the public in general, this little work is essentially a revised edition of one printed under the same title in 1850. Only a hundred copies were struck off, and these went into the hands of personal friends, excepting two or three which were presented to local libraries. One of them is in the library of the Manchester Athenæum. This statement as to the long-ago composition is rendered necessary by the issue, during the twenty-eight years since elapsed, of writings upon language and etymology from the pens of Farrar, Wedgwood, Earle, Whitney, Trench, and pre-eminently Max Müller. I do not presume to say that I was in any degree the pioneer of these eminent authors: my desire is simply to show that I have not been their imitator. Neither do I presume to consider myself their rival, even afar off. On the whole they have strengthened and confirmed me in my views, especially as regards the Origin of Language. There are points, nevertheless, upon which a comparison of the various works would indicate a rather wide disagreement. No opinions or speculations occur in the present volume that were not in the original

of 1850. All the quotations from the classical poets, and most of those from modern writers, were in it as well. Is it then only a *reprint*? By no means. The matter has been broken up into chapters, and almost entirely rearranged, and very considerable additions have been made. Were it even purely a reprint, *Figurative Language* is a subject which the lapse of time does not affect. What value the book may possess is a question in no degree involving that of the year in which it was written. No scientific experiments are required for its subject, no geographical discoveries; so that to all practical intents and purposes it is, after all, a new one. While revising, I have endeavoured to avoid adopting anything from the authors named, unless in the form of a brief quotation.

The object of the book being to show that the study of *Figurative Language* introduces us by new avenues to the noblest themes on which the mind can employ itself, very frequent references are made to Scripture. Being written, not for the vulgar and superficial, but for the well-taught and the aspiring, I have not hesitated either to print the Greek words required for illustration, in their proper classical character. To those who are unacquainted with the Greek letters, I have simply to recommend the learning—a matter of a few hours only.


Some of the derivations are different from those given in the dictionaries. Etymology is confessedly a subject

which admits of strongly conflicting views: no two etymologists are agreed at all points.

As regards the general treatment of the subject, and the distance to which I have gone, I do not pretend to have done more than suggest answers to the questions propounded, and to have collected illustrations that may be serviceable to younger students. To awaken and promote interest in Figurative Language has been my sole aim, and if attention should be given to it more extensively than heretofore, knowing, as I do, what pleasure and profit will accrue to the inquirer—that will suffice me.

71 RUMFORD STREET, MANCHESTER,

May 1879.



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la Volta = The Vault step = Valse - a waltz

ERRATA.

- Page 35, line 4 from bottom, for "expounding" read "expanding."
,, 74, note, cancel the word "Moe."
,, 175, line 12 from bottom, for "feeling" read "smell."
,, 185, line 6, read "so goodly-a-weaponed a man."
,, 215, last line, for "temple" read "tabernacle."



FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE.

CHAPTER I.

“Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas !”

IN its ordinary acceptation, the term “figurative,” when applied to written or spoken language, denotes certain picturesque or poetical ways of expressing ideas, as when the Psalmist says that “they who sow in tears shall reap in joy;” the novelist, “the old love that won and warmed his heart in the long-ago was in her eyes;” or the author of *Comus* :

“He that hath light within his own clear breast,
May sit in the centre, and enjoy bright day ;
But he that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts
Benighted walks, under the mid-day sun,
Himself is his own dungeon.”

Figurative language, taking the term in its popular sense, covers also a very considerable variety of elliptical and indirect modes of expression, often by no means picturesque, but resorted to for the sake of brevity,—mild rebuke, satire, the exciting of pity or admiration, desire not to give offence, concealment of one’s meaning from the dull and unintelligent, and many other reasons, as

many, perhaps, as there are motives for speaking. Literature in all its forms, the conversation of the cultivated, sermons, speeches, even the quarrels of the brutish, and the slang of the vulgar and criminal, alike supply examples of such modes of expression. Rhetoric long since distinguished the different kinds of figure, and gave them names,—metaphor, metonymy, irony, hyperbole, personification, and so forth, as illustrated in books; the minutely analytical subdividing these into a hundred or more.

The variety and the universality of figures of speech declare them an integral part of the very life of language. The clear understanding of figures contributes immensely to our intellectual happiness: mistaken apprehension of figures has caused unspeakable trouble and bitterness, not to say persecutions, cruelty, and the shedding of innocent blood: the study of their origin, fabric, and purpose forms an important portion of genuine culture, and is indispensable to sound criticism.

In the present volume it is proposed to go a little further than the rhetoricians have gone: to show that the bulk of all language is figurative essentially, and that although we may appear to ourselves to use the simplest words and phrases, and even deliberately strive to avoid figure, yet, like M. Jourdain in Molière, who had “spoken prose all his life without knowing it,”

“ Our mouths we cannot ope,
But out there falls a trope !”

Reflect but for a moment on the multitude of common words which possess several distinct meanings, the word to *see*, for example. This we apply both to the obser-

vation of material objects by the bodily eye, and to the comprehension of things which address themselves exclusively to the understanding, such as the meaning of a person's remarks, the force of an argument, or the tendency of particular events. Thus: "I *see* your drift," "I *see* how it will end." In these two expressions the word is employed in a purely figurative sense. The original or primitive signification, or that which relates to corporeal eyesight, to express which optical power the word was primarily contrived, is the *literal* one; and as every meaning cannot be the primary one, it is plain that all the other meanings must of necessity be figurative. So with the beautiful promise, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." This does not refer so much to future vision as to discerning the hand of the Almighty now, to-day, in this present world, in everything: the pure in heart shall have clear ideas of God's love and government. The literal sense is known to be the original one, because the physical sense of a word is invariably the eldest. Thoughts and feelings and mental processes are named without exception from material things, or from other external circumstances, as will presently be shown. There is no other way in which it can be done. Such words as *see* are thus both physical and metaphysical, corporeal and spiritual, possessed of two natures, but only one person. Every one of them forms a beautiful emblem of man himself, who is a word of the Creator.

Etymology and the philosophy of language in general, —things which can never be dissociated if we would achieve true and useful ends, certify to us that not only are vast numbers of words used, like the above, in two

distinct senses, one literal, the other figurative, but that very many words have actually lost their primary meaning, and retained only the metaphorical or extended one. Such, for instance, is the word *calculation*. This word now denotes an arithmetical process, no matter how performed ; we also speak of our calculations as to future events. These are purely figurative uses. The physical sense, that which the word was originally intended to convey, referred to the mechanical contrivance used for counting by the Romans, of which pebbles or *calculi* formed the chief part. "Ambition" is derived from *ambo ire*, and in its primary sense meant a going about ; thence it came to mean a going about to solicit votes, and thence a desire of honour and preferment, such as resulted from procuring the votes. The old meaning is retained, however, in the word "ambient," as when the poets speak of "the ambient air." *Stylus*, again, was the name of the instrument with which the ancients wrote upon their waxen tablets:—

"Sæpe stylum vertas, iterum quæ digna legi sunt
Scripturus"—

"He who desires that his works should be read more than once with pleasure must often turn the stylus," *i.e.*, must often efface what he has written, using for that purpose the flattened upper extremity of the stylus, and write anew. Shortened into "style," the word is now used to denote the character of literary composition, and thence has come to signify what is elaborate in other things. We live "in good style ;" a performance is gone through "in good style." A "fanatic," or religious enthusiast, is literally "one who frequents temples,"—the temples

understood being those of the heathen deities, so that again it is figuratively that the term is applied to Christian churches.

“ The cottage homes of England,
By thousands on her plains,
They are smiling o’er the silvery brooks,
And round the hamlet fanes.”

The “profane” among men were originally no more than the “outsiders,” the laity as opposed to the priests, or, as we should now say, to the clergy; and “profane books” were simply those which were not written or preserved within the sacred precincts of the fanes. “Interval” belonged originally to the language of the Roman camp, designating the space between the stakes or palisades which strengthened the rampart, the *inter vallos spatium*. Figuratively it came to denote intervening portions of *time* as well as of space, and now it is so exclusively applied to time that to speak of an interval between two places would convey no idea. In the writings of Lord Bacon many such words are employed in their original or physical sense. To “edify,” with that great author, is to build, and to “incense” is to set on fire.

Such instances are not confined to words derived from the classical tongues. The Anglo-Saxon word *faran* signified primarily nothing more than to go or proceed as a traveller does, the sense preserved by Milton:

“ So on he fares, and to the border comes
Of Eden.”

Excepting in a few compounds, such as thoroughfare, farewell—which means “safe journey to you!” welfare—which means pleasant progress, warfare, seafaring, field-

fare, this term is now employed only in the figurative senses which have superseded the original, viz., as the name for what we pay at the booking-office for permission to go, and for the food which we receive while upon our journey. When about to start, we ask, "How much is the fare?" and at dinner-time we inquire for the "bill of fare." Still further extended, fare has become the figurative name for food in general: "There was a certain rich man who fared sumptuously every day."

Practically, figurative language is thus of two separate though blending kinds. In the one, the rhetoricians' figurative language, the metaphors are, if not designedly, at all events consciously, made use of; in the other they are employed without suspicion of their actual nature. "What," says Carlyle, "is all language but metaphors recognized as such, or no longer recognized? still fluid and florid, or now solid grown and colourless? Non-metaphorical style you shall in vain search for; is not your very attention a 'stretching-to?'" That the metaphorical nature of colloquial speech should be unrecognized by the generality of people is of course perfectly natural. The non-recognition comes partly of the words being derived from ancient and unfamiliar languages, partly of long habit, with the taint, perhaps, of incuriousness and indifference. Figures of speech, in short, are not simply beautiful and ingenious but still arbitrary and fanciful devices of the rhetorician and the poet, as some consider them, but the spontaneous utterance of the universal human mind, and are inevitable to it. "The entire language of mankind has been fashioned by that ancient and public spirit of poetry which pre-eminently dignifies our human nature and stamps it with the impress of Divine

workmanship." Figurative expression, as we shall see presently, is not only co-extensive but contemporaneous with the simple and original fact of language: the origin of the one is the same as the origin of the other. The figures which constitute the first class, the rhetorical ones, or those designedly made use of, may for convenience' sake be distinguished as "artificial;" the latter may be called natural or colloquial. There is no absolute difference between them: there is no point at which the one kind ends and the other begins; thousands of expressions might be referred with propriety to either. Expressions, moreover, which would be considered rhetorical or the property of the poets to-day, often become colloquial to-morrow. Employed first by some one possessing a quicker aptitude than is common for perceiving analogies, the bases of all figurative expression, after a while the rhetorical rank becomes lost, and they float into the ordinary diction of the multitude. It is with the "flowers of speech" precisely as with the flowers of nature which for the sake of their loveliness are brought home by travellers. Admired at first as beautiful exotics in ducal saloons, after a while they deck the windows of the cottager. Thanks be to God that the lily, the fuchsia, everything that is peerless, will bloom, if it be loved, as well for the poor man as the rich one. On the converse mark that not the least part of the floral beauty of the garden is the spontaneous product of the fields,—witness the cowslip and the narcissus. So does the sweet emphasis of the figurative language of the poet come very often of his taking up the simple utterances of rural joy.

To obtain clear ideas of the way in which figurative

expressions first arose, and to comprehend why they are inevitable to intellectual commerce, as well as so very pleasantly eligible, it is necessary to ask what was the probable origin of language,—not of any particular *tongue*, as of English, Latin, or Hebrew, but of human language in the abstract; proceeding thence to the steps by which language advanced from its earliest stage onwards and became diversified; just as in considering the history of a noble tree the physiologist begins with the germination of the seed. All opinions and conjectures respecting the origin of language bear upon one or the other of two distinct views. The view held very generally by the theologians of the eighteenth century, and still extant, is, that man had language given him ready made, and immediately, by the Creator: the other, preferred by modern philosophy, is that man was simply provided with the necessary powers, and that he constructed language, by successive movements, for himself. According to the latter view, language is the outcome of definite laws, which await only the patient and comprehensive study of existing facts to reveal themselves to the unprejudiced and diligent student.

On the first side it is asserted that language *must* have come by inspiration; that to acquire ideas in the ordinary way would have been so tedious a process, that man, in the beginning, was provided at once with knowledge and the power of intellectually communicating with his fellows. Leland, Dwight, Magee, and many other divines, upheld this view: it had the support also of Dr. Johnson. In the older writers it is often found in company with the wildest hypotheses as to the meaning of Genesis i—xi., Dr. Clarke's surmise, for instance, that the "serpent"

was an ape. Solid ground for it does not exist, neither is there any occasion for it. There is not the slightest necessity to suppose that the Creator endowed the first members of mankind with language, nor would the gift have been consistent with the laws of Divine order. The bestowal of language ready made implies the loading of the memories of the recipients with a mass of words denoting things unknown to them. Man would have been embarrassed, not befriended, by such a gift. It is much more honouring to the Divine to view Him as the Creator of a being who should be able to fabricate language for himself. To have done *this*—for we believe that it pleased God so to have acted—is a wonderful display indeed of creative power; the Divine wisdom becomes far more excellent when contemplated not as providing everything once for all, but as giving powers to act happily and victoriously in emergencies. In the one case God is regarded as the Creator of a weak and incompetent thing; in the other of a strong and princely one, then truly His “image and likeness.” Man is God’s masterpiece, not so much in what he is, as in what he is made capable of. His sublimest prerogatives, all his richest possessions, are acquired by working, under his Maker, with his own head and heart. God never does anything for man which man, with the Divine help, can do for himself.

“Nec deus interit, nisi dignus vindice nodus
Inciderit.” *H. v. v. v.*

Does the Divine benevolence give man loaves of bread? No; guided by the underlying infinite wisdom, it gives him corn, and the rest is left to his own industry. So, what was given to the first members of mankind

was, we may most reasonably conclude, not a language ready made, but the power to produce articulate sounds, a full consciousness of this power, and the impulse to use it, the contrivance of the vocabulary being left to man's own pleasure and ingenuity. Language everywhere bears traces of such an origin. The presumption that it began in this way accounts for the whole of its diversified phenomena, and there are no phenomena which the doctrine of human origination fails to render both intelligible and meaningful. The theory of the Divine origin of language explains nothing. It resembles, as Bacon remarks of something else, a holy vestal, consecrated, pious, unfruitful, and useless. No Divine quality is discoverable in language except that language is human throughout, and this, after all, is one of its grandest characteristics. In structure, in strength, in weakness, in everything, the noble edifice we call language discloses not heavenly ideas, but human ones. "How is it possible," says a great author, "to turn aside from all the traces of this creative spirit of speech to seek its origin in the clouds? What proof exists of one single word contrived by God? Can there be found in any language the vestige of any single expression which 'must' have descended to men from heaven? On the other hand, how many hundred reasons, analogies, and proofs, present themselves to show the origin of language in the human soul?" In all such questions look rather at what God *has* done than speculate on what He may or might have done, or could do. Compare the nature and origin of vocal music, the enviable sister of spoken language. Here, as every one knows, while the love of God gave the organs

for the production of sweet sounds, and the impulse to employ them, the composition of the melodies was left to man's own feeling and fancy. Depend upon it, there is a much simpler account of the origin of language nearer home than is implied in miracle. One of the greatest charms that pertains to tracing the hand of the Divine consists in finding out His *suggestions* as well as His gifts.

The "inspiration" view of the origin of language requires one to believe that man enjoyed this peculiar and eminently grand privilege—the privilege which distinguished him at first, and which still continues to distinguish him as a rational creature—without being called upon to exert those reasoning faculties by which he was enabled to raise himself in all other respects so much above the level of the brute. The human mind is unintelligible if we do not place language within it as an ingenerate power,—destitute of this power man is no longer man. It awoke with the first play of human consciousness. If man is to be considered as having learned a Divinely-given language, it must at all events be granted that he had reason wherewith to learn it, and if able to learn, why, then he was quite as certainly able to construct for himself. If to some persons it be incomprehensible how man could invent language; much more incomprehensible is it to profounder thinkers that the human intellect should have become what it is without having constructed language during its upgrowth. Language in its simpler state is the natural result of the first act of reason; in its completeness it is the *chef-d'œuvre* of the human mind. Of what period in its history can it be said of the mind of man, "Here it commenced

its operations, and not before," if that period be not identified with the beginning of its construction of language? If the mind can proceed, why could it not begin? It is as much a part of our original aptitude to employ the tongue and the voice in the articulations which have their final result in speech as it is to devote the limbs to walking and working. Utterance is as much a part of essential human nature as chirping is of sparrow nature. Man was from the first moment of his existence a free, active, and rational being, intended and qualified to help himself to all that he needed, and language was the centre of his intellectual gravitation. The most resolute champion of the "Divine origin" must perforce confess that there is nothing to help him in Scripture. If anything is to be extracted from the sacred record, it bears rather in the contrary direction: "God brought the beasts to Adam to see what he would call them. So Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowls of the air, and to every beast of the field." By the Divine conversing or "talking" with Adam, of course is not to be understood the employment of articulate words. Here we have a striking illustration of the importance of discriminating between the figurative and the literal. God does not converse with man in the oral language of the material world; when He speaks to him, it is through the medium of the conscience. Besides, if these remarkable statements are to be understood literally, the "serpent" must be supposed to have gone shares in the vocabulary thought to have been given, or how could it have talked to Eve?

The popular leaning to the idea of the Divine origina-

tion of language may be referred to two causes,—personal indolence, and the absurdity of the hypotheses which have been put forth by way of explanation on the other side. On a subject the early history of which is so exceedingly remote, and which is beset by so many difficulties, the widespread contentedness with ignorance which is glad to excuse itself upon any plea whatever from exertion, especially when the excuse has the savour of piety, takes refuge, very naturally, in that ancient and comprehensive argument,

Διὸς δ' ἔτελείετο βουλή
 (“The will of God decreed it.”—*Iliad* i. 5).

To do this is so very much more easy and convenient than to meet the question as one within the compass of human reason and investigation, that no one can wonder at its being the favourite mode of procedure. But to ascribe to miracle or to the immediate activity of the Creator whatever appearances or occurrences, either in the moral or natural world, are not amenable to immediate explanation, is absolute and total abnegation of the very first principles of Christian philosophy. The alternative of the Divine origination is *not* found in the absurd hypotheses that have been advanced on the human origin side.

Language, according to some of these hypotheses, commenced with an unintelligible gabble, a painful and senseless jargon, a fantastic mixture of interjections and of the names of beasts and birds, the latter founded upon their natural cries. The hypotheses in question are those which one of the greatest of modern philologists has well designated the “bow-wow” and the

“pooh-pooh.”* These, however, as just said, are *not* the alternative. The human origination does not by any means imply a slow and wearisome process, requiring ages for its full accomplishment. There is not the slightest need to suppose that language arose piecemeal and fragmentarily, much less that it consisted in the beginning of a few childish imitations of animals’ cries. We shall see presently that it came forth at once, the inevitable joint-product of the senses and of the living consciousness of man—that wonderful centrifugal faculty by means of which he diffuses himself throughout the universe. Not that the language of the first members of mankind was as vast and complex as to-day’s. The necessities of the early inhabitants of the earth must not be measured by what is required by enlightened Englishmen. Take even the rich and elaborate language of a nation that did not come into existence until many ages had passed away, that of the ancient Greeks. How many words are now in daily use which, with all their learning and civilization, the Greeks neither employed or had occasion for, being ignorant of the things which they denote—iodine, printing, the microscope, and a thousand others. Even at the present day, in England, the vocabulary of an uneducated man bears only a very small proportion to that of an accomplished one. To the former, seven-eighths of the English language is non-existent. The fewness of the terms that suffice for mere social intercourse, and for the ordinary wants of the physical life, is scarcely imaginable till they are reckoned up. As a medium of social communication,

* Max Müller, “Lectures on the Science of Language,” p. 361, 1862.

language, though limited and slender, was probably complete and coherent at its birth. The first of the concentric circles produced on the surface of still water by the touch of the bird as it skims across is no less perfect as a circle than the last, though in comparison its area be minute and scarcely visible. In this old familiar phenomenon we have a very pretty emblem of the commencement and subsequent growth of language. Certain natural laws induced the beginning, and the expansion was governed by the same, for laws are uniform in their operation; and as there is no limit to which the aqueous circles may undulate, provided there be no mechanical obstructions, so is there no limit to the growth of language, as experience daily proves. Language, with the first members of mankind, as with ourselves, grew with their growth, and strengthened with their strength. Words would be contrived in the degree that they were wanted, and grammatical forms evolved contemporaneously with the aspiration after fixed rules.

Though in the highest degree improbable that the Almighty gave language to mankind by "inspiration," of course it is not to be denied that He *may* have done so. In the absence of all written evidence, the actual origin of articulate language, like that of man himself, must for ever remain unknown. "Whether man," says Dr. Wm. Smith, "being originally endowed with the power of speech, gradually formed language, stimulated by his instincts for social life, and guided by his intellectual powers:—or whether language, and not the bare faculty of speech, was conferred on him by the same power which called him into being, are questions that cannot be answered." Doubtless there is a measure of truth

even in the most strongly asserted inspiration view, for "a man hath nothing but what is given him." This, however, is all that can be claimed for it. The author of the "Vestiges" would be hard to controvert when he says that "if it were possible that poetry, sculpture, language, could be utterly banished and forgotten, yet in a short time they would all spring up again, because these things are natural products of the human mind."

CHAPTER II.

ASSUMING, then, that man constructed language, by what means or process is it probable that he effected this great work? To complete and consolidate the theory of the human origination, of course we want the *modus operandi*. If it can be proved that terms, first for physical objects, secondly for emotions and abstract ideas, could readily have been contrived by the early members of society, the requirements of the argument will be met. The contrivance of such terms is perfectly compatible with the human faculties and powers, and eminently congenial to human aptitudes. How men have actually conducted themselves on particular occasions, in the absence of any positive and authentic record, it is obviously impossible to pronounce with certainty, especially in such an inquiry as the present, when the period of the events is so very distant. It is easy, however, to determine how they are *likely* to have proceeded, and there is no danger of getting astray when the inquiry is conducted under the guidance of the following considerations:—(1) the physical circumstances by which the parties were surrounded; (2) their probable mental capacity; and (3)

the known laws of human action, as learned from history and experience, the laws of mind being as fixed as those of matter. The facts which lie *within* the limits of historical and psychological knowledge constitute a quite admissible basis of reasoning with reference to the facts which lie *beyond* those limits. All past things in language may be explained by reference to causes which are still in operation, and which have been so by continuity from the very beginning.

(1). *The external physical circumstances.*—Whatever may be meant by the Garden of Eden, there can be no doubt that, in the days of the first members of the human race, the complexion of nature generally was exactly as at present. There is not the remotest reason for supposing that the sun then shone more gloriously, or that the brooks rippled with gentler music, that the birds of its ancient spring-times sang more cheerily, or that the sea rolled more grandly. There were palm-trees in the east, and oak-trees and woodbine and bluebells in the west. The seasons were the same. April—

“a primrose coronal
Circling her sunny temples,”

and autumn with its golden fruitage and many-coloured woods. The stars were in the sky, Orion and the Pleiades “shedding sweet influence ;” the rainbow and the aurora were as now.

“ There is not lost
One of earth’s charms ; upon her bosom yet,
After the flight of untold centuries,
The freshness of her far beginning lies.”

We to-day, on the converse, possess nothing different from what the primevals enjoyed ; the world is nowhere

more beautiful or significant than it was 6000 years ago—

“the sun of Homer shines upon us still.”

The eyes and hearts that delighted in these things were probably many. The human race probably existed from the very beginning as a community. Such at least appears to be the teaching of Scripture, taking its statements, as most people are disposed to accept them, in the plain and straightforward literal sense. “Adam,” though ordinarily considered exclusively a proper name, or, at most, the Biblical word for *a* man, or *the* man, is primarily and essentially a collective term, signifying what in English is expressed by the word “mankind,” *i.e.* man in general, both men and women. It has the same meaning in Hebrew that *ἄνθρωπος* had among the Greeks, as opposed to *ἄνθρωπος*, and that *homo* had among the Romans, as opposed to *vir*, the Hebrew word corresponding to *ἄνθρωπος* and *vir* being *אָדָם* (*cesh*). The latter word has a feminine form, *cesha*, literally “she-man,” but “adam” has no feminine form; neither has it any plural, being in itself already a plural in sense. “So God,” says the record, “created adam in his own image; male and female created he *them*.” That in other passages Adam appears to stand as the name of an individual is quite true. The probability is that Genesis contains two distinct narratives, perhaps more than two; one stating the Divine origin of the human race in general terms, the other the Divine origin of that particular branch of the human family the annals of which were destined to become so sacred and momentous, the final event being the birth into the material world of our

Lord Himself. The command to be fruitful and multiply appears before any mention is made of Eve; and what is said about Cain and about Lamech seems to indicate the existence of human beings of families other than "Adam's." The Pauline expressions in Rom. v. 19, and 1 Cor. xv. 22, 45, do not in the least interfere with the idea of an original community, when the full meaning of those expressions is recognized, and the reasons for their being employed are sought from unbiassed principles. Of course it is quite possible that mankind may have commenced in a single pair. But the weight of evidence and probability is quite on the other side. Dr. Pye Smith remarked long ago that "the origination of all mankind from a single pair cannot be proved from Scripture."* Let no one imagine that the plurality view is *necessary* to the support of the doctrine of the human origination of language. The latter stands upon its own independent merits.

The difference between *adam* and *eesh* is admirably illustrated in the use made of their equivalents in the classical languages. When St. Peter, discoursing upon the duties of wives, tells them to be in subjection to their husbands, τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, he adds that still, instead of outward adorning, they must put on "the hidden man of the heart," ὁ κρυπτός τῆς καρδίας ἄνθρωπος, *i.e.* the proper heaven-seeking nature of a human being. Cicero, when his daughter Tullia was on her deathbed, told her she could not expect to be immortal because she was a *homo*. Elsewhere he describes Metellus as "nobilissimus homo, et optimus vir." The want of corresponding

* "Relation between the Holy Scriptures and some parts of Geological Science," ed. 1852, note E.

terms in the English language is one of its defects. The nearest approach to them is found in the adjectives "manly" and "humane," which answer to the Latin *virilis* and *humanus*. In the English version, both of the Old Testament and the New, the defect in question is often very strikingly disclosed.

(2). *The probable mental capacity* of the framers of oral language. Whether many, or only two, it can hardly be doubted that the first members of mankind were intelligent and active-minded individuals. The notion held in days gone by that the first members of the human race were governed only by the instincts which they shared with the brutes—that, in a word, they were "savage"—is utterly unsupported by evidence, and is contrary to recorded experience. That which is "savage" tends to decay rather than to endure and grow; instead of developing it declines; the start of an immortality such as that of the intelligence of the human race must have been admirable indeed. Every relic of the primeval ages attests the vividness and the enthusiasm of the impulses and the impressions of the men who lived during their lapse; the mythologies alone, antique fragments even in the days of the *Iliad*, showed that man in his earliest breathings stepped forth a poet. Go back as far as we will we cannot reach a time or find a country where man was *not* a poet. Everything goes to show that the human mind, a Jupiter in its maturer days, began life as an Apollo, his lyre already strung.

(3). *The known laws of human action*.—That men act in similar ways when urged by similar necessities, and while exposed to similar perils, needs no illustration. In regard to language it remains therefore only to inquire how

men have proceeded in contriving the forms of speech which exist at the present day among those nations of the earth which represent its highest intelligence. The history of these forms of speech is, in all probability, the history, so far as concerns the laws of their life and development, of the tongues which preceded them. The vocabulary actually framed by the first members of mankind is of course wholly undiscoverable; we may determine pretty nearly, nevertheless, after what manner it was made by considering how vocabularies have been constructed in times nearer our own. Like ourselves, the primevals were surrounded by objects which would constantly call their faculties into play, and excite feelings which they would desire to express, for it must be remembered that He who gave the intellect to reflect, and the lips to utter, gave also the *voluntas* to communicate. The instruments of speech were ready; the corporeal powers and functions were adequate, and the intellectual capacities were ample: why should not the development of their faculties be as rapid as we are assured our own would be under similar conditions? And why should not a mode of becoming orally intelligible result as certainly as we may be confident would be the case with ourselves?

CHAPTER III.

THE first step taken in the construction of language would be to mould the sounds produced by external nature into articulate vocables which would become the names of the particular objects emitting them. Under the laws of analogy, these names would then be passed on to objects which do not produce sound. In the third and last place, these very same primitive vocables would be passed on, under the guidance of the still greater law which Lord Bacon terms the "respon-*dence of nature,*" to emotions, feelings, and sentiments. Man is in every respect a *progressive* being. He gathers his first impressions from surrounding physical objects; he denominates them as well as he can, by imitating with his vocal organs the sounds which he hears them emit; by - and - by, as his intellectual and moral faculties come into play, they find utterance in metaphors derived from the organs of sensation. This is the entire and very simple principle of language; imitation begins, metaphor continues and completes the noble work. Man is an imitator and an analogist by instinct. Gifted as he is, at the same time, with the power of utterance, language follows as a matter of course. Intuitively also he perceives Lord Bacon's

“respondences,”—the original harmonies between things natural and things spiritual. When we find Homer, Sophocles, Virgil, Chaucer, Shakspeare, Burns, Coleridge, connecting human sympathies with the phenomena of objective nature, after precisely the same manner, who shall question for a moment that those harmonies are a part of the very life and essence of God’s creation, immutable and immortal, present, consequently, in all their fulness, to the fathers of our race? In order to frame metaphysical language the first members of mankind had simply to notice and refer to those harmonies, and this they did as a part of their inevitable daily habitude. They would need no reflection or conference one with another, because all would perceive the same things, and view them in the same manner. This second part of the process of constructing language would in truth be the easier of the two, consisting merely in the new application of physical terms already in constant employment.

To connect and intelligibly marshal the words would be quite as easy as to frame them. Grammar has its prototype in the external world just as names, and the appellations of emotions and ideas, have theirs. No “part of speech” has been arbitrarily contrived. Nothing has grown up in independence so thorough of the aids of scholastic science as Language. Grammar exists in language because already in the system of the external or material world. Existence, quality, and number, the images and counterparts of sex and gender, the relations of time and space, possession, action, passivity, are all prefigured in it, and all enter into language, necessarily, because language appropriates for its glossary the objects

with which they are identified. The relation of the sunshine to the river, and of the river to the sunshine; the trees bending in the wind; the wind itself, in its many moods; the ancient mountains, standing so still and solemn; the sailing of the clouds in the sky; the repose of the shadows in the water; the leaves, flowers, and fruits, as they mark the changes of the seasons;—these, and the thousand other lovely and ever-speaking phenomena of nature, while they kindle in our souls the sense of beauty, and thereby nourish and freshen our affections, at the same moment unite in depicting to the mind's eye a living syntax, as perfect in its scheme and measure as its elements are charming and diversified. On a nearer view, the material world is thus perceived to be the source and prefigurement of language in a much wider and larger sense than is indicated in the mere furnishing of words. In nature there is not only the whole *form*, but the entire *method* of language; each resides in it, moreover, not as an accidental tenant, but as an inalienable property of the very fabric of nature, born with its own being. On the one hand, ages before there were any spoken words, their prototypes were spread out like flowers in unvisited valleys:—upon the other, while the office and mutual bearing of noun, and verb, and adjective, were yet to be discovered, day unto day was uttering speech, night unto night showing knowledge; their line was gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.

That language commenced with man's imitating natural sounds is the central point of most of the hypotheses above spoken of as constituting, with some of the many writers upon the subject, the alternative of

the Divine origin. In the crude and ridiculous form in which the doctrine has usually been put, it might well be abhorrent to the pious, and justly called down upon itself the facetious designation bestowed by Max Müller, who terms it the "bow-wow theory." The "bow-wow theory" may without hesitation be laughed at heartily. Let us be careful only, during our merriment, that we do not laugh at the great verities of which it is the effigy and caricature: the absurdities referred to in a sally that amuses the flippant are not to be confounded with philosophical truths. Listen also to what is said by Professor Key: "Oral language we might almost infer, *a priori*, originated in an attempt to imitate, by the organs of the human voice, those different sounds which nature, in her animate and inanimate forms, is constantly presenting to our ears. By his powers of articulation, man could imitate those sounds at pleasure, and thus recall to the minds of those around him, the notions of absent objects and past actions with which those sounds were connected. . . . That such must have been the origin of spoken language, reason would seem to point out, and the investigation of the subject strongly sustains the theory. We see pretty clearly at least how the discovery of language *may* have been made, perhaps how it actually *was* made."* Regarded as the Divine scheme for enabling man to qualify himself for conversation with his fellow-creatures, how elegant and finished, yet how simple withal, is this arrangement! God's wonderful works are not the less wonderful because effected by simple contrivances:—on the contrary, they become, to thinking men, so much the more

* The Alphabet, p. 18, 1844.

admirable. We should do well to cultivate the habit of recognizing God's emphasis as much *in* nature as in what is vaguely called beyond or above nature ; in the facts of everyday life as much as in "miracles." The unpretending yet incomparable arrangements instituted for the daily working out of the intentions of His benevolent and far-seeing providence, are far more delightful than the supernatural, and of these arrangements we have nowhere a more striking example than is furnished in the birth and expansion of human language.

CHAPTER IV.

THE Indo-Germanic languages are built up on fundamental words called *roots* or *bases*, and in all probability the primitive language of mankind was so far exactly their antetype. In the polished languages of literature, and in all very composite modern tongues, this fact is somewhat obscured, except to the scholar, the vocabularies having usually been derived from two or three older languages, and the words having often undergone considerable change in form. The determination of their root-words is thus frequently difficult, and always requires an extensive knowledge of comparative philology. The English language, for instance, though mainly a modification of the Anglo-Saxon, contains a large number of words derived from the old Norman French; others imported, more or less directly, from the Greek and Latin, with others which in origin are oriental or Scandinavian. To get at the roots of our everyday speech we thus have to search in many different directions. It remains true that the various words in daily employ do most certainly rest upon roots; and the less elaborated and the less composite a language is, the more obvious this becomes.

Take, for example, the English words witty, wise, wisdom, a wizard, a witch, a witling, a witness, the wits. All these have been developed in course of time from the radical Anglo-Saxon verb *witan*, to know, still preserved in the abbreviated form employed in legal writings, "to wit." It occurs also in the fine old Scriptural phrase, "Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?" The variation, in some of the derivatives, from the *t* of the original *witan*, to *s* or *z*, does not invalidate or in the least degree affect the fact of the common origin; changes of this nature, called by etymologists the "permutation" of sounds or letters, being, as will presently be shown, one of the oldest accustomed phenomena of language. The old Greek name for the honey-bee was indifferently *melissa* and *melitta*. A familiar parallel case is found in the abbreviation of the name Elizabeth, which is either Bessie or Betty. Take again the English words mission, missionary, missive, missile, and the numerous compounds made by prefixing a preposition to *mit*, such as omit, permit, remit, commit, intermit, submit, with their own respective offspring, omission, permission, remittance, committal, etc. etc. These are all referable to the Latin verb *mitto*, I send, and have similarly grown up, like a man's family of children—in course of time. Brought together in this manner, words show themselves to be by no means solitary and independent creations, but, as a rule, enlargements and variations of primary genetic words, derived originally perhaps from some older language, perhaps immediately from some tone of nature. In a highly-developed language the words, taken in the mass, are like the foliage of a beautiful wood. Looked

at as a whole, the various shapes and colours of the innumerable leaves blend and intermingle indistinguishably. We are conscious only of a rich aggregate of living charm, and the sources whence they derive their being are invisible. But when individualized, carefully traced from twig to branch, from branch to bough, and from the boughs to the stem, the parent trees are found to be comparatively few, and the botanist will show that the distinct genera and species are still fewer. To call the primitive or fundamental words of language its *roots*, is thus to employ a metaphor eminently and instinctively true to the perennial analogies of nature. "How," says the poet, "can a tree live without its root?"

In an ancient and uncompounded language, not much indebted to previous languages, the number of root-words, or primitives, would of course be much less than in a highly-compounded modern one. The presumption that there would be fewer is borne out by what is observable in, for example, both the Greek and the Hebrew. Remarkable as the language of Homer is for plenteousness of vocabulary, all the words contained in it are referable to a few hundred parental ones. Contemplating this obvious fact, namely, that words exist not so much as individuals, as members of groups of words, which groups rest upon roots; considering, also, how few root-words would be required to furnish a vocabulary sufficient for the purposes of the early members of mankind, it becomes evident that to satisfy our minds as to the possibility of language being a human achievement, we have merely to inquire whether an adequate collection of *root*-words could readily be formed by man, by virtue of his own intellectual

powers and vocal aptitudes. If he could fashion a sufficiency of *roots*, all the rest would follow as a matter of natural sequence. It seems tolerably plain that such a collection *could* be formed, and most easily, and that it would be the inevitable result of the contact of the senses and the mind of man with objective nature—in other words, of his imitating and adapting to his own purposes the sounds of nature above adverted to. What were these sounds specifically? Even without reckoning the infinite capacity for modulation of the human voice (which, as regards the inarticulate and untutored expression of the feelings, is of course to be regarded as one of the prime fountains of “natural sounds”), those which are associated simply with the inanimate part of creation, and with the lower forms of life, are themselves as numerous and suggestive as they are beautiful. Hence they form one of the most charming attributes of the country, filling it with melody at all seasons, and giving vitality and cheerfulness to the remotest and loneliest wilds. Doubtless to thousands of the dwellers in towns and cities the sounds in question are nearly or quite unknown. The possessions of such are of another order altogether. But the lover of nature in her freedom knows full well the changing intonations of the sea, the gentle rustle of the leaves when the wind visits the dells, and the heavy rushing when it moves the tall and sturdy pines. He is acquainted with the “courteous echo;” with the dash of the waterfall; with the purl, the ripple, the gush, the gurgle of the “unreposing brooks.” He needs not to be told of the song of the various kinds of birds, or of the hum of insects in the sultry air of summer. They are sounds, every one of them, which fall upon his

ear as tones of true music, and with the sweetness and familiarity of a sister's sunny laugh.

“ Deinde satis fluvium inducit, rivosque sequentes ;
 Et, cum exustus ager morientibus æstuat herbis,
 Ecce, supercilio clivosi tramitis undam
 Elicit. *Illa cadens raucum per levia murmur*
 Saxa ciet, scatebrisque arentia temperat arva.”

“ He lay along
 Under an oak, whose antique root peeps out
 Above the stream that *brawls* along this wood.”

“ As one whose drought
 Yet scarce allayed, still eyes the current stream,
 Whose liquid *murmur* heard, new thirst excites.”

“ *Bubbling* from the base
 Of the cleft statue, with a gentle leap
 The rill runs o'er, and round, fern, flowers, and ivy creep.

“ Yet as if grieving to efface
 All vestige of the human race,
On that lone shore loud moans the sea.”

Thus, before a single vocable was constructed, the entire substance of language lay latent in nature. The woods, the sea, the mountains, birds, animals, every created object, both animate and inanimate, was ready to supply its quota so soon as the world's lord and chief ornament should be introduced and assert his claim. Everything lay ready, biding the time when, in the order of Divine Providence, man should want it. Animals told him what to call them in their cries : if it were an inanimate object, such as the sea, or the wind, or a fountain, that he wished to designate, then he would take the sound it produced at the time being ; if it were an object always and altogether silent and mute, then he would name it by virtue of some resemblance to a vocal one. These various

sounds, including his own ejaculations, would furnish materials, as above implied, for the *root*-words. Having got these, he would be provided, under the law of the natural harmonies between things material and things spiritual, with the means of adverting to the emotions of his own being—hope, love, joy, sorrow, fear, etc. and the roots would give rise, just as *witan* and *mitto* have done in modern times, to constantly multiplying groups of articulate and expressive vocables. The words thus framed would be immediately accepted by the individual to whom they were addressed. The very same principles, relations, and circumstances which opened an easy way to the speaker, would contribute to make him perfectly intelligible to the listener. Considered in reference to language—especially that portion of it which is required to denote emotions, thoughts, and sentiments—the world would thus continually prove itself to the fathers of human speech, a repertory of picturesque and delightful symbols, adapted to render audible and pleasing what would otherwise have been no more than mystery. How beautiful and benevolent an institution! Worthy indeed, of God, such pupils as mankind, and a school for them so glorious as the world of nature.

What particular sounds would be first made use of as the elements of words it is manifestly impossible to say. Indeed it may safely be concluded that no one class of sounds would be selected to commence with, and that when these had been employed, another set would be taken, and so on with the various kinds in succession; for this would imply not only an exact and complete foreknowledge, on the part of the framers of language, of the entire work that had to be accomplished, but also

an intimate familiarity with the whole of the sounds which nature yields. So far from this being the case, the only idea of language possible to the framers of its rudiments would be the one which they would form from their individual and existing necessities. The several kinds of sounds would be adopted *indiscriminately*. They would be taken from one source at this moment, from another source at the next, according to their suitability or adaptedness to meet the specific desire or necessity of the would-be speaker, his object being of course to make *himself* understood, and not to provide materials for the language of future generations, though all the while he was unconsciously doing so. It is very well for modern philologists to classify sounds, and to observe their relation to language *as developed*; but man, when *constructing* language, would recognise nothing more than their individual values, and these he would at once apply to his immediate purposes.

Employing the sounds of nature in the way indicated, man would utilize every department of it almost at once. There was no period when language consisted simply of interjections, or of the names of brute creatures. Nothing can be more inconsistent and unreasonable than to suppose that man—the animal which has always manifested the largest amount of intellectual capacity, should in the beginning have possessed the very least; for this necessarily involved in the idea that there was a period when dogs could bark, and monkeys chatter, and man at the same time be unable to do anything but mock them.

The various tongues of which philology takes cognizance abound with words which were evidently framed

exactly in this way. Whether they were transmitted from the first framers of language to the nations in whose speech we now find them, coming down from the primitive times to the later, and to the existing ones, in the way that ideas, manners, and customs have done ; or whether they have been constructed during what may be called, for distinction-sake, the historical times, of course it is impossible to decide. Probably there are among them both primeval words and relatively modern ones. Finding them, as we do, in the most ancient of all known languages, as well as in those of later date, the fact is indubitably established that such a mode of framing words was in use in the earliest times of which there is authentic knowledge ; and if in *these*, there can be no objection to assuming that the usage was by inheritance from the times up to which secular history does not reach. In the languages which appear to illustrate in the best manner the processes of the universal human mind when enlarging and expanding its vehicle of communication, it is clear also that these words have served, very extensively, the purpose of roots or bases.

CHAPTER V.

THE words in any language, whether ancient or modern, which obviously point to the primitive sounds of nature, are called *onomatopæias*. It is not to be supposed, however, that a natural sound is always imitated in human speech in precisely the same manner; still less, that when represented in alphabetic characters, the written symbols of that sound will always correspond. We must not expect to find the same original onomatopœtic forms everywhere. The sounds of nature are like the gems which lie embedded in the earth. Man finds and takes possession of them, then cuts, polishes, and manipulates them according to his own particular aptitudes or genius. The people who originally adopted those sounds imitated them as best they could: differences of imitative utterance would of necessity soon arise, and hence it would inevitably come to pass that the actual source would often be lost sight of, and that when the word came to be written down, the sense alone would in many cases be all that remained to prove its origin. It is not to be supposed either that the root-words of any given tongue, even a very ancient one, are as a matter of course always plainly referable to the sounds of nature. This is very markedly the case

with Sanscrit, and on this account Schlegel doubts, if he does not actually deny, the onomatopœtic origin of language. But Sanscrit itself was only a derivative tongue: it is a highly polished one, and the onomatopœias on which its roots doubtless rest in no trifling measure, are transformed and concealed. Nor, in the third place, is it to be supposed that every word in a language, even in the tongues which supply the strongest evidence, can be shown to be of onomatopœtic origin. No school of etymologists pretends to explain the derivation of *all* words. The argument is simply that in the conspicuous we may fairly assume there is a truthful clue to the concealed. When the conspicuous is fairly contemplated, the wonder rather is that instead of denying the onomatopœtic theory, there should be the slightest unwillingness to accept it.

The most obvious onomatopœias are the names of animals founded upon their peculiar cries or notes. Birds in general were called, for instance, by the ancient Hebrews, *tsippōrīm*, or, as we should say in English, "the twitterers." This is the name by which they are mentioned in the enumeration of the living things taken by Noah into the ark. The turtle-dove the Hebrews called *tōr*, as in that lovely spring picture in the Song of Solomon—

" For lo, the winter is past,
The rain is over and gone,
The flowers appear on the earth,
The time of the singing of birds is come,
And the voice of the *turtle* is heard in our land."

In Greek such names are numerous. One of the most striking is the Greek name for the frog, *βάτραχος*,

literally, the crier of *τραχ! τραχ!* or, as we should say in English, "the croaker." The grasshopper the Greeks called *τεττιξ*. Different kinds of birds were designated by them for the same reason, *στριγξ*, *κίχλη*, *καύαξ*, and *κικκάβη*, and the humming-bee they called *βομβύλη*. Theocritus has a very beautiful line:—

"ὦδε καλὸν βομβεῖντι ποτὶ σμάνεσσι μέλισσαι."—I. 107.

The bull, after the same manner, was called by the Greeks, *βους*, or the sounder of *boo!* The verb designating this creature's roar was *μυκαω*. The onomatopœias of the Latin language bear an exceedingly close resemblance to those of the Greek, rendering it tolerably certain, in connection with other evidence, that they were derived from some earlier vocable which furnished both. The Latin *bombus*, the humming-bee, *bos*, the bull, and *musca*, the buzz-fly, have unmistakable affinities with the names these creatures bore in ancient Athens.

In the languages of modern Europe onomatopœic names of animals occur but seldom. The reason of there being so few, comparatively speaking, is that in course of time almost all the creatures familiar to civilized man have either had descriptive or metaphorical names bestowed on them, these superseding the original onomatopœic ones; or else they received their names at first on descriptive or metaphorical principles. In many cases, again, the original onomatopœic names have suffered vicissitudes so heavy during their transmission from one generation to another, and from one race to another, especially where there has been no literature to protect them, that although extant, they are completely metamorphosed. Examples of names which still plainly

declare their origin are seen in the English cuckoo, peewit, chiff-chaff, and corn-crake, and in the French *hibou*. Most of these run through many different languages.

But if onomatopœtic *names* occur but seldom, the principle before us is abundantly illustrated in the terms applied to the sounds which animals ordinarily produce. In English we speak of the hissing of serpents, the cawing of rooks, and the grunting of pigs. We say also that a cat mews, and that it purrs; and that dogs whine, bark, growl, yelp, and snarl. Nearly all these words are familiarly employed also in the metaphorical sense, the figurative use showing exactly how such terms would become available, with the first members of mankind, for the general purposes of language. After the same manner the French say that “le bœuf *meugle*,” “le serpent *siffle*,” “le chat *miaulle*,” “la grenouille *croasse*.” To coo as a dove, they call *roucouler*; and to warble as birds, they designate by the beautiful word *gazouiller*.

The differences in the endings of these names, and in the entire spelling of many of those which are diffused through various tongues, result of course from the peculiarities of the respective languages which go shares in them. In comparing such names, allowance must also be made, as already said, for the different ideas of men as to the best mode of representing a sound by means of alphabetic characters. No two races of men write down the verbal image of a sound exactly in the same manner. And in addition there have to be considered the changes induced under the laws of permutation of sounds and their written symbols, a subject to be dealt with presently.

Let us inquire before going further how an onomatopœtic word of this description would give rise to a variety of terms, some purely physical, others, after a little while, in the highest degree figurative or poetical. Take, for this purpose, the very ancient one still in use, which designates the howling of a brute creature. The sound in question is inarticulate, high-pitched, long drawn out, and more or less monotonous. Hence it becomes suitable, when imitated by man, and modified by his emotions, to serve a twofold purpose. According to the intonation, it may be used to represent either what we call "shouting for joy," on the one hand, or wailing, or sorrow, upon the other. In the Hebrew language this interesting root occurs in the shape of *yēlāl*, modified, on the one hand, into the first part of the jubilant shout of praise, Hallelujah, or Praise ye Jah! and serving, in the second place, to denote a cry of anguish, as in the *heylālū* of Isaiah xiii. 6, which the Authorized Version well translates Howl ye! The pure *Hallelujah* form is very properly left unaltered in the Septuagint and Vulgate renderings of the Scriptures, being uniformly copied as ἀλληλοῦν and *Alleluja*: but in the Authorized Version it is usually treated like any other word, and translated "Praise the Lord." It is from the associations connected with this sacred and solemn use of the word that we have our figurative English expressions *holy* and to *hallow*, as in "Hallowed be Thy Name." Not that these words are immediately derived from hallelujah, but from the ancient root of which hallelujah itself was one of the early offspring, and which ramified through all the languages that had their beginnings in the countries which hold the archæology of Europe,

reaching England, in the course of ages, through many different channels. They came proximately, not from the Hebrew, but through the Anglo-Saxon channel of *halig* and *halgian*. The dictionaries are accustomed to rest in the Anglo-Saxon words. This is right enough as regards the *proximate* roots. But a philosophic system of etymology never stays with the proximate. Proximate roots are like what the chemists call oxides. It may be, and doubtless is, quite sufficient for the ordinary purposes of life to be content with the lime, the soda, and the clay, but the laboratory addresses itself to the determination of the bases of those oxides, and these are found at last in the primeval metals. To stop in our researches with the proximate roots of words, is to stop at the most interesting point of the inquiry. By going on we also learn how to interpret a thousand other things that at starting seemed veiled for ever. So widely and so delightfully does the ripple spread.

Passing to the Greek language, we find the root in question reappearing, as before, under two principal forms, the type-words of which are respectively ἀλαλάζω and ὄλολύξω. The latter was usually applied to cries of sorrow; the former to shouts of rejoicing or victory. The war-cries ἀλαλή! and ἔλελεῦ! with which the Grecian soldiers were accustomed to encourage one another at the commencement of battle, were modifications of the same root. Another modification was ἔλελεῦ ἰή, the shout with which the Greeks both began and ended their hymns or pæans to Apollo, just as many of the Psalms (cvi. cxiii. cxvii. cxxxv. cxlvi.-cl.) both begin and end with the equivalent Hallelujah! Pindar beautifully applies the mournful form of the word to

the quivering of harp-strings (Olymp. ix. 21), and by Theocritus it is used as a name for the nightingale (vii. 139). The Greek or Septuagint translation seeks on all occasions to preserve the distinction between the two words. Thus where the Authorized English Version renders the laudatory form by "Shout unto God!" (Ps. xlvii. 1;) "Make a joyful noise!" (Ps. lxvii. 1, lxxxviii. 1,) the Septuagint reads, ἀλαλάζατε! or ἀλαλάζατε τῷ Θεῷ! So, too, in Ps. xxxiii. 3, where the Authorized Version gives us, "Play skilfully with a loud noise," the Seventy have rendered it καλῶς ψάλατε ἐν ἀλαλαγμῷ. The howl ye! of Isaiah, on the other hand, the Septuagint well copies as ὀλολύζετε! The twofold usage of such words as the one before us is not an unusual circumstance, the expression of intense feeling often taking shapes but little different. Tears spring from exquisite joy as well as from sorrow; and misfortune when at its last extreme often finds vent in jocularly and laughter. The Greek exclamation παπαὶ or ποποι expressed, like our own *oh!* both misery and gladness.

In the Latin language this interesting old root is represented, as to its verb form, only by *ululo*, the distinction usually observed in more Eastern languages in regard to its dual form and application being by the Romans either lost sight of or disused. Virgil applies it in one place to the howling of wolves; in another to the moaning or wailing of the Oreades or nymphs of the mountains when frightened by a terrible storm. Lucan uses it to represent shouts of victory—*lætis ululare triumphis*.

The Celtic and Teutonic families of languages preserve this old root in various derivatives. Through the

Teutonic, besides hallow and holy, we have the shout of welcome or laudation—hail! as in “Hail, King of the Jews!” It is the root also of *holla* and *halloo*—

“List, list, I hear
Some far-off halloo break the distant air.”

Through the permutation of the *l* into *r* it is the root likewise of *hurrah!* It is the basis, too, of *yule*, the old name of Christmas (*geol* in Anglo-Saxon), just as the ancient festival of the Scandinavians called *iulfest* was named from *iolen*, one of the Northern shapes which this fecund word assumed. The sorrowful utterance survives among us in “wail,” cognate with which is *yell*. The Greek and Latin words for a wood or forest, *ῥλη* and *silva*, rest, there can be little doubt, as regards their ultimate root, upon the same old onomatopœia, each signifying, literally, “the place of howling.” Woods and forests in ancient times abounded with howling creatures, just as they do at the present day in countries where civilization has not extinguished them. The Greek *ῥλη* appears in Latin as *silva* through the retention in the latter word of the digamma, as in *oliva* compared with *ἐλαία*, *ovum* compared with *ὄων*, and many other pairs of congenerate words; and by the exchange of the aspirate for an *s*, just as in *serpo* compared with *ἐρπω*, and *sudor* compared with *ῥδωρ*.

CHAPTER VI.

ANOTHER illustration of a sound produced by a brute creature giving rise, little by little, to an immense progeny of words, thus exemplifying how, in the beginning, language would spring to the lips of mankind as fast as needed by his expanding intellect, appears to be supplied in the great group of which "intellect" itself is a member. There is no positive evidence; perhaps it is only a coincidence; if so, it is still a very curious one, but on looking into Hebrew, the act which to-day we call the *licking*, lapping, or gathering up of fluid by quadrupeds, is designated by the very obvious onomatopœia, *lāqaq*. This is the word used to describe the licking up of Ahab's blood by the dogs (1 Kings xxii. 38). In the same very ancient language, the gathering up of the manna by the Israelites, and the gleaning of the corn by Ruth, is expressed by the word *lāqat*. Can it be a mere coincidence that in Greek and Latin the word for "to gather up" is *lego*? How beautifully this latter word is used by Ovid: *Sæpe legit flores*—"often she gathers flowers," *i.e.* in the way that a child collects its primroses or cowslips, accumulating till the hands overflow with the lovely spoil. From *lego* come *elect*, *election*, *elector*. That which

is chosen, *selected*, and brought together, is said to be *collected*. A company of picked or assembled students is a "college." A *résumé* of our thoughts, a going over and bringing them to a focus, is *recollection*. These latter words come proximately from the compound *colligo*, which through the French *cueillir* gives the verb to *cull*. That which is suited for culling or choosing is *eligible*. It is that which we *like*, i.e. pick out in preference, and which is spoken of as *likely*, as in "a likely boy." The picked out is called the *eclectic*. *Eligo*, a compound of *e* and the verb, has also supplied the word *elegant*, literally the thing which on account of its merit is most deserving of choice. The congenerate word *lego* in the classical tongues further signifies to *read*, because reading is a gathering up or collecting of words, the representatives, in writing, of ideas and thoughts. In reference to this particular sense are derived from it *legible*, that which is easily read, *illegible*, that which we cannot read. Compare the very interesting parallel phrase in English, "I *gather* from what you say." From reading or gathering up on our own private behalf, the expression naturally transfers itself, or passes on, to reading aloud to other people. Hence *lecture*, the discourse which is read, and *lectern*, the place in which the minister reads the *lessons* for the day, "lessons" being yet another descendant, and very expressive when applied to what a child learns or gathers out of its school-books. From reading aloud the metaphor passes on in turn to *speaking*. Hence the great cluster of words to which the way is led in the first place, by *λογος*, as logic, dialogue, loquacious, colloquy, eloquent, elocution, these last coming through the avenue of *loquor*. With the prefix *inter*, the same proximate

root gives us *intellect*, *intellectual*, *intelligence*, *intelligible*. Intellect, therefore, is that which enables us to "choose between" things, that is to say, after regarding them steadfastly, to pick out the best. Intelligible denotes that which we can gather up and make use of. To "mistake" Cicero calls *male intelligere*, to "choose badly." By prefixing *dis* or *di* was formed the Latin *diligo*, to esteem highly, literally, as in the preceding cases, to pick out or choose, that which we select being that which we intuitively most value. Hence the beautiful word *dilectus*, "beloved"—

"Anna refert, O luce magis dilecta sorori!"—*Æn.* 4, 31.

Delight, delightful, delectable, delectation, are other forms of the same charming metaphor. The "heart's delight" is the thing it has chosen or singled out—that for which it has a natural predilection. That which from preference we choose or select, we are attentive to; *ubi cor, ibi fides*. Hence *diligence*, literally active gathering up of that which pleases. Apprized of this, what ampler significance in Shakspeare's beautiful verse—

"Many a time
The harmony of their tongues hath into bondage
Brought my too diligent ear."

Neglect and *negligence* are from *nec lego*, and signify to abstain from choosing or gathering up, thus to be inattentive.

Among many other curious procedures in the construction of language has frequently been what philologists call the "insertion" of a letter; a sound, that is to say, is interpolated between two other sounds. A very familiar example of this occurs in the vulgarism

“drowned” for “drowned.” By virtue of this interpolation we find among the offspring of the ancient onomatopœia before us, *lingua*, the tongue, the member with which licking or gathering up is performed, and hence, by successive steps and changes, we have language and linguist.

Every important word in language, perhaps we may say every unimportant word as well, is after the same manner, only one of a series of words; one of a group which has arisen concurrently with the lapse of time, and every individual of which group points in its significance, and more or less clearly in its fabric, to a common original. One simple onomatopœtic base or root underlies scores of derivations, all of which preserve the primal idea in a metaphorical or figurative manner. The fact that many of the words in any such group reach us through different channels, by no means spoils or disproves the genealogy. Nor is this affected by the changes that may be superinduced upon their form. Words resemble coins; constant use and circulation almost cancel the royal profile, but they must be sadly worn indeed for their significance to be undiscoverable. Words, in short, as the examples of root and offspring above given will have made evident, are not, like the sands of the sea, unconnected and independent atoms, but things that cohere in family clusters after precisely the same manner as human beings, the successive extensions, transfers, and metaphorical applications producing in the end, variety in unity, of the most beautiful and captivating description.

CHAPTER VII.

IT will be useful, at the present stage of our inquiry, to consider the laws of the permutation of sounds and letters referred to in the preceding chapter. These laws, and certain phenomena appertaining to etymology, not exactly reducible to order, but still of constant recurrence, enable the student to understand how it is that words of very different complexion can still be referred unhesitatingly to a common root. That there is a certain amount of relationship between lick, lego, lectern, legible, etc. cannot but be evident to the least experienced in philology, especially when the meanings are compared. And it needs very little research in order to be satisfied that elegant, eligible, recollection, delectable, etc. are relatives of lick, and that they are descended from the same primitive ancestor. Were the changes never greater than in the words that have been cited, the process of affiliation would be simple enough. But there are numbers of words undoubtedly derived from a common parent, which in course of time have become totally unlike. Such are the English *bishop* and the French *évêque*, both of which are referable to the Latin *episcopus*. So prone, indeed, are words to become altered in form, when passing from one country or

language to another, that if two words in two different languages hold precisely the same shape, the presumption is that they possess no real affinity. Even within the boundaries of our own language, the English, it is not difficult to find examples: "grave," the place of deposit of the deceased, has no connection with grave, the adjective denoting demeanour; nor has "league," a measure of distance, any connection with league, a bond or alliance. With a view to showing how these curious facts can be reconciled, and in what way the relationships of dissimilar words can be determined, this chapter will be devoted specially to the consideration of the laws adverted to. For illustration it will suffice to take words in the aggregate, or just as they happen to come, whether simple or compound, leaving to a future page what has to be said regarding the structure of the latter.

The phenomena to be considered are, first, those which fall under the general head of the permutation, or exchange, or substitution of sounds, one for another; secondly, those which include the shortening and the enlargement of words simply by the omission or the addition of a sound, the latter not being an affix or a prefix. There are likewise the singular phenomena which come of transposition.

The "permutation" or exchange of sounds is illustrated in the English *purse* as compared with the French *bourse*. Exchange of this nature appears to take place in a fixed and orderly manner, though really it does sometimes seem as if every sound could change places with every other sound. Granting this, there is still "a method in the madness." When a nation alters a particular word in a certain manner, it generally does the

same with all similar words, and thus we are furnished, so far, with a key. Seeing, for instance, that the French are apt to employ an initial *g* where in English we have an initial *w*, as in *guerre* and *war*, a clue is at once given to the French *guêpe* compared with *wasp*, to *guise* and *wise*, and many more. Spanish words derived from the Latin are prone, after the same manner, to change the initial *f* into *h*, as in *falco*=*halco*, *farina*=*harina*, *formosus*=*hermoso*. The commonest permutations, say rather, the principles upon which they rest, are set forth in the phonetic alphabet published by Mr. A. J. Ellis in or about the year 1849. In this alphabet the consonants are shown to be not so much individual and separate sounds as members of natural pairs of sounds, the respective members of every pair differing only in depth. Advancing from this fundamental and quite obvious truth to the discoveries made by the great German philologists, we learn next that the consonants possess certain cross relationships, or capacity for diagonal interchange as well. The sounds represented, for instance, in *p* and *b* are simply their light and heavy extremes. Those represented in *fe* and *ve* are again only the light and heavy extremes of the same central sound, and in the next place *p* and *b* exchange places with *fe* and *ve*. So, again, with *t* and *d*; so, again, with these, and the two sounds of *th*, as in *thin* and *thine*; so, too, with all the others in succession. The careful study of these relationships and capacities for interchange throws a flood of light upon the genealogy of innumerable words, disclosing also their common ancestry, and the fewness of the primitive roots. Under their guidance we perceive the identity of *probus* and *brave*; *habeo*, *avoir*, and

have ; elevatus and aloft ; vulgus and folk ; apicula and abeille ; cuprum, cuivre, and copper ; labium and lip ; ebur and ivory ; gubernare and govern ; duo and two ; edo and eat ; sedeo and sit ; paratus and parade ; mater, madre, and mother.

The sounds represented in the initials of Kate and gate form another of the above-mentioned natural pairs, and these in turn exchange with *ch* and *j*, and in written language are symbolized also by *q*. Hence the long list of again identical words which includes crassus and gross ; caseus and cheese ; Carolus and Charles ; caballus, cheval, cavalry, and chivalry ; carus, cherish, cheer, and caress, which last quartet, being primarily referable to cor, cœur, the heart, the metaphorical seat of the affections, beautifully illustrate spontaneous figures of speech. The substitution of *j* for *ch* is shown in a very interesting manner in cheer and jeer, the former implying approval, the latter disdain and ridicule ; while for the employment of *q* we need only look at *καλ* and que, queue and cauda. It is anticipated in the Latin aquila, whence aigle and eagle. Many words illustrate two, and even three, of these substitutions, the French aveugle, for instance, which is the Latin aboculus. Nothing is commoner than exchange of places by *v* and *w*, as to this day with the illiterate Londoner. Worth is found in virtus, wasp in vespa, wind in ventus, wine in vinum, waste in vastus, widow in vidua, worm in vermis, wolf in vulpes. *C*, when sounded like *s*, sometimes in writing changes absolutely into *s*, and *s*, as shown in the phonetic alphabet, gives way sometimes to *z*. Hence from racemus we have raisin ; and from circum, through the Italian cercare, to go round inquiring for a person,

chercher in French, our English verb to "search." Trance is from transitus, employed figuratively to denote the being carried away, as it were, into another state of existence. Compare also placeo, plaisir, and pleasure; nasus and nez; lacerta and lizard; ace and εἶς. The ace of diamonds at cards is literally the *one* of diamonds. In Italian *ch* often represents the initial Latin *cl*, as in chiamare=clamare, whence the English chime, literally that which calls to the place of worship. Of course it is not intended to imply that the various English words above cited are directly derived from the Latin ones beside which they stand. Some of them are so; others have reached us through independent channels. They are cited simply to indicate the general nature of the verbal affinities under consideration, and to which we are guided by the law of permutation.

Very interesting examples occur again in connection with the four liquids, *l, m, n, r*. Here we find the beautiful French word for the nightingale, rossignol, which is the same as the Latin lusciniola. Pilgrim is through the French pelegrin, from peregrinus—per ager; thus literally denoting the traverser of the fields. Lily, lilium, and λείριον are the same word; plum and prunus are also the same.

Looking particularly at the language of Homer, innumerable old Greek words are shown by the law of permutation, with the help of the signification, to be no more than early forms of the Latin, French, and English ones which denote the same objects. Compare, for example, θεός, deus, dieu, and deity; ὑπερ and over; φελλός and pellis; φυσα and vesica; βαίνω and venio; ἐκκλησία and église; βικίον, vicia, and vetch; φηγός,

fagus, and beech; θυγάτηρ and daughter; θύρα and door; κιθαρα and guitar, the latter received through the Spanish. When these Greek and Latin words are compared with the Sanscrit, there is disclosure yet again of the most palpable relationships. Sanscrit, the ancient language of India, though it has ceased to be spoken for many ages, survives, in fragments, in the current vernacular of modern England.

Placing the vocabularies of the Greeks and Romans side by side, *p* and *q* are often found in parallel places, and here again light is thrown on the parentage of numerous modern words. The Greeks called the horse ἵππος, the Romans called it *equus*. The Greeks said πέντε, the Romans *quinque*, which in French becomes *cing*.

After the same manner, where the Greeks had an initial *h*, in the Latin language the aspirate is superseded by an *s*. The Homeric word for the sun, ἥλιος, becomes in Latin *sol*; ἑπτα is *septem*; ὑπερ is *super*; ὅμαλος, *similis*; ἔρπω, *serpo*. The fragrant little labiate of the hills' which in English we call wild thyme, with the Greeks was ἔρπυλλον, with Virgil *serpyllum*.

The vocabularies of the Teutonic languages show permutations of yet other kinds, but still preserving a certain degree of consistency. Here the "phonetic alphabet" is a guide no longer, and the facts are gleaned only by long and patient tabulations. The Teutonic languages are, to a great extent, in their vocabularies, the Græco-Latin ones transformed. The initial *k* sound of the Latin often, for instance, in German, changes into an *h*, and many of the identical words in which this happens have, through the medium of the Anglo-Saxon, become English ones. Who would

believe, at the outset, that *caput*, *haupt*, and *head* are the same word? or that *cor*, *cordis*, *herz*, and *heart* are the same? But the fact cannot be gainsaid, and is corroborated in the English *hill*, *house*, *hemp*, and many another, which though proximately German, represent the Latin *collis*, *casa*, *cannabis*, etc. Occasionally the reverse occurs, as in *garden*, German *garten*, Latin *hortus*.

To multiply illustrations of these phenomena is needless. They are co-extensive with the Indo-Germanic languages, and enumerated exhaustively would fill a volume. It is proper, however, to glance, in passing, at the permutations undergone by the vowels. These being the feminine sounds, their changes are not so easily classified, nor do they seem reducible to laws. In English only five vowels are specialized, but every one of them having both a long sound and a short, practically the number is doubled, and there are the diphthongs and the digraphs besides. The organic entity of a word depends chiefly upon its consonants; hence, in tracing etymologies, it is customary to treat the vowels somewhat slightly. Very interesting is it, nevertheless, to note how they change places, as in *pyrus*, *poire*, and *pear*; *amor*, *amour*; *hora*, *heure*, and *hour*; *shine* and *sheen*; especially when it is remarked that countless new ideas have had appellations contrived for them simply by changing the vowels. Many of these extensions are strikingly figurative, as *reap* from *ripe*, and *ride* from *road*. A *rut* is that which is made by the wheel or *rota*, which last word we employ almost unchanged in the phrase to "learn by rote"—literally, to go over the same track again and again. *Trouble* is probably from *tribu-*

lare, to beat or bruise. Compare also bind, bend, band, bond, bound, bundle; and ninny, from *nanus*, the signification of the English word being "dwarf-minded," just as (if the etymologies be correct) a fool is one who fails, and a noodle one who is in need—an intellectual pauper. Vowel permutations sometimes strengthen the descriptive power of the word, as in raise, rise, and rouse; drip, droop, and drop; bear, bier, burden: or they denote reduction, as in knob and nib, top and tip.

How these various permutations originally took rise is a very large and composite question. Climate, habits, civilization, barbarism, constitutional strength and weakness, all have their influence upon human articulation, independently of what is referable to error and carelessness. If the organs of speech be not with all races of men precisely similar, in their modes of utterance at all events, they differ quite as profoundly as in physiognomy. Even the degree to which the mouth is opened, and the energy or the feebleness of the customary respiration, will induce changes, especially when the breathing is connected with the condition of the atmosphere. The changes are analogous to those induced in musical instruments, which yield different tones according to the touch of the player. Certain races of men seem, moreover, to possess peculiar and remarkable antipathies to particular sounds, never employing them in their own language, and substituting others when they adopt words containing those sounds from other nations. Sometimes there seems to be an absolute incapacity to utter particular sounds, as was discovered to their cost by the unfortunate Ephraimites at the fords of the Jordan: "Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth:

for he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him : and there fell at that time of the Ephraimites forty and two thousand." The influence of climate is chiefly shown in the different proportions of vowels to consonants according as the abode of the speakers is frigid or genial. The language of Tahiti, where the annual range of the thermometer is only from 69° to 78°, has no fewer than 70 or 80 vowels in every hundred letters contained in a given sentence. Some of the tribes inhabiting the islands of the Pacific Ocean are actually unable to articulate words possessing even no more consonants than those now before the reader of these lines, without inserting a vowel wherever two consonants come together. In the Sandwich Islands Britain is called *Beritania*, November *Novemaba*, France *Farani*. The Rarotonga Testament, printed by the Bible Society in 1836, contains in the first chapter of the Apocalypse 1550 vowels to 882 consonants. London, in this volume, is *Lonedona*. The dialects, on the other hand, which are spoken by the Esquimaux (with whom the thermometrical range is from -31° up to only 43° , the average of the year being *zero*, are noted for the profusion of their consonants, and these, moreover, are mostly guttural. "They do not like to open their mouths sufficiently to the cold air to pronounce the labial, dental, and lingual consonants, much less the vowels, and least of all the open vowels." A despatch in the Esquimaux language respecting one of the Arctic explorations, given in the *Times* for October 1st, 1850, contained 85 words, in which were comprised 531 consonants and 348 vowels, or nine of the former to rather more than five of the latter. These two may be extreme

cases, and possibly, both with the Tahitians and the Esquimaux, there may be some peculiarity in the organs of speech. The important consideration in regard to them is the metamorphosis which a word conveyed from either region to the other would assuredly undergo. Even the period of life at which men first attempt to utter particular linguistic sounds induces differences. No foreigner who comes to England after the age of thirty ever learns to pronounce the language well, owing to the fixity which the vocal organs acquire towards middle age; and an Englishman of thirty and upwards can hardly ever be taught to utter the sound which a Scotchman gives to the Greek χ , or even the French sound of the vowel *u*. A Frenchman's pronunciation of the English *the*, which he calls *de*, is not nearly so defective. When Arabic and other Oriental tongues are attempted after thirty, the difficulty of getting hold of some of the sounds is almost insuperable. Many of these curious failures are foreshadowed in the prattle of the nursery, where lessons may be learned the value of which is scarcely recognised. One kind of consonant is incessantly substituted for another. Instead of *Mary*, the child says *Maly*, and for good it offers *dood*.

Consider now what would be the eventual result of these various spontaneous tendencies in ages when there was no literature to fix and regulate the symbolic representation of words, which, it must be remembered, are after all, in their essential and original nature, only pulsations of sound, designed purely for the ear, ages before pens were thought of. When there is no writing, of course there is no spelling: it is literature which organizes and establishes "orthography," and until literature

arises, words must needs be liable to constant change. When literature began, in the various countries and tongues to which these remarks apply, a great check was placed on this tendency; and little by little the original fluidity of speech gave way to the crystallized forms contained in the dictionary. That in innumerable cases the symbolical representation was most arbitrary and irregular is quite true, though perhaps this is to be said more of modern than of ancient methods. For unhappily, while the giving a written or symbolical form to words has been in progress, accident, mistake, inadvertence, caprice, ignorance, diversity of opinion, have all contributed to aggravate the multiformity of method, literature itself assisting, through unconscious and undesigned departures from elder practice, with now and then complaisant deference to the changing habit of the popular lip.

The *abridgment* of words, by the omission of particular letters, has been immensely productive of seeming difference. Sometimes the abridgment would appear to have resulted from the attrition of use. Words, to adopt Horne Tooke's famous old simile, leave letters behind them as they descend the generations, just as advancing armies leave by the wayside a certain proportion of dead. The vowels, the feminine or weaker individuals, seem to go first, and each is followed in turn by its particular consonant. Sometimes the abridgment would seem referable to a deliberate desire to soften and improve the language, this coming in turn of a smoother and milder national taste. One of the oldest and most interesting illustrations of this consists in the disuse, by the later Greeks, of the sound or letter which in their

original alphabet occupied the sixth place, and which in the Latin, and in our own tongue, is represented by the natural pair *f* (or *fe*) and *v*. Scholars have given to this ancient letter, as used by the Greeks, the name of the digamma. What was its full power is of course not positively determinable. It would seem to have stood at times for the sound heard in the initial of *week*. The Romans retained both the sound and the symbol, and hence it becomes quite easy to determine the place the digamma primitively held in the Greek equivalents. Compare, for example, *οἶνος*, *vinum*, wine; *νεός*, *novus*, new; *κλείς*, *clavis*, clef; *λείος*, *lævis*; *αἰών*, *ævum*; *ναῦς*, *navis*; *λούω*, *lavo*; *ὄϊς*, *ovis*; *ἴον*, *viola*; *εἶδω*, *video*, *witan*; *οἶκός*, *vicus*, wick; *ὄμιλία*, *familia*; *ἴς*, *vis*; *αὐξεῖν*, A.S. *weaxan*, to wax. “*Biholde ye*,” says *Wiclif*, “the lilies of the feeld how thei wexen: thei traveilen not, neither spynnen.” The initial of “*vestry*” is this identical and very interesting digamma, the *vestry* being literally the place where the vestments are kept. *Vestis*, the Latin root, is the same as *ἔσθης*, which is derived from words signifying to clothe. Hence the digamma is preserved again in “*travesty*”—literally, a changing of the dress. Very interesting is it to hear in English farm-houses, 2500 years after the disuse of the digamma in Greece, oven pronounced “*oon*.”

In modern times the most conspicuous example of abridgment by the omission of one or two particular letters occurs in the large class of English words, derived from the Latin through the French, which includes *peril* from *periculum*, *fennel* from *fœniculum*, *feat* from *factum*, *feature* from *factura*, *feint* from *fictum* (whence also *fiction*), *paint* from *pictum* (whence also *picture*), *seal*

from sigillum, maitre from magister, œil from oculus. In these the important omission is the *c* or *g*. A list quite as long might be made of those in which the shortening has been effected by omitting *t* or *d*, as in moiety from medietas, plane from platanus, which in Milton is still "platane." Sometimes the original is loth to surrender entirely, as in fidelity=fealty. To this interesting class are also referable very many such words as cousin from consanguineus, surmise from supermissus—literally, something sent over one's head, an arrow flying wide of the mark; clove from caryophyllus, parsley from *πετροσέλινον*, alms from *ἐλεημοσύνη*—literally, "olive-giving," the olive being the emblem not simply of peace, but of that which peace underlies and vitalizes. Noël, the French word for Christmas, is from natalis. Carême (the "Lent" of the English) is from quadragesimus. Venue, heard only in the antiquated phraseology of the law-books, is from vicinetum. Sometimes the introductory sound entirely disappears, as in uncle, oncle, from avunculus, and in "shabby" from déshabillé; or only the first syllable survives, as in coy from quietus, seem from similis, quill from calamus, ear (of corn) from arista, cue from cauda—literally, a tail—sue from suivre (Latin, sequor), and oui=yes, which word is derived primarily from audio, I hear, signifying literally, I listen, and figuratively, I assent to what you say. There are examples, not in literature perhaps, but in the spoken vernacular, of no more than a single sound remaining, as at the close of the maid-servant's yes'm, which is through ma'am, madam, and madame, from *mea domina*. The omission by the French of the *s* in numerous words received from the Latin is also very conspicuous. In a considerable num-

ber of these words it seems as if an *e* had been put in the place of an original sibilant, as in *étude* from *studia*, *école* from *scholia*, *état* from *status*. But these all had the *s* originally, as illustrated in the analogous terms which retain it, *espérance* from *sperare*, *espèce* from *species*, etc.

The enlargement of words by the addition or insertion of a letter or two—of course quite a different thing from the methodical construction of compound words—is illustrated in many curious ways. Sometimes the new letter or sound appears at the end, as in “sound” itself, which in its sense of noise is the Latin *sonus*, and originally did not possess the *d*:—

“ Mixt with a murmuring winde, much like the sowne
Of swarming bees.”—*Faerie Queen*, i. 41.

The lower orders, in whose usages, disagreeable as it may be to admit the fact, a clue is found to many of the phenomena of etymology, show distinctly how the *d* got in, saying, as they do, *gownd* for *gown*, *surgeond* for *surgeon*. The same kind of senseless superfluity occurs in *thumb*, *dumb*, and many more of similar *facies*, wherein the *b*, by the approval of literature, has now become an established piece of the word. The most interesting elongations are those in which a direct and satisfactory purpose is subserved by the addition of a letter or two, as in numbers of the words somewhat oddly called diminutives, which at the same time often involve or introduce a pleasing metaphor. From *pose*, for example, has been made *puzzle*; while from the inelegant “*dab*” have been educed *dabble* and *dapple*. Milton speaks of the “*dappled dawn*.” By insertion of *m*, from the same root comes the sweet word “*dimple*.”

The introduction of an *m* is by no means infrequent, and in every case either makes a new picture or gives emphasis, the latter well illustrated in the group to which the way is led by *trappen*, to tread. The lightsome doing is expressed in trip, while the *m* gives tramp :—

“ But hark ! the tramp of armèd men, the Douglas battle-cry.”

So with *stappen*, to step, the intensitive of which is stamp, while the diminutive is stippen, whence the artists' word stipple—literally, to mark with a succession of delicate dots. The creeping of a new sound into the heart of a word, and the metaphorical meaning thereby given to it, is well exemplified again in simmer, the sound and appellation of water beginning to boil, which term, in the hands of the poets, has become shimmer, the enlarged form denoting the play of tremulous light, as of the sunbeam on the leaves of an aspen, and reminding one of Lord Bacon's delightful comparison of the shake in music to the quivering of the moonlight on slightly agitated water. Another pretty example occurs in celandine, from chelidonium, the flower which arrives with the bird after which it is named—the herald-swallow. There are plenty of examples of such insertions, probably thoughtless or accidental, as of the *b* in chamber from camera, and of the *c* in scent, from the Latin sentio, whence also “sense.” From insertions of this nature, of course, must be distinguished the euphonic cement often met with in compound words, the *m*, for example, in “detriment,” and all of its class; and the *d* in such words as redound, re-unda, the returning dash of the waves of the sea; and sedition, se-itio—literally, “a going apart.” When the Roman people quarrelled with

their rulers, they were accustomed to retire to Mount Aventine. Hence the going apart or withdrawing came in time to signify, figuratively, factious and insurrectionary proceedings in general.

The prefixing of a sound or letter is again very common. Where the ancient Greeks had $\gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\phi\omega$, the Romans wrote *scribo*, and $\gamma\lambda\upsilon\phi\omega$ similarly became *sculpo*. By a similar process in English we have *smite* from *mitto*; *speed* from *pes, pedis*; *scourge* from *corrigia*; *square* from *quadra*. When, however, as in Italian, an initial *s* stands as a negative, as in *ballare* to pack, *sballare* to unpack; *frenare* to bridle, *sfrenare* to unbridle; it is a relic of the Latin *dis*, just as in English we have *arm* and *disarm*, *continue* and *discontinue*. Sometimes an initial *g* makes its appearance unexpectedly, as in the French *grenouille*, from *rana*, a frog; and in numerous German words, as *gluck*, English *luck*. Pushing, for a moment, out to sea, it is interesting to note the identity of *rock* and *craig*. That the unfortunate letter *h* should disappear from many words is, of course, not surprising, nor can we be astonished to find it often usurping the place of an initial. Very amusing is it to observe that when ejected from its legitimate place, it almost invariably takes to itself an illegal lodging. Old inscriptions show that the Romans aspirated many words from which the *h* is now dropped. The English not only retain the original aspirates, but are prone to increase the number, being *gens spiritosa* in their utterance as well as their character. There are plenty of examples also in French, where the Latin *oleum* has become *huile*; *ostrea*, *huitre*; *ostium*, *huis*; and in Spanish, where *ovum* has become *huevo*, and *orphanus*, *huerfano*.

The *transposition* of sounds would seem to come of a certain proneness of the tongue, when the ear misses the true procession of the sounds in a word, to reverse the important ones altogether, just as a boy, when he finds himself unable to leap, goes to the other extreme, and turns a somersault. Numbers of words, under the influence of this curious perversity, appear to be different, though in reality the same, and referable to a common origin. Of course it is more difficult to grapple with transpositions than with permutation, or even with abridgment. As long as letters remain in their primitive places, they can be tracked through an indefinitely long series of changes, but when they shift their places it is quite another matter. Then very special help is supplied by the signification. Examples are common in all the Indo-Germanic languages. The Greek *ἔρπω* is in Latin *repro*, and *σκέπτομαι*, *specto*: the *φύλλον* and *folium* of those languages are in English represented by "leaf." Compare *ψυχή*, *psyche*, and *pixie*; *spirit* and *sprite*; *λύχνος* and *link*; *aptus* and *pat*. Among the uneducated, everywhere, nothing is commoner than transposition, and were it not for the vulgarity, it would ordinarily be laughable. "Vulgarisms," however, are in some cases archaisms. The exact line of demarcation between the two is often indistinguishable. *Granatus*, *pomegranate*, *granary*, show the way to *garner* and *garnet*, words not only legitimate, but esteemed poetical, yet in reality not different from *waps*, *ax*, and *brid*, the rustics' pronunciation of *wasp*, *ask*, and *bird*, which latter forms were by the Anglo-Saxons used indifferently with the preceding.

CHAPTER VIII.

LET us resume our illustrations of the way in which a simple sound belonging to external nature, after being shaped into a word, has become the parent of a very numerous family of derivative words, many of them beautifully figurative or poetical. Every step made in this department of inquiry shows with new force that the primitive or root-words of language, so far from being mere archæological curiosities, interesting only to the scholar, are living realities. The study of roots, and of their ultimate dependence upon onomatopœias, is like the exploration of the geological facts upon which depend the majestic scenery and the picturesque of nature. As the rocks, moreover, supply the most important chapter in the history of our planet, furnishing the ground-plan of everything else, so in these root-words, where obtained, and how dealt with, we have the foundation of the history of the play of the human mind, the advance of which has in every age been signified by the concurrent growth of the human vocabulary. We have seen what is the fruitfulness of words founded upon the sounds emitted by the lower animals : let us now take an instance from the inanimate portion of nature.

On a calm summer evening, when standing a little way

inshore, contemplating the "green wave that trembles as it glows," dimpling beneath the golden sunlight, one cannot wonder that in all ages the human heart has been charmed by its sweet, soft murmur. Virgil refers to it many times; Shakspeare in the immortal picture in *Lear*—

"The murmuring surge
That on the unnumbered idle pebbles chafes,
Cannot be heard so high."

Nor is it more than one would expect when we find the verbal adaptation of it by the primeval framers of language extant to this day in the Sanscrit *mira* (murmur existing in Sanscrit as *mormoroh*), in the Celtic *môr*, the German *meer*, and the Latin *mare*, whence the French *mer*. From the Celtic word came *Armorica*, which in Latin would be *ad mare*; and from the German word, *meerschaum*, literally sea-foam, the mineral substance so called having been thought to be the froth of the sea petrified. Many familiar words are referable to *mare*, as marine, submarine, mariner, maritime. From the same source also we have "mermaid," in Shakspeare's time synonymous with siren—

"O train me not, sweet mermaid, with thy note,
To drown me in thy sister's flood of tears."

So too when Oberon relates how once he heard a mermaid—

"On a dolphin's back,
Uttering such dulcet and harmonious breath,
That the rude sea grew civil at her song."

For the mermaid of fable is in its lower half like a fish, therefore incapable of taking such a position; the sirens, on the other hand, held the complete human form.

Washington Irving compares Venice to a mermaid, the earth and the sea claiming equal shares. From the same root probably came the Latin *mergo*, to plunge, dive, or put under water, thence, figuratively, to overwhelm, sink, or drown; and from which, in the literal sense, our own *merge*, *submerge*, *immerge*, *emerge*, *immerse*, *immersion*. Metaphorically one thing is merged in another when mingled with it, as a river with the ocean. To *mare* is also referable *margo*, the margin or edge of a thing, nothing supplying so perfect an idea of a boundary as the "beached margent of the sea." *Murmur*, in its original sense of a low and indistinct sound, moves on figuratively to the half-uttered complaints of a multitude, "The children of Israel murmured against Moses;" thence to the discontent of an individual, "Jesus said unto them, *Murmur not among yourselves.*"

Viewed from afar, with the morning or evening sunlight upon its bosom, the surface like molten silver, how perfect the presentation by the sea of the idea of "shining." Hence the beautiful word employed by the ancient Greeks, their fancy nourished by the sound and loveliness of the blue *Ægean*, to designate shining in general, *μαίρω*, which word, duplicated after the same manner as *mur* in *murmur*, a practice very frequent in Greek, became in a while *μαρμαίρω*. *Æschylus* describes the sky of a delicious southern night as *ἀστροισὶ μαρμαίρουσαν*, "shining with stars." So in the *Orphic Hymns*, *μαρμαρυγαῖς στίλβοντες*, "radiant with splendour." History is silent as to the date, but there was a time when the fair, white stone claimed by the sculptor had no name. Wrought into smooth slabs, polished and shining like the sea, what more natural than to call it *μάρμαρος*? *Marmor*, the

Latin form of the name thus instituted, in course of time became changed into the French *marbré*, the proximate parent of our own "marble." Boys' "marbles" are so called because originally made of alabaster, a stone of marmoreal substance and complexion, and still furnishing "alleys." By metonymy, again, the same word denotes sculptures, as when we speak of the Elgin Marbles, and most especially sepulchral ones.

"Alas for him who never sees
The stars shine through the cypress-trees!
Who, hopeless, lays his dead away,
Nor looks to see the breaking day
Across the mournful marbles play;
Who hath not learned, in hours of faith,
The truth to flesh and sense unknown,
That Life is ever lord of Death,
And Love can never lose its own."

Repaying Nature with her own gift, the poets often apply the epithet "marble-like" to the ocean when smooth and luminous,—Homer, for instance, in his *ἄλα μαρμαρέην*, Virgil in his *æquore marmoreo*. The "Sea of Marmora," one of the softest and loveliest of inland waters, is so called by reason of the abundance of marble in its largest island. Perhaps there is an ancient etymological connection between *mur*, as a name for the sea, and *marah*, one of the primeval words for bitterness, sea-water being figuratively bitter. Homer so describes it (*Od.* v. 323). In Virgil we have *Doris amara*, the bitter sea; and *rorem amarum*, the bitter sea-spray. *Marah* stands for bitterness more than once in the Old Testament. "They could not drink of the waters, for they were bitter: therefore the name of that place was called *Marah*." "And she said, Call me not *Naomi*: call me

Mara, for the Almighty hath dealt very bitterly with me.”* Amarus itself seems to point to the same ancient extension of meaning, thus to the primitive *mur*, in which, through the association of bitterness, would seem also to lie the origin of “myrrh,” one of the bitterest of gums; *μύρομαι*, to lament (Iliad, vi. 373), as when we speak ourselves of “bitter tears;” *mæreo*, to grieve, the Anglo-Saxon *murnan*, whence mourn, mourning, and mournful, also the French *morne*, sad, and *marri*, sorry.

Thus it is that words of which bare lexicon-etymology can render no account, or of which it at all events renders only an imperfect account, may by virtue of poësy, the science of the natural harmonies of things, and the golden key to the highest philosophy, be traced, as our argument has contended from the beginning, to the forms, the sounds, the pictures, of the world around us. Nature is an unfailing interpreter to all who set out with earnest and reverent faith in her power and munificence, or as Horace excellently calls it, “the riches of her native funds.”† Beside her, in truth, there is no interpreter. Hence when we would get at the best and most meaningful of the phenomena of language, to depend on books alone is to stop in the temple-portico. A genuine system of etymology cannot rest in partial histories, nor in any theory of roots which regards them as simple phonetic types, arbitrary and casual. Simply to refer words to another and older language may be the beginning of etymology, but it certainly is not the end. The reasons of the applications of words should be

* The feminine Christian name Mary, often mistakenly referred to the above, is an abbreviation of Miriam.

† “At quanto meliora monet, pugnantia que istis,
Dives opis naturæ suæ!”—Sat. i. 2. 73, 74.

sought, not merely their dictionary pedigrees. "Verborum explicatio probabatur, id est, *qua de causa* quæque essent ita nominata, quam etymologiam appellabant," said Cicero long ago, and what was true with *him*, assuredly to-day is yet more important. To disregard Nature in tracing the history of words is to shut one's eyes to all the best scenery of the route, since when consulted on true principles, the ministration precisely accords with that of the poetic faculty,

" Leaving that beautiful which always was,
And making that which was not."

Plato taught nearly the same. For that words, in a genuine system of etymology, must be investigated poetically, and not merely as a linguist or a grammarian would handle them, is unquestionably the true idea of the "Cratylus," which despite the unjust censure it has received from misapprehension of its real intent, is in principle undeniably correct. A dictionary constructed on this plan, *i.e.* showing the progression of words from their onomatopoetic bases, so far as ascertainable, to the final or figurative meanings, is a great desideratum, and would be of incomparable worth both to literature and philosophy.

To give the figurative meanings first, or exclusively, as too often done, is contrary to right order. A truly philosophical dictionary, moreover, would disregard alphabetic arrangement, and classify words according to their genesis and vivifying soul. When such a dictionary shall be compiled, it will at once exhibit a map of the human mind, and the history of its development:—it will also present a record of the progress of human knowledge. Not until this is done will etymology have fulfilled its duties, or vindicated its noble capacities, inestimable alike to the historian, and as an educational lever.

CHAPTER IX.

ANOTHER example of the fecundity of a root-word founded upon a simple tone of inanimate nature, is supplied in the immemorially ancient onomatopœia which represented the sound of a vigorously burning fire; the same which is employed to-day when we say that a bonfire *roars*. In Hebrew, fire is called by the precisely equivalent name of אֵשׁ, 'ōr, as in Isa. xxxi. 9 and Ezek. v. 2. From fire, 'ōr naturally passed on to the denomination of light, thence to the sun, which is the source of light, as in Job xxxi. 26. In Job xxxvii. 3 it is put for lightning. From the sun nothing could be more natural than that it should be extended to the morning, when light first appears; and now we recognise it in the Sanscrit "aur," the day, or the period of time which is specially characterized by light. Duplicated, like mur in murmur, with the Greeks it became the name of Aurora, the mythological goddess of the morning, "the cheerful lady of the light," who,

" Decked in her saffron robe,
Dispersed her beams through every part of this enflowerèd globe."

How beautiful again its reappearance, in metaphorical use, in οὐρανός, the infinite heavens above, the scene of the sublime command which might well make the morning

stars sing together, and all the sons of Elohim shout for joy—"Let there be light," and which ever since that wonderful birthday have so specially declared the glory of God, while the firmament showeth His handiwork. The Greek name for the rainbow, Iris, is another outcome of the same word, and truly nothing better deserves to be called light, since in the rainbow is disclosed its inmost soul, the threefold chord everywhere expressive of perfect beauty. Figuratively this lovely old word moves on to a company of the queenliest of the lily-flowers, the Iris or fleur-de-lis of "unnumbered dyes," and at last we have it in one of the so-called hard botanical terms, Iridaceæ, literally the flowers which resemble the rainbow, and which, like their celestial prototype, for ever make one's heart "leap up."

" So was it when I was a boy :
 So is it now I am a man :
 So be it when I shall grow old,
 Or let me die."

The morning of the day is the counterpart, in little, of the spring of the year. The terms are constantly interchanged, and hence in Greek we find the latter season denominated *εἶς*. Originally this word had the digamma prefixed, so that in Latin it reappears as *ver*, whence *vernalis* and *vernal*. The characteristic tint of the spring is green; therefore in Latin this colour is termed *viridis*, in French shortened to *vert*. Connected with it are also *verdure* and *verdant*, the literal meaning of the entire series of words being "spring-like." The beautiful words *vireo* and *viresco*, literally to wax green or become spring-like, belong to the same group. *Virescens*, "becoming green," is the parent, through the French *frais*,

fraiche, of our English word "fresh," literally "spring-like." To be "refreshed" is to be enlivened and exhilarated as in spring. And as the spring is the season of sprightliness and activity, from the same source come the terms frisky and brisk. The morning and the spring are natural counterparts of childhood and youth, constantly recognised in such expressions as the "morning of life." With these are identified not only freshness, but its correlatives innocence and purity. In "Festus" the morning has the epithet of "maiden." "Virgin," literally "one in her spring-time," conveys precisely the same idea. Virginitv in its turn is emblematic of whatever is stainless, immaculate, untouched. The chemists speak of "virgin gold;" the farmers of "virgin meadows." Sir R. C. Hoare, in his "Ancient Wiltshire," talks of "maiden downs," green hills unbroken by the plough. Spiritually, virgin is the scriptural name for the Church: "Who is she that looketh forth as the morning?" "The virgin daughter of Zion;"—also for the redeemed, without limitation of sex:—"These are they which are virgins."

The spring cannot be said to commence properly till the snows of winter have disappeared, life springing to the front sweetly and emphatically. Precedence as to place and time have an original and immutable relation with excellence as to quality, as shown in our common expressions, first-rate talents, second-rate abilities, and in the colloquial use of prime, principal, and other derivatives of the Latin *primus*, all of which point to the spring, the period when power asserts itself. The precedence as to time which marks the season of spring, constitutes it, in other words, a natural and beautiful representative of advance in all other departments of

nature, whether visible or invisible. Hence, through the medium of the Teutonic languages, the word we had just now in the shape of *zapr*, the spring, becomes in English the sign of the comparative degree, conveying a secret but very charming comparison of the state of the object spoken of, to the vernal season of the year. Happier and brighter denote happiness and brightness with the comely and gladdening idea of the spring-time superadded. So with larger, finer, sweeter, better.* Unhappily in this temporal world there are decline and retrogression as well as improvement and advance, and the very emblems which normally stand for the good and lovely become images of the reverse, as expressed in poorer, slower, weaker. The sign of the comparative in Latin, illustrated in *melior*, *prior*, *fortior*, *superior*, is probably another shape of *er*. "Early," it may be added, is in Saxon-English exactly what "vernal" is in Latin-English, being from the Anglo-Saxon *ærlit*, the first part of which is the same as "ere," literally "before," or coming first. Co-descendant with it is *ier*, the Anglo-Saxon for "soon."

* *Better* is one of the words now scarcely recognisable as comparatives, by reason of the positives being obsolete, or nearly so. "Bot," for instance, the positive on which *botes* or "better" was formed, is extant only in the phrases "what *botes* it?" "a *bootless* errand," and in "booty." "Good" has usurped its place. ~~*More*~~, the positive of "more," is also obsolete, being only met with in old poetry. "Rather" is the comparative of the word used by Milton, when he says—

"Bring the *rathe* primrose that forsaken dies,"

and occasionally heard in "rath-ripe." *Rathest*, the superlative, is supplanted by "earliest." *Neah*, "near," next, are of the same class, the positive subsisting only in the seldom-used *nigh*.

"Sooner to boot"

From the same fertile source came the ancient Greek *ἐρι*, a prefix used to augment the force of words, which it does in a manner similar to the comparative *er*, but more energetically, the significance being "uncommon," "great," or "splendid." Homer says for "very fertile," *ἐριβώλαξ*, and for "highly famous," *ἀριδείκετος*. Pindar describes loud-roaring lions as *λεοντες ἐρίβρομοι*. The etymology of hero, heroine, heroism, terms indicating excellence or foremost place, would seem to lie in the same direction.

Again collaterally related, by virtue of common origin, is the Latin *orior*, to rise, represented in our own language, through the Gothic or Teutonic channel, in rise, raise, and arise, all of which terms refer figuratively to the morning, when the aur lights up the sky. And as the day rises in the east, the name for that quarter of the heavens is *oriens*, whence orient and oriental. To "find the sunshine for ourselves"—best exercise and best proof of practical wisdom, remembering always that reasonable self-reliance translates into reliance upon God—is in French expressed in the single beautiful word *orienter*. The commencement of the day presignifies all other births. Hence the Latin *ortus*, which, primarily denoting the rising of the sun and stars, signifies also nativity, the contrary of which is expressed in "abortive." A near equivalent is *origo*, whence our English "origin." To "originate" is figuratively to appear or introduce a thing in the way or with the complexion of the newness of morning. "Original" denotes that which is equally fresh and agreeable with the opening of the day. Can we feel surprised that the loveliness of the morning should be resorted to in the same old sweet spirit of

poetry for terms to express comeliness, decoration,* grace, and beauty? For it is the same primitive thought which reappears in *orno*, "to make beautiful," and in its descendants ornate, ornament, and adorn, by Wycliffe, in 1 Peter iii., spelt *ourn*. *Aurum*, the Latin word for gold, whence in turn the French *or*, and the long train of pretty derivatives illustrated in aureola, aurelia, oriole, oriflamme, etc., had its foundation in the resemblance borne by this metal when burnished to the colour and the brightness of sunrise, the old, old likeness recognised in the innumerable passages in literature which speak of the rising and setting sun as "golden" or as "gilding," and which is the life also of the Homeric epithet κροκόπεπλος—"attired in crocus."

Reverting to the fundamental or onomatopoetic signification of *aur*, this word, in one or other of its primeval modifications, is the root also of the vocables found in a later age in the Greek *πυρ*, fire, and *θέρω*, warmth, the initial being a prefix, or the relic of one. From the first have come in course of time, and by successive developments, pure, purify, purification, purity, purge, purgatory, purgation, etc., all of which are figurative expressions having reference to fire in its character of one of the great natural agents in refining and cleansing. The same appears to be the ultimate source also of the Latin *urere*, to burn, with the allied *furere*, *fervere*, *comburare* (whence "combustion"), *furnus*, an oven, and *fornax*, a furnace; also of the Anglo-Saxon *fyr*, *wearm*, and *burnan*, whence our current fire, warm, and burn. From burn, or its obsolete form *brun* or *bren*, resulting from transposition, came "brown," literally the colour of that which has been

slightly burned or scorched. Hence, again, "brunette" and "auburn." The brunt of the battle is literally the hot or burning part of it. Brandy, from the German *brandt-wein*, is literally burnt wine, or spirit distilled from wine by means of fire. A "brand" is a piece of wood burning or partly burnt; thence a sword which when waved gleams as if it flamed; figuratively also a mark burned into anything with a hot iron, a "brand" such as formerly indicated a deserter from his colours. Fire and burning in material nature are representative of violent and destructive wrath and anger. Hence the figurative terms fury, furious, and infuriate. Strife, the result of burning anger, with the ancient Greeks was *ἔρις*, and doubtless in this direction we have the key to the primitive significance of ira, ire, irritate, and irascible, metaphors referring in every instance to anger, or proneness thereto. The same idea underlies the constant scriptural description of the misery of the wicked in the future life, under the names of fire and burning, hell consisting in the unspeakable torments induced by assimilating into one's heart the bad passions which fire symbolizes, envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness, and having, by a man's surrender of himself to these, a beginning even in the current or time life.

"Though this a heavenly angel, hell is here."

But heat when temperate is delightful. Hence those beautiful metaphors wherein, never letting slip the ancient word, we speak of the warmth of our attachment, the fervour of affection. Herein, too, we have the beginning of the history of *ἔρως*, the ancient Greek term for "love," and the contrary of strife, which helps us in the end to

understand what is meant by "the kingdom of heaven is within you."

Arrived at this point, very interesting is it to observe that if an *aur* word be not employed to describe the liveliest and most spring-like emotion of the human heart, something of equivalent physical sense is used instead. Compare "ardour," from the Latin *ardere*, to burn or be warm; incense, to inflame with anger, from the participle of *candeo*, to glow, the root of "incendiary;" the use of "flame" in the sense of "sweetheart," anticipated by the shepherd in Virgil, "meus ignis Amyntas;" and the figurative use of the word "fume," from *fumus*, smoke, a person who "fumes," being implied therein to be metaphorically on fire. Hence also the fine scriptural phrase, "Why doth thine anger smoke?" Hence again the familiar phrases, inflamed with indignation, the heat of resentment, to kindle one's wrath, a hot-headed fellow, burning with passion, boiling with rage. The beautiful word "zeal," denoting love or enthusiasm for a particular object, is from the Greek ζέω, to seethe or bubble up, as water does when beginning to boil. Zeal, accordingly, presents the same general idea to the mind's eye, and is at the same moment a most interesting witness to the way in which all abstract terms rest upon the sounds of nature, ζέσις, the substantive, being a close imitation of the noise of water beginning to boil. Plato expressly applies it to "the fervour of the soul," ζέσις τῆς ψυχῆς.* Cognate with "zeal" is the essential

* Cratylus, 419. The "boiling" and hissing of the surf as it dashes among the rocks and pebbles on the beach is admirably described by Herodotus through the medium of the same word, τῆς θαλάσσης ζησάσης (vii. 488).

part of the word "jealousy." Originally the two words were exchangeable, as they are still in the phrase to be jealous of one's honour, which means to be zealous on behalf of it. Jealousy in the reverse or ignoble sense to which it is now almost restricted, is simply zeal developed in a selfish or wrong direction.

How plainly the principle involved in these various usages, always self-consistent, bears out the doctrine of the human origin of language must be evident. They evince incontrovertibly that in order that he should be able to converse man needed no miraculous aid.

They prove that, by virtue of his own intuitive perception of the natural harmonies or correspondences of things, he is capable of constructing out of a single word, procured in the first place from the material creation around him, an indefinite variety of new and expressive terms. For when we find that from time immemorial such abstract emotions as love, anger, and zeal have possessed names suggested by man's own instincts, and evidently fashioned by his own lips, the great difficulty in supposing language to be of human origin at once disappears. The difficulty in question centres in the origin of words such as these, namely, the terms which denote "abstractions." The only other real difficulty that can possibly suggest itself, the origin of the first *physical* appellations, is sufficiently met, as already shown, by the universal existence of onomatopœias. No matter that in England at this present moment we use, in speaking of anger and love, terms apparently unconnected with fire, and having no etymological relation with the primeval *aur*. We have their synonyms, warmth, ardour, zeal, etc., and that is enough. All that

is proved by the objector is that in course of time things have received a variety of new figurative appellations. "Love," after all, is not so very far away in its inmost sense, this word, which has come down from the remotest antiquity, appearing to designate, in its physical purport, *breathing upon*, so as to warm and cherish, as when a mother nestles her babe, giving it paradise in her bosom.

CHAPTER X.

TAKE next, in illustration of the general principle before us, two or three groups of words which have for their ancestors the simple ejaculations of man himself, a class of which it is easy to find examples, and in which there are none more obvious than the infantine utterances which long ago became shaped into "father" and "mother." Though denied by Sharon Turner, there cannot be a doubt that these two utterances are almost universal among mankind. They exist, at all events, throughout the languages distinguished as the Indo-Germanic: they are illustrated also in the Semitic tongues; and as our general argument is founded upon the phenomena presented in these two leading families of human speech, quite enough is furnished to sustain it. As regards Hebrew they occur in Isaiah viii. 4, which verse, though rendered in the Authorized Version very properly, "Before the child shall have knowledge to cry, My father and my mother," would be more exactly represented by using the monosyllables 'ābh and 'em, the original Hebrew being אָבִי and אִמִּי. The sound which naturally and uniformly escapes when the lips of infancy are opened in an endeavour to articulate is either that of the letter *m*, with a vowel either before or after it, or

of the letter *p* or *b*, also with an accompanying vowel, these two sounds being emphatically labials. For convenience' sake we shall call them *pa* and *ma*, these being now established vocables, and in their duplicated forms, *papa* and *mama* (constructed after the manner of "murmur" and "Aurora"), recognised ingredients of even literary language. Lengthened forms of them appear in Sanscrit as *pītri* and *mātri*, in Greek as *πατήρ* and *μήτηρ*, in Latin as *pater* and *mater*, in German as *vater* and *mutter*, and so on through fifty other languages, the French contracting the Latin into *père* and *mère*. The first of them appears again in the Pehlevi or ancient Persian language as *bab*; in Syriac it becomes the well-known scriptural *abba*; the second occurs in the Celtic tongues as *mam*. The origin of the variations of the spelling has already been explained: remembering the laws of permutation, there is, of course, not the least difficulty over the *p*, *b*, *f*, and *v*. As with ourselves, in ancient times there were familiar modifications of each of these tender appellatives. In the sixth Odyssey, old King Alcinous' daughter, the fair Nausikaa, so delicately described as *ἑυπεπλον* and *λευκώλεον*, the "beautiful-robed" and the "white-armed," addresses her father in nature's own sweet and changeless language of affection as *πάππα φίλε*, "dear papa." In Euripides' *Alcestis* the boy calls upon his dying mother as *μαῖα*, "dear ma." These two little utterances are found also in modern verse. Dante, when he would describe the loftiest powers of the intellect, speaks of them as the reverse of the effort of the infant when it says only "mamma e babbo" (Dell' Inf. xxxii. 9). With the Greeks, *βαβάξω*, literally to say "ba," signified to speak

inarticulately, and thus unintelligibly. Idle chatter and prating they called βαβαξ, and a cradle they called βαβαλιον. It is the same old word which exists in the French *babiller*, and in our own English babble, babe, and baby, the equivalent term "infant" signifying the non-speaker or the speechless one. Infancy is literally "inability to speak." From the Latin *mater* we have matrimony, matron, matriculate, matrix, maternity, maternal. By another beautiful figure we speak of our native land as the mother-country, just as the ancient Hebrews called theirs 'ōm; and as the world gives and nourishes everything, our planet is figuratively "mother earth." No phrase occurs oftener in the classical poets.* We have it also in Job i. 21, and in Shelley—

" Maternal earth, who doth her sweet smiles spread
For all."

The idea of the substance of which a thing is made is also expressed by derivatives from the infantine *ma*, this being the base of *materia*, matter, material (figuratively extended as an adjective to the all-important), immaterial, materialism, materialize, etc. *Amo*, I love, though sometimes referred to a different source, would seem consistently assigned to the same prolific root. A mother's love is the type of the entire scope of the affections. The derivatives, it is needless to say, are very numerous, including amor, amour, enamour, amative, amabilis, amiable,—which last signifies not only of loving disposition, but that which is worthy of love: "How amiable are Thy tabernacles, O Lord of Hosts!" In the same list come also amicitia, amity, amicus,

* Pindar, Nem. vi. 3. Æschylus, Prom. 90. The Orphic Hymn to Nature. Ovid, Met. i. 393, etc.

amenity, amateur, all the best, in a word, of the terms which refer to cordial attachment, friendship, and predilection. Several of them take a prefix implying negation, and thus still further expand the vocabulary, as exemplified in enemy, enmity, inimical, and in the Latin *inamabilis*, literally "the unlovely."

"Tristique palus inamabilis undâ
Alligat, et novies Styx interfusa coerces."*

From the Latin *amita*, through the French *tante*, we have "aunt," figuratively a person of loving disposition; and by a perfectly natural extension of the original word for mother, "mamma," the resort of the unweaned, whence the new stream of words which includes *mammosa*, one of the epithets borne by deep-bosomed Ceres, *mammal*, *mammalia*, *mamelon*, and *mamilla*. "The country," says a lively traveller, "was mamillated with little hills,"—a metaphor which recalls the terms bestowed on gently-swelling and rounded eminences by the Greeks, by whom they were called *μαστοι* and *τιτθοι*.

Just as the above came from *ma*, from *pa*, by a similar process, have come the numerous words which have their proximate root in *pater*, including paternity, patrimony, patronymic, etc. Many of these are eminently figurative. A powerful friend, a defender, a protector, one who behaved, as we say ourselves, "like a father," the Romans called a "patron." Now we apply the term to one who countenances and supports, not merely persons, but principles. The senators, literally the "old

* The *en* of enemy, French *ennemi* (from which our own word is proximately derived), is the same as the Latin *in*, which has the double sense of in, into, or on, and of "not" or "against." Compare *enfant*=infant.

men" or fathers, in ancient Rome were the "patricians." Now we apply the term to people of exalted rank. "Patriarch" means chief or principal father, and "patristic" that which pertains to the first writers upon Christian doctrines. Commemorative even more directly of the primeval *ab* are the words abbot, abbé, abbess, abbey, abbacy, all of which are again expressive metaphors.* So are the common colloquial phrases, "a paternal government," "father of his people," "the wish is father to the thought." The atmosphere, with its showers, the fertilizing spouse of maternal earth, was called by the ancients "father Æther." The Almighty, in every sense the Creator and Sustainer, we ourselves call "Our Father," an expression to which language affords no parallel. The head of the Romish Church is its "papa," pape, or Pope. We speak, too, of our "fatherland," a man devoted to which is a "patriot." The devout man carries his patriotism a step beyond, as expressed in the sacred verses, immemorially ancient, which end with

" Quid vitam sine termino
Nobis donet *in patria*."

The showers bestowed by "father Æther" naturally lead on to the idea of water in general, pronounced by Homer and Thales, by virtue of its fine masculine character, the origin of all things. Homer and Thales did not say this foolishly: the last things in the world to be called foolish are the metaphors employed by great

* Abbot, the father or head of a monastery, was originally spelt *Abbat*. Flowing from this appellation came the name of his family, the "friars," literally the brethren, friar being a corruption of the French *frère*, constantly used in the sense of "friar" by the early English writers, as in Chaucer, Prologue, 208—

"A frere there was, a wanton and a merry."

poetry and lofty philosophy, which in truth cannot express itself except by means of metaphor, any more than the Christian religion can. Rivers of magnitude and perennial flow, such as give a country its life and prosperity, have in every age had the title of "father," as in the expressions "Father Tiber" and "Father Thames." For the same reason they are also personified as male—

"Indus or Ganges rolling *his* broad wave."

Hence one of the earliest names applied to water, so far as philology can discover, was *ab* or *ap*, in Sanscrit *âpas*, literally "father." Very interesting is it to find this ancient appellation still extant in the names of rivers wherever the Indo-Germanic languages, in any of their many varieties, have existed. In Celtic it became Abon, Apon, or Avon, which last is extant in the names of no fewer than ten English rivers. In France it is found in the Aube; in India in the geographical name Punjaub or Panj-ab, literally the "Five-river-land." *Annis*, the Latin word for a river, likewise rests on *ap* and *âpas*, by interchange of *p* and *m*, as seen in *ἄπνος* and *somnus*, and in *σεμνός*, reverend, from *σέβω*, to revere. By permutation of *p* and *q*, as explained in chap. vi., *ap* or *âpas* became transformed into *aqua*, the proximate root of aquatic, aquarium, aqueduct, aqueous; and which reappears in French in the abbreviated form of *eau*, plural *eaux*, which is still further contracted into *Aix-la-Chapelle*. Thence it became a denominative for the greatest of waters, *aquor*, the sea, other forms of which ancient word are extant in the Welsh *aig*, the Icelandic *ægir*, and several other Celtic and Gothic terms of similar import. In Anglo-Saxon it assumed the shape

of *egor*, a word extant, it would appear, in one or two old topographical names.

Where shall we find a more beautiful and exact image of calm and tranquillity than the ocean in repose! Things habitually tranquil cannot possibly supply it so well as one that is apt to be tossed and troubled. Hence the Latin *æquus*, smooth or even, a word sometimes referred to *εἰκῶς*, resemblance, but which certainly has its proximate affinity with *æquor*. *Æquus*, whence "equal," literally signifies "resembling smooth water;" figuratively, even, regular, justly and harmoniously balanced. When we speak of things being "equal," it is a comparison of them to the ocean at such times as the halcyons build; and when we speak of an equable disposition, or of equanimity of temper, it is in reality describing those characters by similarly pointing to the smooth mirror of an unruffled sea, or of a still and quiet lake. And it does not end here. For as smooth water always best reflects the gliding clouds and the objects on its banks, so do we find the correspondence still holding good in regard to the aptitude for receiving fair impressions from without, which is possessed by the calm and even-tempered soul. "The mind," says Plato, "when free from tumult, reaps the pleasures proper to itself, the truest and sincerest that can be." Compare what is said by the Psalmist, on the foundation of the image of the good shepherd:—"The Lord maketh me to lie down in green pastures, He leadeth me beside *the still waters*;" that is, When I trust in Him, He gives me the heavenly tranquillity of soul which quiet and transparent waters image. The effect of the picture is considerably heightened when we reflect on the likeness presented by stormy or troubled waters to

a mind disturbed and unsettled by guilt or passion. "The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest."

This leads us to the word *iniquitas*, the negative of equity, one of the most expressive metaphors in the language. In its literal translation iniquity means unevenness or roughness of surface, whether of land or water. Livy speaks of the *iniquitas* of an uncultivated country. With Cicero it becomes a metaphor for heavy obstacles. Lucretius, in his opening invocation, laments that he cannot pursue the task he undertakes, "tempore iniquo, æquo animo." Finally it becomes the name for that which is opposed to justice, peace, and happiness in every form. From *æquus* also come adequate, inadequate, equalize, equality, equilibrium, all which words address themselves to the mind's eye as depicting or alluding to things or conditions which resemble a tranquil sea. Great rivers being masculine, of course the ocean is the same.

" Old ocean was
 Infinity of ages ere we breathed
 Existence, and *he* will be beautiful
 When all the living world that sees *him* now
 Shall roll unconscious dust around the sun."

Sweet as is the spectacle of the sea in repose, how grand when it breaks upon the shore in crested surf! People are accustomed to call these great waves "horsemen." Lord Byron speaks of laying his hand upon the ocean's "mane;" he compares the pleasant tossing of a bark in full sail to the action of a horse that "knows its rider;" ships are constantly described as "riding at anchor" and "riding out the storm." Surely there is something more in this than can be called accidental?

Perhaps it will some day help to explain why Neptune was fabled to have presented mankind with the noblest of quadrupeds. In ancient times the horse was regarded as a symbol of the sea. When at full speed it was figurative of a ship running before the wind. Hence it seems not impossible that in *ap*, *âpas*, may be found also a clue to the origin of *ἵππος*, itself the basis of many beautiful metaphors employed by the ancient Greeks, as well as of various metaphorical plant-names, Hippuris, Hippophaë, etc., and which, by permutation of *p* and *q*, exists in Latin as *equus*, the source of equine, equestrian, and equerry. In some of the Gothic languages the horse is called by the congenerate name of *ag*.

Paternity implies energy, vigour, and power, and these in turn lead to and imply possession. On the primeval *ab* rest accordingly the Sanscrit *ap*, to obtain, and the Latin *habeo*, in Anglo-Saxon *habban*, whence the English "have."* Habit, habitude, habitation, inhabit, denote that which we hold, possess, or "have" as our personal property. In possession of wealth, rightly understood, or as denoting wealth in respect of mind and feeling as well as in respect of gold and silver, is implied "happiness," which again literally denotes "having." The Hebrew, Greek, and Latin words for "happy" carry the same physical signification. **טוֹבָה**, *to-bhāh*, the Hebrew term, stands in Eccles. v. 10 for "abundance;" in Ps. xvi. 3 for "delight;" in Ps. cvi. 5 for "gladness." Homer applies the epithet *μάκαρ* at one time to a rich farmer, at another to the felicity of the im-

* This ancient word existed also in Greek, for Hesychius proves that *ἄβεις* was employed in the same sense as *ἔχεις*, particularly by the Pamphylians.

mortal gods. *Felix* (whence felicity) in Virgil continually denotes productive or rich, just as *infelix* is constantly put for "barren." Thus, *felicibus ramis*, "with luxuriant boughs;" *infelix oleaster*, "the unproductive wild olive." The correspondence is illustrated every day in conversation, as when we say "happily endowed," meaning richly or plentifully. To be made happy, and to make her one's own, are synonymous for the gaining of a wife. It is for the same general reason that possessions are called by the figurative name of "goods." Cicero, speaking of the equivalent Latin term *bona*, says he wonders whence it arose, seeing that true riches consist not in money and chattels (Paradoxes, i. 6). From *habeo*, through *habilis*, comes "able," another expressive metaphor, "able" signifying the power which is identified with the idea of "father" in its complex signification of originator and sustainer. Hence, by another step, ability and enable, and with prefixes implying negation, unable, disable, inability. Our "behaviour" is the way in which we hold, conduct, or "have" ourselves. A "haven," a place where ships can get good and safe anchorage, figuratively any place of safety, an asylum in time of trouble, is that which holds or contains whatever takes refuge in it. The "haft" of a knife is that by which it is held or "haved." In French the initial aspirate of the Latin is dropped, *habeo* becoming *avoir*, whence comes *avec*, a contraction of *avez que*, "have that." By permutation of *h* and *g*, as in "hortus" and "garden," *have* becomes *give*. "Give it me" is the same as "Let me have it." From "give" comes in turn the conjunction "if," originally spelt "gif." "If it be fine" is literally "given it be fine," that is, "having fine weather" we will do so and so.

The verbs to *be*, *bide* and *abide*, are also originally derived from *ab*, father, since "being," that is, life in its highest quality and vigour, is in paternity naturally implied. Our "abode" therefore is where we have our "being." Recognising the idea of "father" as the soul of the word "abide," how beautiful becomes the disciples' touching entreaty: "Abide with us, for it is towards evening, and the day is far spent"!

"*Abide* with me ; fast falls the eventide ;
The darkness deepens ; Lord, with me abide :
When other helpers fail, and comforts flee,
Help of the helpless, O abide with me !

Hold Thou Thy cross before my closing eyes ;
Shine through the gloom, and point me to the skies ;
Heaven's morning breaks, and earth's vain shadows flee ;
In life, in death, O Lord, abide with me !"

Be, when used as a prefix, still implies the same thing, as in *because*, *beside*, *besiege*. The preposition *by* is of similar purport. *By* night and *by* day, literally mean "being" night and "being" day. To *bid* is to order to remain or "be" where you are ; thence to ask, intreat, demand.

Again, by reason of its implying energy, vigour, and power, *ab* or "father" becomes a figurative appellation, in innumerable ways, of cause, origin, and beginning. Not to pursue the subject tediously, let it suffice to refer to certain prepositions. Most of the prepositions which in the Indo-Germanic languages denote such relations as above, superior to, by reason of, on account of, are traceable to this identical root ; conclusively proving that while no words seem to have less of the figurative or poetical in their nature and substance than prepositions

and conjunctions, none are more truly and essentially metaphorical. The fact was originally brought to light by Koerber, who developed it in connection with the Hebrew language.* Subsequently it was taken up by Horne Tooke, who in his celebrated work, the "Diversions of Purley," established it in regard to the English prepositions. It is an error, therefore, to suppose that Horne Tooke was the pioneer, though it is quite likely that his discoveries were original as regards the English words of the class referred to. Immeasurably remote from the sounds and forms of objective nature as many of the prepositional words now appear to be, their connection therewith is indisputable: like all other words, they carry with them the sheen of ancient poësy. In many cases, it is true, the parentage has not yet been ascertained, but the testimony of those of which the history is known, is quite sufficient to attest the character of the remainder. Whenever the veil which time has spread over them is drawn aside, there is not one that does not show itself a metaphor of excellent beauty, because founded on a natural agreement. The words of this class referable to *ab* are the Græco-Latin *ὑπο*, *ὑψου*, *ὑφ'*, *απο*, *αφ'*, *επι*, *sub*, *suf*, etc., with the Gothic *af*, *auf*, *op*, *uf*, *ufa*, *ufan*, *ufon*, etc. In English we possess it in the thence derived up, upper, upward, utmost, above, of, etc. The fragrance "of" the rose is the sweet smell "haved" by the rose.

* *Lexicon Particularum Ebræarum*, Jena, 1712.

CHAPTER XI.

WHEN the infantine and inarticulate utterances represented in *pa* and *ma* come to be superseded by conscious and intelligent Language, man expresses himself in numerous interjectional forms. The fecundity of many of these in regard to derivatives is quite as conspicuous as that of the proper onomatopœias, and may be illustrated by considering the old familiar interjection employed throughout the Indo-Germanic languages to demand, and thence to denote, cessation, quiet, fixity, and the numberless collateral circumstances and objects of which quiet and cessation are either literally or metaphorically descriptive. The interjection in question is *hist!* The behest which it conveys is expressed also in *hush!* But it is "hist" which has become parental, the central idea of the whole of the great group of words which has arisen upon it being that of staying or standing still. If the reader will utter *st*, and watch the process, noting how the tip of the tongue is pressed against the roof of the mouth, just above the teeth, he will perceive that no utterance after *ba* and *ma* requires so little exercise of the vocal organs, or so small a quantity of breath, or so thoroughly puts an end to all further vocal movement. Self-checking, it is an exact type of standing or stopping, and is thus

naturally adapted to furnish an inconceivable number of words, with meanings both physical and figurative. The earliest ascertainable *verbal* shape which the original sound acquired is the Sanscrit *ti-stâ-mi*, or *ti-sthâ-mi*, to stand, represented in Greek by *στᾶω* and *ἵστημι*, in Latin by *sto* and *si-sto*, and in the Gothic tongues by *stan*, etc. From these have descended many hundreds of words, comprising all the most familiar and forcible terms employed in the Indo-Germanic languages to denote staying, and thence, metaphorically, mental and emotional passivity, resolution also, repose, permanence, and unchangeableness. Such of the race as cannot be affiliated upon any one of the main progenitors doubtless sprang up from the original *st* in precisely the same way that in the garden accessory shoots spring up around the principal stem of a lilac-tree. Of the simple word "stand" (the final *d* of which, like the *d* of "sound," is no part of the original), the daily metaphorical use is so varied that the dictionaries ascribe to it no fewer than seventy meanings: standing the test, standing content, standing by one's contract, etc., and besides these there are the compounds, such as "withstand" and "understand." In Scripture these figurative meanings occur incessantly, and in the most beautiful forms and relations, and the references being purely to spiritual things, it becomes delightful to note that the best and most certain key to the true sense of Scripture is the phraseology of common life.

"The grass withereth, the flower fadeth ;
But the word of our God shall *stand* for ever."—*Isa.* xl. 8.

"The works of His hands are verity and righteousness :
All His commandments are sure.
They *stand fast* for ever and ever."—*Ps.* cii. 7, 8.

“ He shall not be afraid of evil tidings :

For his heart *standeth fast*, trusting in the Lord.”—*Ps.* cxii. 7.

The ancient secular poets use the word in ways precisely similar. In the *Odyssey*, Penelope, after her husband's long-protracted absence, is so hard to persuade that it is really Ulysses who stands before her, that Telemachus, chiding her silence and seeming indifference, tells her that she is insensible as a stone. “Nay, my son,” she replies, *θυμός μοι ἐνὶ στήθεσσι τέθηπεν*, “it is that my whole being *stands still* within me,” meaning that she is utterly confounded and overpowered by her mingled astonishment, joy, and misgivings. Æschylus, describing fruit ripe and dropping from the tree, calls it *καρπώματα στάζοντα*, *i.e.* incapable of becoming riper. Virgil, when he places before us that beautiful picture of the sea, so calm that the shepherd-boy walking upon the sands saw his figure reflected in the water, says that this occurred one day, “*cum placidum ventis staret maré*,” “when the sea stood unruffled by the winds.”* The idea is expressed also in the nearly allied Latin word *sterno*, as when Ovid, describing the effects of the deluge, says, “*sternuntur segetes*”—“the corn-fields were laid flat,” the word here depicting not simply the overthrow of the previously erect, but the utter stop put to the sweet soft waving and swaying of a corn-field awaiting the sickle when rippled by a breeze, which renders it so beautiful a symbol of life. Observe, again, how in the ancient poets the simple physical act of standing, as when one is fascinated by some novel and lovely object, is made

* *Ecl.* ii. 26. Imitated, however, from Theocritus, vi. 34, 35, where Polyphemus contemplates his huge outline in the sea as in a mirror.

suggestive of a long train of pleasing ideas. Pindar says of Hercules when he drew near the beautiful oleasters of the Hyperboreans, *τόθι δένδρεα θαύμαινε σταθείς*. We need no more. The entire scene is before the mind. The graceful trees, shining like silver (the peculiar charm of the oleaster), the blue sky beyond them, the sunshine reposing upon the foliage, all is seen on the instant; and we are filled with the same kind of agreeable satisfaction which arises when introduced suddenly to an ample and delightful prospect.

In every case the word under consideration thus acts upon the mind as the keynote of a little melody which it immediately proceeds to generate for itself. In the Virgilian passage it wakes up all our own most treasured recollections of the shore. We "taste in thought again" the sweetness of those peaceful hours in the langesyne, when the waters, touching the wrinkled sands without a sound, transfused into our own hearts their unspeakable calmness, and gave us a new lesson in the amenities of nature. In its plain literal sense and ordinary use the word is prosaic enough. By the touch of the poet it is transformed on the instant; the silent thing becomes vocal, the inanimate moves and breathes. The charm and glory of words is their infinite capacity for being transmuted by the poet into pictures and music, and the more that we accustom ourselves to regard them in this light, the more nearly do we approximate the poet's own spirit. All words are poetry intrinsically; and in reading the poets, unless received as such, we miss their profoundest charm. The reason why the poet makes so peculiarly delicious and wonderful a use of words is, that he is the high priest and interpreter of

nature, and in his spirit recognises more deeply than the generality of men how consummate and sublime is that relation of outward and material things to invisible, spiritual, and immortal ones, in which all language and poetry have their origin and their nutriment.

“The world is full of glorious likenesses ;
 The poet’s power is to sort them out,
 And to make music from the common strings
 With which the earth is strung ; to make the dumb
 Earth utter heavenly harmony, and draw
 Life clear and sweet and harmless as spring water
 Welling its way through flowers.”

Poetry, therefore, cannot be discussed apart from the metaphysics, the origin, the nature, and the composition of language. Men may call it, as some have done, an “abstraction,” or an emotion, or “an idea in the mind,” and talk about it as such, but a clear perception of the philosophy of words is the only key that unlocks its full and boundless meaning. True of poetry, the work of man, how transcendently true of revealed theology!

A good example of the employment of the word “stand” in English poetry is furnished in the celebrated passage in the “Seasons,” where the lady discovers while bathing that not only “Paris on the piny top of Ida” had charms such as those of the celestial Three been “unconfined :”—

“With wild surprise,
 As if to marble struck, devoid of sense,
 A stupid moment motionless she stood.”

Here are portrayed not only her physical attitude, but the utter paralysis of sense produced by the overwhelming shame and terror of the moment. It is interesting to observe that Ovid uses the equivalent word *adstitit* in

narrating the celebrated story of Diana and Actæon. The introduction of the word *stupid* greatly adds to the force of the passage, the primary sense of "stupid" being "fixed" or "insensible."

The relation of *stillness* to the onomatopoeic *st* needs no argument. It is quietude itself. Hence the sublime command to the stormy waves, "Peace, be still!" so grandly foretold in the 107th Psalm, "He maketh the storm a calm, so that the waves thereof are *still*." The magnificent display of power here afforded is no less consolatory than majestic, being representative of the healing efficacy which the love of God can exert over the soul when tossed and disturbed by evils, a condition of which it is impossible to have a more striking emblem than a dark and troubled sea. This is the fact which both the prophecy and its accomplishment are intended to unfold. For the circumstance of the Divine allaying a *material* tempest serves no higher purpose, regarded in itself, than to exhibit Him as a tremendous, and it may be arbitrary, autocrat over the elements. Far more beautiful, sacred, and consistent does it appear when regarded in its true character of a physical intimation of His power and love in *spiritual* operations. In *Comus*, one of the perfect poems, Milton uses the expression with infinite beauty to denote the tranquillizing powers possessed by the music of the lost one's guardian angel,—

"Who with his soft pipe and smooth-dittied song
Well knows to *still* the wild winds when they roar,
And hush the waving woods."

The passage has a fine parallel, too, in the *Æneid*, where Virgil likens Neptune stilling the waves to the calming of an angry and excited multitude by a man of piety and

worth, whose presence inspires respect even in the most turbulent. He concludes this most finished bit of poetry with the words "*arrectisque auribus astant,*" as though incapable of describing such a scene without making an immediate reference to standing, figurative as well as literal. Horace conveys the same general idea in his "*sternere ventos,*" literally "to still the winds." In ordinary conversation, for the same reason, we apply the word "still" to repose, quietude, or standing, in all their varieties, both physical and emotional. It also furnishes innumerable similes. Milton speaks of profound attention as being

"Still as night,
Or summer's noontide air."

Another simple derivative of *st* is the word "*staff*," the uses of which in language exhibit some strikingly beautiful results of men's intuitions of responsiveness. Primarily, a staff is an instrument which enables a person to *stand firm*, by reason of the support which he derives from leaning on it. Hence it has come to be used in all ages as a metaphorical name for *food*, as when we call bread "the staff of life." Hence it has come to be used also as a term for filial aid given by children to their parents. How often do we hear the beautiful phrase, "The *staff* of his declining years"! In the ancient poets there are many examples of this figure. In Euripides the dutiful Polyxena is so denominated. Sophocles applies it to Ismene and Antigone, the daughters of the poor, blind, helpless old Œdipus.* Shakspeare, of course,

* The Greek words are *βάκτρον* and *σκήπτρον*. This does not in the least interfere with the truthfulness of the image, since whatever *names* may be given to things, their representative character must always be the same.

recognises its full value: "The boy," says Launcelot, "was the very staff of my age."

It is obvious from these usages that the essence of the signification of a staff is that of *power*. This shows us why a staff or sceptre is given to kings as a symbol of dominion. It also explains the origin of the different kinds of maces and batons, as used from time immemorial to symbolize authority, and termed the "staff of office." So incomplete, indeed, is the idea of majesty or power unless the staff be present, that the Jews, when mocking our Lord prior to the Crucifixion, not only put a crown of thorns upon His head, but "a reed in His right hand," the most bitter mockery of the whole. For a reed is the natural emblem of impotence and weakness, and in meaning is thus the remotest possible from that of the staff. In Anglo-Saxon *stafan* signified to command.

The use of the baton as an emblem of authority explains a curious phrase in Shakspeare, wherein the very primitive word "stick" is employed in the sense of staff of office. In "Troilus and Cressida," after

"Achilles hath the mighty Hector slain,"

he exclaims—

"The dragon wing of night o'erspreads the earth,
And, *stickler-like*, the armies separate."

In the Elizabethan times a stickler, literally a stick or staff bearer, signified an arbiter, such a one as had for his duty the watching of duels, seeing fair play, etc., and who had authority to separate the combatants if needful. Shakspeare makes the darkness of night perform the same use. Arbiters are often troubled over punctilios; hence

the modern somewhat inelegant verb to "stickle," or insist upon trifles.

From being the symbols, the staff, the baton, etc., became names for the authority itself. Ovid, when he would speak of laying aside the dignity of empire, calls it "*Sceptri gravitate relictâ.*" Another beautiful illustration occurs in Talfourd's "Ion:"—

"So resolved, so young—
'Twere pity he should fall, yet he *must* fall,
Or the great sceptre which hath swayed the fears
Of ages, will become a common staff
For youth to wield, or age to rest upon,
Despoiled of all its virtues."

For the same reason, enchanters and magicians are uniformly represented as bearing what is the same thing virtually—a *wand*. Homer gives one to the famous enchantress Circe. A similar instrument is carried by the magicians of the Arabian Nights. Mercury also had his *virga*, with which he procured or drove away sleep at pleasure. Without their wands enchanters are further represented as powerless. They are described, therefore, as exceedingly careful not to let them out of their possession.

"What, have ye let the false enchanter 'scape?
O ye mistook! ye should have snatched his wand,
And bound him fast. Without his rod reversed,
And backward mutters of dissevering power,
We cannot free the lady, who sits here
In stony fetters fixed, and motionless."

The same idea supplies the meaning of Prospero's decision in the "Tempest:"—

"When I have required
Some heavenly music (which e'en now I do)
To work mine end upon their senses, that

This airy charm is for, I'll break my staff,
Bury it certain fathoms in the earth ;
And deeper than did ever plummet sound,
I'll drown my book."

In Latin a staff is called *baculus*, the diminutive of which word is *bacillus*. Hence the term "imbecile," literally one who has no intellectual *baculus*, no staff to rest upon or wield, neither power nor its symbol.

Comparing these various testimonies, it is easy to gather what must be intended in Scripture by the "staff." For it cannot mean one thing *out*, and another when *in*. When used in connection with *good*, it denotes power exercised by God, or by Him given to man for spiritual purposes. When referred to in connection with *evil*, it denotes, on the other hand, the arrogant assumptions and overbearing of the wicked. Examples of the former are frequent ; of the latter, rare. Perhaps the most striking is that in Isaiah xiv. 5, where it is said that "the Lord hath broken the staff of the wicked." A beautiful example of its higher meaning occurs in the history of David and Goliath. David when preparing to encounter the giant (who is representative of the strength and audacity of spiritual evil) "took his staff in his hand." In its supreme sense God Himself, who is all power, is here meant. In its secondary sense it signifies *reliance* on that power, which can alone carry man successfully through such combats as are in this narrative representatively depicted. Thence to the Christian it also signifies the Gospel, which is God in His Word, and which points or indicates the way to victory and life spiritual, and thus *confers* power. "Though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, yet will I fear no evil, for Thou art

with me; *Thy rod and Thy staff they comfort me.*" This is the reason also why the disciples were commanded to "take nothing for their journey save a staff only;" meaning that they were to go forth into the world relying solely upon God for strength, and that if we would be numbered with them, such likewise must be our own procedure.

The representative character of the staff is further and admirably illustrated in the history of the miracles worked by Moses, all of which are described as having been effected, under the direction of Jehovah, by means of his "rod." Aaron also had his rod, which last "budded and bloomed blossoms, and yielded almonds." That such an event should occur in the ordinary course of nature was in ancient times regarded as so utterly impossible that oaths of peculiar energy and sanctity were accustomed to be sworn upon it. Achilles in Homer exclaims, when venting his rage against Agamemnon—

“Ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον, τὸ μὲν οὐποτε φύλλα καὶ ὄξους
Φύσει, ἐπειδὴ πρῶτα τομὴν ἐν ὄρεσσι λέλοιπεν,
Οὐδ’ ἀναθλήσει.” *

So in the oath of friendship sworn by Latinus to Æneas—

“ Ut sceptrum hoc (dextrâ sceptrum nam forte gerebat),
Nunquam fronde levi fundet virgulta nec umbras;
Cum semel in silvis imo de stirpe recisum
Matre caret, posuitque comas et brachia ferro.” †

* “I vow by this staff, which has produced neither leaves nor branches since it first left its parent stem upon the mountains, and never shall sprout again.”

† “As this sceptre (for a sceptre he chanced to hold in his right hand) shall never more with light foliage produce twigs nor shady branches; since, cut from its stem in the woods, it is once for all

Another interesting derivative from the onomatopoeic *st* exists in the name of *stone*, which substance is so called because of its fixity and insensitiveness. From designating physical qualities, the words "stone" and "stony" thence pass to the designation of corresponding emotional conditions, and in their metaphorical use have a thousand illustrations. "O graceful Amaryllis, O dark-browed nymph, you that look all beautiful, yet are altogether stone!"* The Propœtides, the fable tells us, the first women who lost their sense of shame, were *parvo discrimine*, by slight transition, "changed into rigid stones." Othello exclaims, "My heart is turned to stone; I strike it, and it hurts my hand." So in the "Winter's Tale," where Leontes says of the statue,

"Does not the stone rebuke me
For being *more stone* than it?"

Hence, too, the wording of God's promise to the repentant, that he will remove their "stony heart," and will give them a "heart of flesh." But a stone, from its very character of endurance and fixedness, is the emblem likewise of anything that owes its worth and excellence to being firm and indestructible; and this is by far the most beautiful aspect under which to contemplate its use in metaphor. *All* objects have a twofold relation. They correspond in their high sense with what is good and heavenly. In their lower, or earthly relation, they denote what is evil. The glorious sun itself on the one hand ripens the golden harvests, and mediately sustains the earth in life and beauty; on the other, it parches the soil, and raises malaria, and is productive of the most severed from its mother-tree, and has laid-down-beneath the axe its locks and arms."

* Theocritus, iii. 18.

direful ills : the wind, so grateful a visitant when gentle, when it swells into a tempest ravages and destroys with remorseless and appalling cruelty. In the consideration of figures, the context, therefore, must always be taken as well as the image itself, just as the occasion, the circumstances, and the tone of voice have to be regarded, in order that in ordinary conversation we may distinguish between seriousness and irony. Attending properly to the context, figures are perceived to be always consistent ; they are never unintelligible, and need not be perplexing.

“ Wise is he
Who scans and construes all in harmony.
A sacred side there is to everything,
As given or forbidden, false or true ;
According to the greater truth involved,
One side is always bright, one always dark,
Leaf-like and moon-like.”

Accordingly, when we find the Lord called by Moses “the *stone* of Israel,” we see that the expression refers not to hard-heartedness, but to the solidity and permanence of His attributes : so, too, in Isaiah, where He is called “a tried stone, a precious corner-stone.” In other places the word is put for His power, His love, or His truth, individually. David took, on the memorable occasion above referred to, not only his “staff,” but “five smooth stones out of the brook.” These stones represent the heavenly truths with which we must in like manner arm ourselves when we would re-enact the shepherd’s conduct ; this little episode of his life being not a mere piece of ancient history, but a parable illustrative of the method by which spiritual evils can alone be overcome.

Bearing these facts in view, we are also enabled to perceive the meaning of that remarkable verse in the Psalms : "Happy shall he be (O Babylon) that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones." The "little ones of Babylon" are the first inclinations towards pride, and he who destroys them in their infancy by dashing them against the truths and ordinances of the Divine law, procures for himself the truest happiness.

The onomatopoetic *st* is the parent also of the word "star," in the Persian language *stareh*, in Greek $\alpha\text{-}\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho$, and in Latin *stella*, which last is by permutation from the older form *stera*, like *tenella* from *tenera*. If not absolutely and directly so, "star" is at any rate one of the very many words which "an imperious instinct, the workings of which are powerfully apparent in language, has forced into an imitative form;"—one of the innumerable results of that "inward and inexplicable harmony" in the procedures of the human mind which constantly makes sound the "co-efficient of sense," and impels us to give to words an onomatopoetic character, although they may be derived proximately from a non-onomatopoetic source. The mind is for ever reverting to its original principles of operation. What more natural and reasonable than that the stars should be so called on account of their *fixedness*? Their positions with regard to the eye of the observer change with the rotation of the earth, diurnal and orbital, but their relative places are the same everlastingly. In the language of metaphor, in poësy, in Scripture, they denote what is true, and especially truths of the highest class. A fine singer, a clever actor, is called a "star," because the embodiment of the highest excellence or truth current in

his particular profession. Musæus, narrating the history of the celebrated but unfortunate Hero and Leander (who lived, it will be remembered, on opposite sides of the Hellespont), says of the two lovers—

Ἀμφοτέρων πόλιων περικαλλέες ἀστέρες ἄμφω.
 "Of either shore each was the lovely *star*."

Shakspeare uses the figure many times, and always in the easy and graceful way which shows that there is no real distinction or line of difference between the consummately poetical and the spontaneous language of nature. Thus :—

"Whose *starlike* nobleness gave life and influence
 To their whole being."—*Timon of Athens*, v. 1.

Shelley speaks of the "starlight smile of children," depicting herein its consummate innocence and truth. A smile may be "put on" by an adult, even for purposes of deception; "a man may smile and smile and be a villain," but the smile of a child conveys only the truthful.

An ultimate reference to the stars in their representative character is involved also in the word to "steer," which primarily denotes the piloting of a ship at sea, by means of observations made on the stars, the only possible method before the discovery of the mariners' compass. In the 5th *Æneid* the pilot says to the king—

"Nec litora longè
 Fida reor fraterna Erycis, portusque Sicanos;
 Si modo ritè memor servata remetior astra."*

* "I deem neither the trusty shores of your brother Eryx, nor the Sicilian ports far distant, if I rightly remember the stars I observed before."

We have another pretty illustration of this fact in the name of the celebrated constellation the Pleiades, which is derived from *πλέειν*, "to sail," and was given to it because marking the period when the Greeks were accustomed to commence their voyages, as illustrated in the famous story of the Argonauts.* The pole-star was called by the Anglo-Saxons *scip-steorra*, the "ship-star."

From its use as a nautical term, the word "steer" naturally passed on to the corresponding acts of civil life, and to procedures emotional and moral. Hence a man is said to "steer his way," a guide to "steer the right road," and a prime minister to be "at the helm" of the country's affairs. In all of these acts the particular method in which they are conducted is governed by the individual's perceptions of what is *best*, or in other words, of what is *true to him*. So that when performing them he is literally watching the stars shining in the firmament of his mind; and as he moves along, thus governed and directed by his truths, it is in the same manner correspondentially, that the primeval navigator steered his bark across the waves, his eyes continually directed to the bright and guiding heavens.

Every other member of the innumerable progeny of *st* might be treated of in manner similar to the above. It is unnecessary, however, to do more here than simply quote a few of the derivatives which most plainly convey their meaning. A statue, for instance, is a model of an animal carved in some imperishable material calculated to stand for ever. Natural affection, affection which

* *Vide* Theocritus, xiii. 25, and compare Apollonius Rhodius, i. 107, and Sophocles, *Œd. Tyr.* 795.

stands or endures, like that of a mother for her child, the Greeks called *στοργή*. Hence the name of the bird called the stork, which is celebrated for its affection. Stagnant water is literally that which stands or is motionless. Virgil beautifully applies the equivalent Latin term to the profound depths of the ocean, which are quiet and undisturbed save during the most violent storms. Shelley says as finely,

"Ye icy springs, *stagnant* with wrinkling frost!"

The laws of the realm are called *statutes*, because presumed to be made in perpetuity, just as anything placed upon a solid basis is said to be *established*. *Sic Di statuistis*, "so the gods decreed," says Ovid. *Stability* is the quality of such things; *instability* of their opposites. *Stupor* is a state marked by the cessation of the activities proper to humanity; and *stupid*, in its metaphorical sense, is the character of one who is too dull to be intellectually moved. The Latin name for such a person is "*stultus*." "Substance" * is that which has being or reality (i.e. *stands*). Existence denotes such being; and its contracted form, *essence*, signifies the vital quality or principle of a thing. Thence the adjective "essential," each word having both a physical and a metaphorical meaning. Taciturnity, or standing of the tongue, the Greeks called *στεγνότης*. Their word for "inexorable" was *στυγνός*, as in Bion's description of death—

Καὶ στυγνὸν βασιλῆα καὶ ἄγριον.

—*Adonis* i. 52.

* The occurrence of the radical in the middle of a word, or at the end, comes of one of the operations which gave rise to "compound" words, a department of our subject to be dealt with presently.

Station is a fixed locality. *Staid* denotes a demeanour characterized by the absence of animation. To be *steady* is to be firm and unyielding. A *steadfast* character is one that does not vacillate. Its worth is spoken of as *sterling*. To be *stern* is to behave with a rigour that will not be moved. To *stare* is literally to look with the eyes *standing still*. The *student* is he who concentrates his mind on any given subject. *Studies*, therefore, properly speaking, are "fixed employments," not intellectual ones merely. Virgil, in charming use of this figure, applies the name of *studia* to the continual working of the bees on their "waxen encampments" (*cerea castra*). The earnest exertions of the rowers in a boat-race he calls by the same expressive name. Hence also the word "*studious*," which means *intent*, as when we say "*studious to please*." Ovid applies it to curiosity (Met. iv. 295). *Stature* is the height of a person when *standing*. A *stanza* is the quantity of verse included between the points at which the sets of lines stay or stop. A *stage* is a resting-place of kindred character, as when we speak of the *stages* of life and the *stages* of a journey. To *staunch* is to arrest the hæmorrhage from a wound; a *staunch* friend is one who stands firm to his professions. *Starch* and *stiff* denote things physically difficult to move. Thence they are applied to a demeanour that has none of the pliancy of courteousness. In German, *stolz* signifies "proud" or "unbending." Στοιχῆα, in the Greek language, are the first elements or principles of things, beyond which science cannot penetrate, beyond which there is nothing accessible to man, and at which, accordingly, it *stops*. Hence, in Hebrews v. 12, this word signifies the fundamental principles of Christian doctrine:

τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν λογίων τοῦ Θεοῦ—"first principles of the oracles of God." From first principles, both in physics and the church, all things proceed in order, wherefore *στοιχεῖν* signifies to advance with regularity and beauty. To *persist* is to continue; to *insist* is to be inflexible; to *rest* is to stay or remain. *Instant* is the being or standing close upon; "an instance" is the thing that does this. To *restore* is to make a person or thing "stand again." To *desist* is to "stand away from." *Stunted* is that which has stopped growing. An *obstacle* is that which prevents our going further. *Sturdy*, *stubborn*, *obstinate*, *obstinacy*, imply inflexibility. The point beyond which we cannot go is the "standpoint." Hence the Greek name for noon was *σταθερὰ μεσημβρία*, literally, the standing-point or completion of the day, meaning that the maxima of light and heat are then arrived at.

The number of compounds which rest upon *st*, all involving metaphors, frequently rich and picturesque, is far more considerable than that of the simple words. In addition to those already cited, take "exist," from *existere* = *ex-sistere*; *extant* = *ex-stant*, or that which "stands out;" *extasy* or *ecstasy*, properly *ex-stasy*, *ἔκστασις*, from *ἐξ ἰστασθαι*, literally to remove out of place or accustomed condition; *armistice*, *arma sisto*, to stand away from warlike weapons; *assist*, *ad sisto*, to keep close to one's friend; *apostasy*, *απ* or *αφ-ιστασθαι*, standing away in general, thence, specially, the act of a renegade, or of a false and traitorous man. To the same class likewise belong *constitute*, to put things side by side; *restitution*, to put them back after removal; *institute*, to set up, or cause to stand; *destitute*, literally to pull down what was fixed, thus to demolish and leave helpless; *priest* (by

some referred to *προσβύτερος*), from *προ ἵστημι*, originally to "preside over," as in Aristotle's definition, "Presiding over things relating to the gods" (*Polit.* iii. 14), to which St. Paul's, in Hebrews v. 1, is very similar. Constancy is that which "stands with," *i.e.* firmly and unshakenly. Hence, after primarily denoting physical stability, it denotes faithfulness in affection. The Greeks called this sweet sentiment *εὐσταθεια*, literally "beautiful standing," there being nothing more lovely than a faithful, patient, unwavering affection. One of the most expressive of all is *ἀνάστασις*, literally "standing up again," figuratively the resurrection. Æschylus employs this celebrated word in the physical sense: "When the dust has drunk up the blood of a man once dead, there is no *ἀνάστασις*" (*Eum.* 648). It is the same which is employed in Luke xi. 34, where the Authorized Version reads, "Behold this Child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel."

In the French language the force and beauty of these *st* words is often wholly lost through the suppression of the *s*. The Latin *stella*, *status*, *studia*, etc., have been reduced to *état*, *étude*, *établir*. In studying this great group of words it is important also to bear in mind that many of similar initial have been constructed artificially. "Storm," for example, comes from the same root as tornado and turn, the *s* being a prefix, as in tumble and s-tumble, tenax and s-tingy, the latter in its sense of parsimonious.* There are other words in which the *s* has been inserted for euphony—ab-s-truse, ab-

* Stingy in the sense of churlish is probably a different word, and referable to "sting," the weapon alike of a nettle and of bees and wasps.

s-temious, ab-s-tract, etc., allied to which in nature are dis-tort, dis-turb, dis-tend, dis-temper, dis-tain, etc., which last, abbreviated, becomes 'stain. From the true *st* words must also be distinguished those beginning with *str*, such as *string*, *strive*, *strew*, *strike*, *strict*, *stratagem*, these being of different and various derivation. In *stray* we have a relic of *extra*, the foundation of the former word being *extra vagare*, whence also "extravagant." From *extra*, *extraneus*, in old French *estrange*, likewise come *strange* and *stranger*.

Here, then, in the *st* words we are furnished with another conclusive proof of the ready way in which the amplitude of language has been attained, and of the practical sufficiency of a comparatively small number of roots. It is not all proved by etymology pure and simple, but under the combined light of etymology and poësy, which two things, taken together, show that language is no mere mass of "arbitrary and opaque conventionalisms," and that roots are by no means mere grammatical bases, "mysterious nonentities come from nowhere;" but that the former is a picturesque outcome of the imagination, constantly excited into lively movement by the beauty and impulse of external nature, and that the latter, the roots, are airy messengers charged with meaning, which it is for man to employ indefinitely. The etymology which takes us up only to where the function of poësy begins, and then stops, is no happier than the old hypothesis of the origin of corals, which regarded them as a sort of marine precipitate, without cause and without history.

Closely analogous to *st*, both in origin and function, is the sound produced by the complete closure of the lips, as when we say *hum*, and hence symbolically

represented in the letter *m*. The progeny to which this sound has given birth is also very considerable, and among the metaphors which rest upon it are some of the most charming known to language. Among the early derivatives are found the Hebrew דָּמָם (*dāmam*), “to be silent,” and the Greek μύω, “to close the lips.” In Latin it appears as *mutus*, whence *mute*, and in English also in the expressive word *dumb*, which cannot be pronounced without completely closing the mouth. “Mum,” and to “mumble,” are other forms of the same onomatopœia. Silence being naturally identified with concealment, becomes figuratively its designation. From μύω, accordingly, came μυστήριον, a mystery, μυστικός, mystic, and μυθος, a fable or parable, whence *myth*, literally a something in which the reality is disguised. Hence, again, μνεω, to initiate, and μστυς, a priest, literally (in the Greek) one who unfolds arcana, the function pre-eminently of the preacher. The Hebrew word is constantly used in the Old Testament to denote silence, quiet, cessation, and their collaterals. In Lev. x. 3, for example, “And Aaron held his peace;” and in Job xxix. 21, “They kept silence at my counsel,” meaning they listened to it in silence. “*Dāmam*” is the word employed again in the command given by Joshua to the sun and moon, in the Valley of Ajalon, to stand still. In Ps. cvii. 29 it is used to denote tranquillity, “He maketh the storm a calm, so that the waves thereof are still.” In 1 Sam. ii. 9 it signifies to die, “The wicked shall be silent in darkness.” In Jeremiah it is used variously to denote laying waste and desolation. Quite easy is it thus to perceive the metaphorical idea involved in *δαμω* and *domo*, to subdue or break in; in *domitus*, vanquished,

and in the English "tame" and "indomitable." Total overthrow is implied in the derivatives *damno* and *damnum*, literally to consign to silence and darkness, as when, in bygone ages, unhappy prisoners were cast into hidden dungeons. So with "doom," the condition of one who is condemned. A popular name for the "end of the world," founded on the idea of its being a time of universal judgment, is "doomsday." When an artificial body of water is confined by an embankment or mole, the latter is called a "dam." Thence the name passes on to the water itself, usefully distinguishing the reservoir from the natural well. To "indemnify" is literally to supersede or make null certain damage that has been done. The indemnity is the reparation. "Damage" is of course from the same root. *Domitare* signified with the Romans to overpower through the medium of terror. Hence, through the French *dompter*, the English "daunt," and with the negative prefix, "undaunted." With the Romans also to bear rule or sway was *dominor*, *i.e.* to possess power to subjugate, and if needful, to annihilate. Indirectly we have from this the second syllable of kingdom, serfdom, Christendom, dukedom, etc. Freedom is the realm which is under the control or command of the free; wisdom is the country possessed by those who have "wits." Hence, again, dominion, dominate, predominate, domain, domineer, with the personal titles *dominus*, *domina*, which in Spanish and Italian became *Don* and *Donna*. *Domina*, through the French, has given us dame and madam, and through the Italian *dominicella*, first the French *demoiselle*, then our own "damsel." Beldame is an abbreviation of *belle dame*, literally "fair lady," in which sense it occurs in

Chaucer. Afterwards it came to signify "grandmother," as in Shakspeare—

"Shakes the old beldame earth, and topples down
Steeple and moss-grown towers. At your birth
Our grandam earth, having this distemperature,
In passion shook."

To-day, in strange contrast to the sense of 500 years ago, we use it only in the sense of a noisy hag. Another curious application of a word having its ancestor in *domina* is seen in *Belladonna*, the name of a celebrated poisonous plant, invaluable in medicine, and so called because of the use made of it by the Italian ladies of the Middle Ages. In ecclesiastical Latin, beginning, it would appear, with Tertullian, Sunday, or "the Lord's day," is *Dominica dies*, whence, through the Italian *domenica*, the odd-looking word applied to Sunday by the French—*dimanche*. "Muse" is another descendant of the primitive *m*, signifying literally "to be silent." *Musing* is the retired and quiet action of the mind when abstaining from converse with society. By prefixing the negative *av* (which is the same as *in* and *un*), shortened into *a*, the word *amuse* is procured, literally that which is the opposite of silent thoughtfulness. A mind given to *musings* implies preference for the things of intellect over those of the external senses. It is a philosophical mind. Hence the Greeks gave to the

εννέα θυγατέρας γλαυκώπιδας άνθισιουργους,
"Nine azure-eyed flower-producing daughters,"

to whom they assigned the presidency over literature and philosophy, the name of the *Muses*. Philosophy, in turn, is, according to Plato, the highest and sweetest music, being that which causes our intellectual powers

to move harmoniously. Music is its audible emblem. Hence from the name of the Muses comes that of *music*, literally that which resembles the operation of philosophy in bringing our intellectual powers into amity and concord. This is why Milton said for all time,

“How charming is divine Philosophy!
Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But *musical*, as is Apollo's lute.”

Museum, the name for a collection of curiosities, comes from *Μουσαιον*, the academy at Alexandria, set apart for the cultivation of science and philosophy.

From the same onomatopœtic root have come the verb to “deem,” meaning to conclude or judge finally; and “a-damant,” literally that which cannot be broken or subdued, wherefore Pliny calls this mineral “*infragilis adamas*.” Adamant, by another change, has supplied us with diamant, diamond.

name "deem" "adamant"

CHAPTER XII.

IN contrast with the *st* words, implying fixedness, may be placed a series equal in extent, and of similar origin, the primary allusion conveyed in which is to *motion*. The leading feature of this large and very interesting series is *f*, which letters represent, like *st*, a purely elementary sound, one which comes of the spontaneous and untutored movement of the organs of speech—at all events in the Aryan races. The gentle and sustained flow of breath required for the utterance of *f* is the exact type of what the letters depict when employed in words: it points clearly also to the origin of this new example of an onomatopœtic base, and to its ultimate fecundity when shaped into a root; for with the Aryan races of man—the races which have distinguished themselves in language and intellect, and whose languages contain nearly all the literature of the world—if with no other races—the desire to speak of movement seems to have almost invariably found its vocal outbirth in a gently modulated expiration, such as *f* is produced by, and usually to have given it this identical form, or at all events one of the forms into which *f* is naturally convertible. The variations have been into the nearly allied *pl*, *bl*, *pr*, *fr*, and *br*, these six sounds, reckoning *f* as

the primary one, different as their symbols may appear upon paper, being all naturally exchangeable, more or less, and subject, in all the languages which contain the base we call *fl*, to be substituted for one another. The oldest forms of the fraternity are probably *pl* and *fl*. The chief portion of the derivatives have been furnished by these two, and especially by *fl*, which for convenience may therefore be regarded as the root-sound; unless indeed the root-sound is better considered to consist simply of *l*—not the letter called *el*, but the sound heard at the end of fill, trill, while, eel, gale, etc. It is not improbable that some, perhaps many, of the words belonging to the series now coming before us, though now possessed of an initial *f* or *p*, did in the beginning, or ancestrally, begin really and simply with *l*, the *f* or *p* getting prefixed, in course of time, under the command of the great law which so constantly makes the sound an “echo to the sense.” No doubt there are words containing the letters *fl*, *bl*, etc., which do not refer to motion, and which are of totally different etymology, just as the letters *st* occur in numbers of words not referable to *sto*. These, it is needless to say, do not in the least degree affect the general argument, nor do they interfere with the substantial fact that with the Aryan races *fl* represents movement. The actual first-born of course it is now impossible, as with the earliest derivatives of *st*, to determine with certainty. It is easy, nevertheless, to conceive of their general character, by contemplating the features of their undoubted offspring. Among these we have the Sanscrit *plu*, which signifies to float or swim; the Greek *φλέω*, *φλύω*, *πλώ*, *πλέω*, *πλύω*, *βλύω*, *βρύω*, etc.; the ancient Latin *flo*, *fleo*, *fluo*, and

various old Gothic bases; terms, in every instance, extremely simple in construction, and which describe motion in the most easy and expressive manner possible. In due time these gave birth to progeny of their own, just as, abreast of them, *στωω*, *sto*, and *stâm* became prolific parents, and at last we have the terms of our current phraseology, such as float, fly, flow, blow, which are modifications of the Anglo-Saxon *fleotan*, *fleogan*, *flowan*, *blawan*.

As with all other words, while the circumstance of material or physical movement was thus provided with a designation, these *f* words became at the same moment, by virtue of the natural harmonies of things, appellations for every variety of emotional and intellectual movement. Every derivative of *f*, directly it was framed, took its place in the language of metaphor. Had not the fact a thousand parallels, nothing would be more curiously worthy of our attention, in regard to language, than that there is no kind of motion, either among visible or invisible things, but may be denoted, if we please, by some word founded on this simple *f*. We talk of the flying of birds, the flowing of water, of the flitting of the butterflies among the flowers. Is this to be the all in all of the sense of the words? Never, so long as words have a meaning for mankind. "In the last days it shall come to pass that the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be established in the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills, and people shall *flow* unto it." Virgil says of the Greeks, disheartened by the long resistance of Troy, "*fluere spes*," literally, their hope began to *flow away*. In our own colloquial we daily employ such phrases as flow of feeling, flow of fancy,

flow of spirits, flow of ideas, flow of language, flow of sentiment, all of which secretly present to the mind, and in the most agreeable manner, the idea of a running stream, whence it is but a step to cite the stream itself.

“ I know where by life’s wayside
 There is a crystal spring,
 Where sometimes I sit down and sigh,
 But oftener sit and sing.
 None tarry there so long as I,
 Or there so often be,
 For its streams for no one outward flow,
 As they flow out for me.

In the driest days of summer,
 Its current sweeps along ;
 The winter brings no ice to freeze
 The music of its song ;
 And like a good thought of the soul,
 That wanders out to bless,
 It every day still deeper grows,
 Instead of growing less.

Ask you, my love, where by life’s way—
 On what delightful ground—
 This crystal spring, so rich and rare,
 Is ever by me found ?
 Look down into your heart, dear love,
 As I into thine eyes,
 And while I trace the outward flow,
 Thou mayst behold the rise !”

Take the other words above cited, or their equivalents, and they supply figures equally vivid or touching. “The wicked man *fleeth* when no one pursueth.” Thoughts of old times are said to *flit* across the memory. In adversity, it is a very ancient experience that false friends *fly* away. Many compound words involve precisely the same idea, supplying metaphors which have no

superiors in common use. The "affluents" of a river are the little streams which carry tribute to it: "affluence" is the state of one to whom wealth is constantly flowing. So with the word influence, the verb form of which is used by Virgil to describe the roll of the Eridanus into the "impurpled sea." Figuratively it denotes that species of action of one person or thing upon another by which some of its own properties and virtues are caused to pass over or "flow in" to them.

" I, from the *influence* of thy looks, receive
Access in every virtue ; in thy sight,
More wise, more watchful ; stronger if need were,
In outward strength ;"

a most beautiful picture of the sunny blessings which those whom we dearly love, unceasingly yet unknowingly shed upon our hearts ; not so much by what they say or do, as through the medium of the heavenly sphere which flows from them like the fragrance from some scented tree. Let any one think for a moment of the face of her whom in his soul he loves best in the world, and he will become sensible that in her sweet, though unconscious and secret influence, or *inflowing* for good, lies her most powerful and enduring charm.

Influx, which is the same word in another shape, appropriately describes the benevolent activity of God with regard to His creation, it being solely by the constant "inflowing" of life from Himself that it is sustained in health and beauty. People are prone, however, to think of God merely as a Creator who *acted*, not as a Creator who *acts*. As if it were possible that the world could subsist for a single moment if its Maker did not constantly act into it, and thus preserve it in the order of its

creation. *Confluence*, again, is the point where two rivers unite or "flow together." Hence it is applied to the harmonious union of men's opinions. *Superfluous* is literally "flowing over;" figuratively, more than is needed. A wave is in Latin called *fluctus*; thence comes our figurative verb to *fluctuate*. *Fluency* is the quality of speech which makes it resemble the easy flowing of a smooth river, in Latin *flumen*. An inundation we call a *flood*; and as the incursion of moral evil is like the terrible, overwhelming, and devastating effects of a flood, Scripture constantly applies this name to the ungodly and the powers of darkness:—

" I sink in deep mire, where there is no standing;
I am come into deep waters, where the *floods* overflow me."

" Let not the *water-flood* overflow me,
Neither let the deep swallow me up."

" If the Lord had not been on our side,
When men rose up against us;
Then they had swallowed us up alive,
Then the waters had overwhelmed us,
The stream had gone over our soul."

" The waves of death compassed me,
The *floods* of ungodly men made me afraid."

There is a fine parallel passage in the "Suppliants" of Æschylus (469-471). Horace, too, says of Ulysses, that in spite of all his perils and hardships, he was "never overwhelmed in the waves of adversity." The *πλ* form of the original word furnished the Greeks with *πλέειν*, to sail. Thence a ship was called *πλοτον*, and a sailor *πλωτήρ*. The voyage was designated *πλόος*; wealth acquired by sailing, or commerce, was *πλούτος*;

thence, on the same great principle so often illustrated, the term was applied to riches in general, and to the mythological presiding deity of wealth, Plutus. The idea which gave *πλέειν* to the Greeks reappears in the Anglo-Saxon name for a ship, *flota*, whence our modern word "fleet," signifying a number of ships in company. In the ancient *pl* we find the beginning also of the Latin *pluvia*, the rain, as in the beautiful picture of dying Euryalus, when compared to poppies beaten down by showers, "too heavy for their weary necks." From the French verb *pluvier*, derived from the Latin word, comes the name of the bird called the *pllover*, which is said to delight in rain and a watery habitation.

Naturally associated with the moving of water is the idea of *filling*, such as comes of its continued flow. Hence, with the Greeks, the rising of the tide was called *πλήμη*, the "filling," just as in English to-day we speak of its "ebbing and flowing." Hence likewise the original form of the Greek word for "many," *πλέος*, afterwards changed to *πολύς*, the former giving the comparative *πλείων*. How forcibly is the idea of rapid flowing conveyed by this word, set forth by Xenophon: ὄχλος πλείων καὶ πλείων ἐπέρρει—"multitudes still more and more poured in upon them" (Cyp. vii.) Hence, likewise, the Latin words *plus*, more; *plenus*, full; and eventually, through various channels, or "proximate roots," the English *complete*, *plenitude*, *plenty*, *plenteous*, *ample*, *replete*, *complement*, *plethoric*, *supplement*, *supply*, *surplus*, *accomplish*, *replenish*, etc., all of which convey the idea of "filling" or "filling full," and place before the mind, in the same pleasing, though secret manner as before, the physical occurrence they refer to—high water on the shore, or in

a tidal river. The English word *full* is derived from the same source. When we say that we *fully* understand a thing, or that we are *fully* aware of it, it is saying that it has *flowed into* and filled our minds, just as the high tide fills the channel of the river.

Nothing could be more natural than to use a modification of the same root to designate *weeping*. "To weep," accordingly, is in Latin *flere*. But weeping is only an outbirth, the physical disclosure of an emotion. Hence the word *fleo* and its derivatives pass on to the designation of the sorrow itself, and to other forms of its expression, such as are called in English grieving, bewailing, mourning, and lamenting. A most beautiful instance of this occurs in Virgil's celebrated description of the bird mourning over the loss of her young, imitated from the fourth Idyl of Moschus:—

"Qualis populeâ mœrens philomela sub umbrâ
 Amissos queritur fetus, quos durus arator
 Observans, nido implumes detraxit : at illa
Flet noctem, ramoque sedens miserabile carmen
 Integrat, et mœstis latè loca questibus *implet*."

"As mourning philomel under a poplar shade, bemoans her lost young, which the hard-hearted clown observing in the nest, has stolen away unfledged. But *she* sorrows throughout the night ; and seated on a branch, still renews her mournful song, and fills all places round with piteous wailing."*

* In Moschus the bird is represented as terrified by a snake, which it watches devouring her young. Virgil is imitated in turn by Tasso, in the 12th canto of the *Gerusalemme*—

"Come usignuol, cui 'l villan duro invole
 Dal vido," etc.

And again, very faithfully, as in many other passages, by Thomson, in the "Seasons." *Vide* "Spring," 714-725.

The masterly way in which the words *flet* and *implet* are introduced, greatly adds to the effect of this justly-admired passage. Not that the poet deliberately selected them, for such words are impersonal utterances. It was the genius that was masterly. Virgil, like all other great poets, Shakspeare pre-eminently, wrote multitudes of things of the interior beauty of which perhaps he thought little. Great poets, and all true ones, do this continually. It is their peculiar characteristic, and in it lies their inexhaustible and ever-increasing charm. For the conceptions of such are not only complete and beautiful as to their synthetical expression, but complete in every detail of it. What, however, is chiefly present to their minds, and aimed to be expressed, is the general conception, the picture, the thought, or the sentiment. The details, or constituent elements, those which lie in the words spontaneously and uncarefully made use of to embody it, appear to the poet himself merely as the medium of its exhibition. To his readers, on the other hand, they convey so many perfect and distinct ideas. Every beautiful or subtle thought laid before us by the poet is a little landscape. His object in displaying it is to exhibit the *picturesque* of that landscape; he presents this through the medium of an infinite variety of charming objects and particulars, thrown together not with a view to their individual values, but with reference simply to their use in the collective; and these stand like the trees, the hills, and waterfalls of the material landscapes laid out for us on every side by the Divine Ποιητής. The full enjoyment and appreciation of poetry consist accordingly, not only in the recognition of the general or surface ideas, but of the accessory or component ones

enveloped in the words, in every one of which there is an individual and peculiar beauty and meaningful symbolism, just as there is in the separate hills, and trees, and waterfalls of the material counterpart to which they owe their being. That beauty is discernible, however, only and entirely in proportion to our knowledge of the æsthetics alike of nature and of language. Hence it is that no man understands the whole of a great poet, because, to do so, he must be acquainted with the particulars of all nature and all philosophy. Every man understands a portion of him, and this portion is ample or circumscribed in the precise ratio of his information, literary and scientific, his knowledge of the human heart, and the vividness and activity of his perceptions of natural harmonies.

This is why all true readers and thinkers feel that old Homer himself is even now only beginning to be understood in the profusion of his beauty. For the same reason it is certain that Shakspeare and Milton, Shelley, and P. J. Bailey, and Tennyson, and Schiller, contain stores the unfolding of which will occupy generations. When a great poet is bestowed on the world, he is given not so much for his own day as for the times to follow. "A great poem," says Shelley, "is a fountain for ever overflowing with the waters of wisdom and delight, and after one person and one age have exhausted it of such of the Divine effluence as their peculiar relations enabled them to share, another, and yet another, succeeds, and new relations are ever developed, the source of an unseen and unconceived delight." Let any one reflect on the feelings with which he has read a particular passage of genuine poetry before and after bringing æsthetical con-

siderations to bear upon it, and he will perceive that this is no less inevitable than true.

“ Poetry is itself a thing of God ;
 He made His prophets poets ; and the more
 We feel of Poësy do we become
 Like God in love and power—under-makers.
 And song is of the supernatural
 Natural utterance ; and solely can
 Speak the unbounded beauty of the world,
 And the premortal concords of pure minds.”

The man who, by studying external nature, and cultivating his æsthetic powers, qualifies himself to enter into the sanctities of poetic sentiment and expression, and thence draw bright, and noble, and elevating enjoyments, is himself a true poet, though he may never have written a single verse. As the chemist, by means of his magic tests, detects curious and varied substances where other men see nothing but dull earth and stone, so does the former learn to distinguish beauties where the uninformed cry “ All is barren ! ” Instead of only one thing, or one idea, *he* discerns and enjoys a multitude, and by virtue of this, inhabits many worlds at once, and lives a score of common lives. It is with poësy as with botany—

“ The well-directed sight
 Brings in each flower a universe to light.”

And as with the wild-flowers in their abundance, so is it still with poësy, for God has sown its elements everywhere, over all the earth, “ plentiful as hope.”

Tears being the natural accompaniment of sorrow, they form its universally acknowledged emblem, and consequently a name for it. Hence it is said of the regenerate, that “ God shall wipe away all tears from their

eyes," and that in the promised land "there shall be no more crying." Homer calls war, *πολύδακρυν*, "the many teared." Compare also the celebrated fables of Arethusa and Cyane, told by Ovid in the 5th book of the *Metamorphoses*. It was a lovely fancy of the ancients to say, as in these tales, that when grief gave cause for many tears, the sufferer dissolved into a fountain. Yet was it quite in keeping with the chaste and sprightly perceptions of nature's "respondences" which originated the wonderful mass of myths to which they belong, and by reference to which the whole of them may probably be interpreted. It is from the same relation—that of tears to sorrow—that we familiarly speak of "melting into tears," and of being "dissolved in grief." Pindar compares a copious flood of tears to the water of a bubbling fountain—

Ἐκ δ' ἄρ' αὐτοῦ πομφόλυξαν
 Δάκρυα γηραλέων βλεφάρων,

a simile in which he has been followed by many, but equalled by none, because of the charming allusion conveyed in the onomatopœtic *πομφόλυξαν*.

The ancient Greek and Hebrew names for tears are strictly onomatopœtic, having been formed, like our own word *drop*, from the sound of dropping water. In the original Hebrew of 2 Sam. xiii. 36, the words translated "wept with great weeping," are in sound as well as sense, "there was a great dropping." The Greek word was *δάκρυ*, also written *δάκρυμα*, which last is represented in Latin, by permutation of the initial, under the varied shapes of *lacruma*, *lacrima*, *lacryma*, and *lachryma*, whence our own "lachrymose." With the framers of Latin the negative prefix *a* gave the word *alacer*, literally non-

tearful; figuratively, gladsome, cheerful, sprightly, as used on several occasions by Virgil and by Terence, and which gave in turn, *alacritas*, the nature of joy being to declare itself in activity, just as that of sorrow is to be passive. By omission of the *c* the Latin *lacrima* became the French *larme* (as in *fait* from *factum*, and *œil* from *oculus*), and through similar omission, and change of the *d* into *t*, the Greek *δάκρυ* subsists in the English "tear." The history of this word supplies a striking illustration of the philosophic fact that terms now having no apparent affinity with natural sounds, are nevertheless indebted to them for their existence.

In the same primary relation, namely, that of weeping and sorrow, is found the origin of the words *plaint* and *plaintive*, also of *complain*, *suppliant*, to *plead*, *implore*, *deplore*, and *explore*. The latter come from the Latin *ploro*, which has the same meaning as *fleo*, and in their primary sense denote acts naturally associated with weeping. *Explore* does not now appear to involve any reference to weeping, but originally, *explorare* signified, like *implore*, to try to affect the mind of another by means of tears, as usually done by those who are seeking to obtain pardon for an offence, or to excite sympathy or pity. Thence *explorare* denoted the earnest desire to accomplish any other kind of purpose, eventually acquiring its current signification of a desire to procure information by earnest endeavour, without reference either to the mode or object of the search.

The rapidity of growth exhibited by plants in general during spring and early summer also conveys ideas of onward movement or flowing. Hence, with the ancient Greeks, the word for "to sprout" or shoot forth, as

plants do, was *βρύω*, so charmingly employed by Sophocles in his description of the sacred grove at Colonos, where he tells us of the luxuriantly shooting laurels, hidden among which sing the "innumerable sweet-mouthed nightingales." Figuratively, *βρύω* was employed also by the Greek poets to denote abundance or luxuriance of any other kind, as in the seventh Orphic hymn, *καλοῖς ἄστροισι βρύουσα*—"abounding with beautiful stars." From *βρύω* comes embryo, the earliest germ or bud; also Bryony, the name of those incomparable hedgerow climbers, supreme among our wild-flowers in regard to rapidity of growth, the one vine-like and tendrilled, the other seeming a green cascade.

From *f* is derived also the Latin word *flos*, genitive *floris*, whence the French *fleur*, and our own "flower." Under what particular suggestion of nature the name was given is not recorded. Possibly it may have been applied because of the tender flowing forth of flowers from the bosom of the earth. Or it may refer to their speedy departure or flowing away, a flower being the most natural of all emblems of the fading and evanescent. "Beauty is vain, and favour deceitful." David compares man to the "flower of the field." Elsewhere it is said that "man cometh forth as a flower, and is cut down." The prophet tells us that "all flesh is grass, and the goodness thereof as the flower of the field." Whatever the precise etymological meaning of the word, over the figurative value and use there can be no uncertainty. Flowers, called by Pliny "the joy of plants," are associated with the most agreeable period of the year, and the loveliest aspect of the plant on which they grow is that which it presents when the flowers are open. Hence the

brightest season of a thing, the best expression, the most delightful playing forth of an idea of any kind, is universally described by reference to flowers, as when we speak of the flower of the flock, the flower of one's age, the flower of youth. Jessie was the "flower of Dunblane." With Pindar no metaphor recurs more frequently. Jason, the famous navigator, he calls *ναυτῶν ἄωτος*, the flower of sailors. Perfect and absolute justice he terms *δίκας ἄωτος*. Tasso is also very fond of it, as when he calls Dudon "fior degli Eroi," flower of heroes, an expression which recalls a similar one in Ariosto, "the flower of martial fields," * not to mention the celebrated lines in the 8th *Æneid* :—

" O Mæoniæ delecta juvenus,
Flos veterum virtusque virûm, quos justus in hostem
Fert dolor."

Classic literature, in a word, abounds with such expressions, and many of them are used again and again by the same writer. Hence again the familiar figures, flowers of speech, flowers of rhetoric, flowers of fancy. Poetical compositions being the "flowers of the pen," choice collections of verses are called *Anthologia* and *Florilegia*, literally, in each case, culled or gathered flowers. On the same principle, anthologies are in English called *Chaplets*, *Garlands*, and *Wreaths*. The most conspicuous and showy colour met with in flowers is red. Hence a person of abundantly roseate complexion is said to be "florid," flower-like, adorned or dressed with the vivid hue of the oleander, which was probably the earliest, or at least one of the first to receive the name of "rose." The florid or roseate condition, in its most delicate degree, and when intermittent, is

* Ger. Lib., iii. 37. Orl. Fur., iii. 42.

denoted by the word "blush," another most charming metaphor, the word itself belonging to the collateral group which includes blossom and bloom. Cheeks which become unwontedly roseate are said to "flush," another way again of saying that they grow "flower-like;" and as the state or condition of being decked with flowers implies the sweet fantasy of overflowing ornament, "florid" becomes an epithet for excessive embellishment, as when we speak of a florid style of architecture. Blossom and bloom are employed as metaphors almost as frequently as "flower." We speak of the bloom of youth, the bloom of beauty, the bloom of life. Shakspeare has "the blossoms of fortune;" and going once again to the poetry of the Hebrews, how beautiful the prophecy in Isaiah xxxv. : "The desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose; it shall blossom abundantly, and rejoice even with joy and singing."

To "flourish" (Latin *floresco*, French *fleurir*) is direct from the name of the flowers (*flos*, *fleur*), and thus conveys, in the same graceful manner, the idea of an exuberant flowing forth, progress, or *blooming* of the thing referred to. Hence it is used in the same sense as "flower," both with reference to man, as in "The righteous shall flourish like a palm-tree," and as applying also to towns, nations, arts, and sciences. This, indeed, is the uniform function in all languages of their respective words for flowers and flourish, inasmuch as the figurative uses of the names of material objects are precisely the same with all nations and in all ages, because proceeding on principles wholly independent of time, of ethnical relationship, and the communications of social intercourse. In the Greek, *ἀνθος* signifies not merely a

flower, but joy, delight, pleasure, and virginity ; ἀνθῆω, in the same language, means to prosper, and ἀνθίζω to embellish ; ἀνθηρὸς is metaphorically lovely or graceful. So natural to the human mind is the perception of these relations, that translators require no instruction how to convey the idea of such words. They instinctively perceive that ἀνθέμιον, for instance, though literally “a little flower,” carries with it every one of those figurative meanings which they would themselves express by flower, as a beautiful child, an elegant sonnet, or a poetical thought. Because of the same original agreement, many things in nature which are in no degree vegetable, also in art and science, are familiarly called by the name of flowers. Crystals are the blossoms of the mineral world. The curious and pretty chemical phenomenon termed *efflorescence* derives its name from the same resemblance. So does that of the “frost-flowers,” which, as Albert Durer’s little daughter used to say, “God paints early in the morning on the window-panes.” With flower, bloom, blossom, etc., are also etymologically connected the words *plant* ; *prata*, the meadows ; and *frondes*, leaves.

“ Nunc omnis ager, nunc omnis parturit arbos ;
Nunc *frudent* sylvæ, nunc formosissimus annus.”

“ Now every field springs, now every tree is budding forth,
Now the woods *flow* with green foliage, now is the loveliest of the year.”

Little inferior as a poetical image is that one in Ossian, “So hears a tree, in the vale, the voice of Spring : it *pours* its green leaves to the sun, and shakes its lovely head.” *

The two Greek words for a flower, ἄνθος and ἄνθος, are

* Temora, Book III.

both of onomatopœtic origin, the former being derived from $\alpha\omega$ or $\alpha\epsilon\omega$, to breathe or blow, and thus literally signifying the breather or odour-giver:—

“ So from the root
Springs lighter the green stalk ; from thence the leaves
More airy ; last, the bright consummate flower
Spirit odorous *breathes* ;”

while $\alpha\nu\theta\omicron\varsigma$ is connected radically with the genetic base of *animus* and *anima*, the wind, the breath, the soul, the spirit. The same idea is involved probably in “blow,” as spoken of flowers, the figurative sense of which last would in that case seem to be threefold. There can be no doubt that the idea of breathing or blowing underlies the word *frago*, to smell sweet, or evolve “fragrance ;” and this one being formed, language has not to hesitate a single instant in describing the charities—the “fragrance of good actions,” the “fragrance of a good life.” No wonder that by another easy metaphor the most fragrant of familiar fruits received its ancient name.

“ Qui legitis flores, et humi nascentia *fraga*,
O pueri !”

“ Ye swains, who gather flowers, and *strawberries* lowly upon the ground.”

To retain the good old name for the modern scientific appellation of the strawberry, *Fragaria*, literally, as we have seen, “the fragrant thing,” was no more than to acknowledge its deserts. The French, in their name for this fruit, are not far behind, calling it *fraise*, literally the cool, the new, the fruit of refreshing. The senses of smell and taste are most intimately allied. Hence the metaphorical word “flavour,” which signifies, essentially, the scent of a thing.

To exhaust the illustrations of metaphorical terms founded upon *f* would require a volume: here it is unnecessary to particularize more than a few others of the less obvious. To *play*, for instance, signifies literally to sport about like the chasing and retreating waves upon the sands. To *please* is to excite agreeable emotions by means of active or flowing kindness. Hence *pleasure*, *pleasant*, and *complaisant*. To *bless* is only another form of "please," with a wider and holier meaning. Hence "a blessing," and the heavenly benediction "Bless you!" *Bliss* is properly the name for the happiness so produced, *i.e.*, full or complete happiness, the original meaning of the Anglo-Saxon *blissian* being "to rejoice thoroughly." A person who acts in an easy, flowing manner is *bland*. Hence "*blandishments*"—fascinations which flow round and captivate us, just as, when enslaved by the sweet sorcery of the rising tide, the water often surrounds and imprisons us unawares. Connected with these is *blithe*, a word but little different from *pliant*. Capacity for easy motion or bending is the physical meaning of these words; thence they denote, figuratively, what is buoyant, lively, and joyous. *Frank* and *free* denote that which is unconstrained. *Fleet* designates that which proceeds or flows swiftly, just as we call flowing water "a *running* stream." To *flock* is to assemble or flow together, as a flock of sheep. Hence the extended phrase of ideas "flocking into the mind." And as a Christian minister is a "pastor" or "shepherd," his congregation becomes, figuratively, his "flock." A *firt*, from the Anglo-Saxon *fleardian*, to trifle with, is one who is perpetually moving or changing. Snow while falling is said to come in *flakes*; it is then that

these flakes have language : when settled upon the ground they are flakes no longer. Hence the exquisite pathos of the lines in Longfellow :—

“ Soft was the voice of the priest, and he spoke with an accent of kindness,
But on Evangeline’s heart fell his words as in winter the snow-flakes
Fall into some lone nest from which the birds have departed.”

Movement implies diffusion. Hence in the base before us we find the origin of many of the words which denote expansion, breadth, horizontal extent, and levelness of surface. Such are *πλατὺς*, whence “platitude,” literally “flatness,” figuratively an uninteresting and monotonous repetition, such as in nature is represented by a “common,” or a “plain,” which last is from the same root, denoting “rolled out.” “Flat” itself belongs to the same brotherhood. Milton speaks of the “flat sea.” Figuratively we say that trade is “flat” when in commercial circles there is but little movement; that a person is “flat” if not animated in conversation, and that an evening party goes off “flatly” when deficient in liveliness. Through the Latin *planus* come other familiar figures. A “plane” in geometry is, metaphorically, a flat surface; the carpenter’s plane is the instrument which makes things “flat.” *Platanus*, the plane, is the tree with the broad leaves, so that in Southey’s well-known epithet we have more than the sense requires. Another set of very interesting metaphors is found in connection with the German *blasen*, in Anglo-Saxon *blæsan*, whence, through one channel, or another, blow, blast, bluster, blaze, etc.

flat
sheer

Among these is to be reckoned the heraldic term to "blazon," literally to sound the trumpet, as at the tournaments, figuratively to describe the armorial devices borne on one's family shield.

The list might again be indefinitely enlarged by the citation of words used in foreign and dead languages. In the Greek, for instance, there are many such, as *φλέδων*, loquacity; *φλέων*, an abundance of fruit; and in the Anglo-Saxon, *fleardian*, "to err;" *flionne*, "to escape;" *flima*, "a runaway;" *freolic*, "liberal;" *freon*, "to love;" whence *freond*, "a friend." *Fruma*, "the beginning," from which all things proceed or flow, is of the same origin, being identical in essence with the Greek and Latin *πρὸ* and *præ*, which signify "before;" that is, at the beginning or spring-head of the thing or circumstance referred to. *Fruma* is the base of our own preposition "from," which thus means "fountain" or "beginning." "Light comes *from* the sun," is literally, "Light comes *beginning* the sun," or "Light comes *fountain* the sun."

Through this channel we also possess *primus*, *prime*, *prior*, *prince*, *princess*, *prompt*, and many other words denoting that which is first, foremost, or at the beginning, head, or fountain of things. As for the prepositions *πρὸ* and *præ*, they form the first members of multitudes of compound words, giving in every case the idea of precedence; for instance, *provision*, *preamble*, *prelude*, *precede*, *predicate*, *prophecy*, *prologue*, *proem*. A very interesting derivative is found also in the Greek adverb *πρωί*, "early" or "in the morning," a frequent New Testament word; the essential feature of morning being advance. Another occurs in "prone," literally "inclining to,"

applied by Horace to the year, in the sense of "gliding away."

Whatever demerits may pertain to English when placed in comparison with the Continental tongues, it at all events preserves the fine old force of the ancient onomatopœtic roots. While in the French language many of the words derived from *st* lose their emphasis by the suppression of the *s*, the Italians not infrequently despoil the *fl* words of the *l*. *Placere* they have changed to *piacere*; *pluviosus* to *piovioso*, *πλανητης* to *pianeta*, *planta* to *pianta*, *flos floris* to *fiore*, *florescere* to *fiorire*. Although the original sense-giving element is effaced, through these, again, we have some very interesting metaphors, as "pantaloon" and "piano," literally a plane, gentle, low, and subdued tone, the complementary strength being expressed in the second though seldom used part of the name—*pianoforte*.

CHAPTER XIII.



PROCESS concurrent with the entire developmental history of the Aryan languages, one in importance and magnitude unexcelled, has been the construction of Compound words. The fabrication of this class of words illustrates in countless instances, and in the best possible manner, the spontaneity of metaphor. Many of them, no doubt, are simply descriptive terms, as in the names of the birds called the red-breast, the woodpecker, and the wagtail; but by far the greater number are essentially and originally figurative. Words of the class referred to have already received incidental notice. "Pianoforte," the last in the preceding chapter, is a case in point:—it now becomes proper, however, to deal with them from an independent point of view, especially as the kinds of figure which they exemplify introduce us to quite new considerations. Some of the Aryan languages, such as Sanscrit, Greek, and German, possess compound words of extraordinary length, and so elaborate that to indicate their full meaning when translated they must be rendered member by member. In Greek occur *δακτυλοκαμψόδυνος* and *καταρχαιρεσιάζομαι*, the former signifying, literally, "causing-pain-in-bending-the-fingers," and the latter, "I-am-corruptly-influenced-in-decisions-at-public-assemblies." In English there are

compound words which will match these Greek ones in number of letters. There are plenty of such as transubstantiation, infinitesimal, indivisibility, heterogeneous. But the English compounds are seldom equivalent to the Greek in complexity either of meaning or structure. The match in these particulars would be found rather in many German words, *buchdruckerkunst*, for example, "the-art-of-printing," *achtzehnhundertjährlig*, "eighteen-hundred-years-old," and *Staatseisenbahnverwaltungscomité*, "deputies-for-the-management-of-the-railways-of-the-State." The resemblance, as regards the English language, is presented in some of those admirable strings of elementary terms, often heard from the lips of orators, which need only a succession of hyphens in order to correspond precisely with *καταρχαιρεσιάζομαι* in spirit; and which, were the hyphens omitted, and the entire string consolidated, would correspond also in form. A memorable speech once contained the phrase "the-never-to-be-thoroughly-adjusted-struggle-between-capital-and-labour." An ancient Greek would probably have condensed this into a couple of words, and the same would have been done by a master in Sanscrit. It is the wonderful strength and richness, as well as the abundance of the compound words, in connection with their poetic quality, in Greek, which has rendered the language of Homer the rapture of all ages. Chapman, in his translation of the "Iliad," attempted, as all will remember, to copy them whenever practicable. The genius of the Aryan languages being favourable to the construction of compounds, words of this character probably existed almost in the very beginning. The earliest derivatives from the onomatopœtic bases of language were, in all likelihood, not very

different from what we now call monosyllabic words. This term must not be restricted too rigorously to what the Spelling-book calls monosyllables. The proper conception of a monosyllabic word is of one which is uncompounded, and complete in itself, as a vocal symbol, though as lengthy as "ripple," or even as the Hebrew word for to sneeze—*ateesh'ah*. The evidence is all in favour of the belief that such words were the primary ones; and that they would amply suffice for the purposes of intellectual commerce is upon various grounds indisputable. We have already seen that in order to make new words, words descriptive of new objects, new occurrences, or new kinds of action, a very trifling change in the tone or the accentuation of existing ones is quite sufficient. It is effected by simple permutation of the vowels, as in "ripe" and "reap," "star" and "steer," "drive," "drift," "a drove," and "a drover," a "slope" and to "slip," to "slide," and a sleigh, sled, or sledge, *veho*, I carry, and *via*, a path; it is effected also by the introduction of single consonants. That monosyllabic words are competent to express all that is most interesting in the everyday life of human nature, is declared, independently, by the still extant profusion of such words, received from the Anglo-Saxon, in familiar speech. Whatever may be demanded by stateliness or fashion, when feeling desires to express itself, it invariably falls back upon the little words, and in these finds its profoundest eloquence, its sweetest energy, and most exquisite pathos. Love, hope, my wife, my boy, my girl, the sun, the stars, the rain, the snow, the oak, the rose, the green grass, the sea, birth, life, death:—in English, at all events, when the heart desires to speak, it asks for nothing more than monosyllables.

“ When sparrows build, and the leaves break forth,
 My old sorrow wakes and cries,
 For I know there is dawn in the far, far north,
 And a scarlet sun doth rise;
 Like a scarlet fleece the snow-field spreads,
 And the icy founts run free,
 And the bergs begin to bow their heads,
 And plunge and sail in the sea.

O my lost love, and my own own love,
 And my love that loved me so !
 Is there never a chink in the world above,
 Where they listen for words from below ?
 Nay, I spoke once, and I grieved thee sore,
 I remember all that I said,
 And now thou wilt hear me no more—no more,
 Till the sea gives up her dead.

Thou didst set thy foot on the ship, and sail
 To the ice-fields and the snow ;
 Thou wert sad, for thy love did not avail,
 And the end I could not know ;
 How could I tell I should love thee to-day,
 Whom that day I held not dear ?
 How could I know I should love thee away,
 When I did not love thee anear ?

We shall walk no more through the sodden plain
 With the faded bents o'erspread,
 We shall stand no more by the seething main
 While the dark wrack drives overhead ;
 We shall part no more in the wind and the rain,
 Where thy last farewell was said,
 But perhaps I shall meet thee and know thee again
 When the sea gives up her dead.”

Here we have about one hundred and twenty-five distinct and independent words, not more than six or seven of which are compound.

The simplest of the onomatopœtic words show them-

selves competent also to contribute largely to man's conversational needs, by employment in the figurative or metaphorical manner. This has appeared already in the case of *mur*, the interjectional *st*, and several others. Compare with them dash, crash, rush, crush, chip, chop, crack, gurgle, jingle, quack, snarl,—the thousand or more, of the kind, in the Aryan languages taken collectively, which denote, in the first place, a sound, and then, metaphorically, in very many cases, something in itself noiseless. A man running swiftly and anxiously is said to “rush;” commercial ruin is described as “a crash;” hopes are said to be “crushed;” a boastful pretender to medical skill is “a quack;” the quaint architectural carvings placed at the orifices of waterspouts are “gargois,” or “gurgoyles,” from the French *gargouille*, literally “gurglers.”

Over and above all as a proof of the sufficiency of monosyllabic words for human language, is the dual fact that in the Semitic tongues compounds are very rare, and that the great mass of the fundamental vocabulary is of the character illustrated in the above-mentioned ripe and reap, etc. In Hebrew new words are made by changing the vowel sound, as in לֶחֶם, 'ōkkel, food, אָכַל, 'ākhal, to eat; by dropping or adding a consonant, as in גַּן, gan, a garden, גַּנָּן gānan, to shelter; by adding to the root-word one of the six following letters, thence called “formative,” א, ה, י, מ, נ, ת; and lastly, by all three methods combined, a metaphor being very often involved, as in אָבָהָק, 'ābhāq, dust, נִבְחָק, nē'ebhaq, to wrestle, which last correspond with the Greek πάλη and παλαίω, and the equivalent κόνις and συγκονιόμαι.

At whatever period in the history of the development

of the earliest Aryan languages the tendency to agglutination began to manifest itself, it is interesting to observe how constantly the purely literal or descriptive, and the figurative or metaphorical, co-operate, even in the very oldest languages of which there are memorials. In Sanscrit a bird is called *viha-ga*, "the frequenter of the air," and a cloud *ab-hra*, the "water-bearer." The bee, with the ancient Greeks, was sometimes called *ανθηδών*, literally, "the feeder-on-flowers," and one of the names for the hare was *δασυπους*, "hairy-foot." Coming nearer to our own age, the Anglo-Saxons, when they wished to designate that which with the Greeks we now call *rhetoric*, united their colloquial *speech* and *craft* (occupation) and made "speech-craft." Wiclif, when he translated the Bible (A.D. 1380), finding no word in the English language denotive of "resurrection," framed for it the descriptive compound "aghen-rising." Identically the same plan is followed at the present day. Simple words of long-accustomed use are conjoined, as in post-office, steam-engine, news-paper; or resort is made to the classical tongues, resulting in such as photograph, telegraph, telephone, microphone. Very strikingly do such words declare that language is not so much a thing that has been made, an instrument completed by our forefathers, as a living organization, growing with our own growth, constantly advancing and expanding, by virtue of its own internal energies and capacities.

Compound words usually appear as polysyllables. But in the languages of modern, civilized mankind, many have become incredibly contracted, especially through the compressing aptitude of the French, to whom are owing "aid" from *ad-juvare*; "puny" =

puis-né from *post-natus*; “surfeit” from *super factus*, literally “overdone;” “corset” from *corpus*=*corps*, and *serrer*, to squeeze. Façade, after the same manner, is from *facies domus*; and “peruse” from *per video*=*pour voir*, literally to see or look through, thence, figuratively, to read or interrogate:—

“Myself I then perused.” . . .

Sometimes entire phrases are thus contracted. *Alors*, Italian *allora*, is a condensation of *ad illam horam*; *aucun*, Italian *alcuno*, of *aliqui uno*; *même* of *semet ipsissimus*. In Rabelais the Latin *unus quisque* becomes *chascun*, which in modern French is *chacun*. The French *désormais*, henceforth, which written out analytically would be *d’es or mais*, is a contraction of *de ipsa hora magis*, literally “from this present hour,” and bears an exact resemblance to the polysynthetic words of the North American Indians. But we need not go out of England. In Lancashire the time to leave off work in the evening is *diligon*=daylight gone. In Yorkshire the wooden frame used for drying newly-washed clothing, elsewhere called a clothes-horse or a clothes-maiden, is a *wintridge*=winter-hedge, *i.e.* the substitute for the natural or summer hedge. In Wiltshire farmyards the hay-loft is constantly *t’aylot* or *tallot*. Compare “*chervil*,” condensed from “*chærophyllum*,” literally the herb “rejoicing” or abounding in foliage; and *alas*! which is a contraction of the Italian *ahi lasso*—ah, weary!

In all compound words which have been constructed upon regular principles, the constituent members are usually discoverable with the greatest ease. A compound must needs have a base, adjoined to which, either as a

prefix or as an affix, is some other word which qualifies the signification, and often renders the meaning figurative. Two substantives may be conjoined, as in milk-maid, house-maid, mer-maid, in which the root-word is *maid*; or a substantive and an adjective, or a substantive and a verb;—or any one of these may be qualified with a preposition, or some kind of termination may be appended. *Pre*-position itself is an example of the former; terminations are illustrated in *viv-id*, *man-ly*, *cyn-ic*. The root, the prefix, the affix, are respectively determined by comparison of the word with others which resemble it. *Viv-id* is compared with *rap-id*, *lur-id*, *flor-id*; *cyn-ic* with *crit-ic* and *class-ic*; *con-tent* with *con-duce* and *con-sider*. The root of a pure Latin word, such as *ut-ilis*, is similarly discovered by the light of *fac-ilis*, *fert-ilis*, *sim-ilis*, *ag-ilis*, *doc-ilis*. It may be unhesitatingly asserted that no compound word can be thoroughly understood in default of exact knowledge of the prefix and the suffix as well as of the radical or base. A prefix may consist of no more than a single letter; the words derived from the Greek which employ its negative *av*, often shorten it into *a*, as in *a-cephalous*, *a-chromatic*, *a-pathy*, *a-morphous*, *a-theism*. Furthermore, in the construction of compound words a letter has often been inserted to serve the purpose, as above mentioned, of a euphonic cement. This is conspicuously illustrated in most of the English words ending in *m-ent*, *argu-m-ent*, *detri-m-ent*, *emolu-m-ent*, etc. Another instance occurs in the *d* of *re-d-ound*, *re-d-undant*, *re-d-undance*, beautiful metaphors taken from the inflowing of the waves of the sea. So again in *re-d-olent*, literally to smell with exceeding repetition of sweetness—"redolent-que thymo fragrantia mella." To the same class belong

re-d-eeem and re-d-emption, the ultimate root of which is *emo*, to buy. Occasionally the root itself consists of only a single letter, a ready example of which occurs in the very interesting interjectional verb-root *i!* literally "go!" Nothing is more certain than that interjectional commands and requests, appeals and warnings, must have held a foremost place among the primitive genetic forms of human speech. The primæval equivalents, whatever they were, of go! come! look! stop! hark! give! tell! would naturally precede the elaborated forms of address which involve time and person, and which grammarians have classified into "conjugations." The conjugational forms would arise out of the interjectional base in the degree that they were needed; often, no doubt, so swiftly as to be almost contemporaneous; it would remain true, nevertheless, that the imperative was the parent of all. No element more simple or satisfactory can be arrived at in the dissection of any verb whatever, either ancient or modern, than is presented in its imperative. The ancient Oriental tongues abound with verbs which retain the interjectional root; their simplest, earliest, and most expressive verbs were obviously founded upon exclamations. No wonder that among the effete hypotheses as to the origin of language is found one which refers it purely to interjections. That *i!* is an interjection of this character is shown by the *hie!* of our own language, as when Juliet says—

"Hie hence! begone! away!"

And how fecund have been these onomatopœtic verb-roots *i!* itself illustrates, being the base of numbers of such words as *ambîent*, *transîent*, *transît*, *circuit*, *circuitous*, *ambîtion*, *sedîtion*, *inîtiate*, *inîtial*, *exît* (the Romans

called death *exitium*), obituary, *iterate*, re-*iterate*, *itinerant*, *itinerary*, all of which are metaphors having reference to going, moving, departing, travelling, or journeying. The first person singular, present indicative, of the Latin verb which grew out of *i!* is *eo*. Hence through the adjoining of the several prepositions, *ab-eo*, *ad-eo*, *re-d-eo*, *co-eo*, *per-eo*, *trans-eo*, *ex-eo*, *sub-eo*. Among the modern derivatives from these, transformed a good deal by passage through the French, are *issue*, literally a going out; and *perish*, literally a going away completely, thence to be ruined, lost, or destroyed irrevocably. Ovid uses the word in its original or physical sense to denote the melting of the snow. From "perish" in turn come *perishable* and *imperishable*, a word of twelve letters, the root represented by the solitary vowel in the centre.

Most of the lengthy compound words found in the classical tongues and in modern English consist of those which begin with a preposition. The property of the preposition, when so employed, is to confer an accessory meaning having reference to time and space, and truly marvellous is the consequent augmentation of the supply of figurative or metaphorical terms. Take the very first word cited in this volume as in common figurative use—the verb "to see," with its substantive "sight." Under the influence of the preposition, these words become capable of describing the kind, the extent, or the object of the inspection. In-sight is seeing into the middle or heart of a thing:—the poetic or Shakspearean faculty;—that which instead of fluttering about the surface, the function of the prosaic mind, pushes at once through the veils and integuments, "sits i' the centre, and enjoys bright day." Over-sight, in Latin called *inspectio*, is pro-

perly and originally "superintendence," as expressed in the appellation of the functionary called the "overseer." By one of the curious vicissitudes to which words are subject, oversight now commonly signifies a failing to notice, thence a mistake or omission. It is much easier, says Carlyle, for the vulgar and uninformed when disposed to criticise, to *oversee* than to see. How expressive again is "fore-sight," the Anglo-Saxon equivalent of "prudence," an altered form of *prudens*, which last in turn is an abridgment of *pro-videns*, literally "seeing before." The *vid-co* words and their prepositions supply countless fine metaphors. From *pro-videre* we have Providence, *pro-vision*, and *pro-vident*, with its negative *im-pro-vident*, which is the same, etymologically as well as in the business of life, as "im-prudent;" also, through the French *pour-voir*, to "pur-vey." The "pur-veyor," in days gone by, was an officer of the royal household, whose duty it was to see that there was plenty of food for the king's table. So, when one person "ad-vises" another, it is literally describing personal "views," views being literally the "things that are seen," first, in the landscapes of material nature, figuratively, in the world of thought. "Advice" is a delineation, as it were, of the speaker's mind. The idea of inspection is conveyed again in "sur-vey," through the French, from *super-videre*, a nearer resemblance to which is preserved in supervision. *E-vident* denotes that which can be clearly seen or distinguished. Pliny, descanting upon the inimitable clearness of the authors of ancient Greece, bestows upon them the epithet "evidentissimi." Evidence, in law, is that which furnishes proof, literally the testimony of an eyewitness. To re-view, and to re-visit, are to look at

over again. An inter-view is a looking between, exchanging with one another. When a Frenchman parts from his friend he says *au revoir*, literally "till we again see." When unkind or jealous feeling arises, the looks are "askance," literally awry or oblique; and as this is the contrary of an honourable and straightforward looking, the action is in Latin called *in-vidia*, whence "invidious;" and by contraction, the French *en-vie*, whence "envy," the most shameful of all abuses of God's munificent gift—the never-sufficiently-valued privilege of seeing.

" Envy rankles in ignoble breasts,
And stings the base man who doth foster it :
Whilst he, the envied, feels not the fierce pang
Which doth afflict the other."

"Envable" carries a different sense, the Latin preposition *in* having two distinct meanings. The *en* of "envious" is from *in*, "not;" but the *en* of enviable represents *in* as used in the sense of "upon," or as found in incident, income, in-cline. Enviable, properly and literally, is that upon which the eyes rest with delight. "Let not thine heart envy sinners," means regard them not as enviable, "but be thou in the fear of the Lord all the day long."

On page 29 the Latin word *mitto*, I send, was adduced as an example of a root, and the fact of compounds being formed from it by attaching prepositions was also mentioned. In further illustration of the general subject of the present chapter *mitto* may be recalled to the front. The essential element of this word is *mit*, varying to *mis*; the radical idea is that of *sending*; and the preposition so often adjoined specifies the particular kind of sending, its object, or direction, meta-

phors innumerable resulting, as in the case of *vid.* Thus, to *transmit* is to "send across;" to *emit* is to "send out;" to *intermit* is to "send between whiles;" a *surmise* is a guess sent in advance of actual knowledge; to *dismiss* is to send finally away; to *commit* is to "send out together," thence to intrust with, or confide, as when we say, "committed to one's charge." Hence, also, "committed to prison" and "committed to memory." A "committee" is that which is "intrusted with." To *permit* is to "send through," figuratively to give leave to pass. To *omit* is to send away, figuratively to fail or neglect. To *submit* is to be "sent down;" thence to be humbled or made low. Ovid, describing the death of Narcissus, says—

"Ille caput viridi fessum *submit* in herbâ."—*Met.* iii. 502.
(Falling gently, he *lays* his head on the tender grass.)

And in the same wonderful poem, describing Arachne's skill in embroidery—

"Illic et lentum filis *immittitur* aurum."
(Here, too, the pliant gold is *interwoven* with the threads.)

So in Virgil; when he says of the hills sloping down to the water-side—

"Quà se subducere colles
Incipiunt, mollique jugum *demittere* clivo
Usque ad aquam."

(Where the hills begin to withdraw, and by an easy decline, to *slope* their ridges to the stream.)

In Lucretius these beautiful figures are equally abundant—

"Florescunt tempore certo
Arbusta, et certo *dimitunt* tempora florem."

(In proper season the shrubs bud forth, and in proper season they *produce* the flowers.)

Less so in Seneca, but singularly poetical—

“ Ut dura cautes undique intractabilis
Resistit undis, et lacescentes aquas
Longe *remittit*, verba sic spernit mea !”

—*Hippolytus*, 580-582.

(As the hard and untameable rock on all sides withstands the waves, and *throws back* to a distance the assaulting surges, so does he spurn my words !)

The idea conveyed in “submission” is expressed also in *demise*, literally, like the former, a laying down, and applied especially to the death of a sovereign, meaning that he lays down his crown. Passed on to the death of a man of great possessions, these he is said to demise by will to his successor. Promise and premisses are other interesting members of the group of words before us. A promise is literally a sending forwards, a faithful assurance, an engagement to do something or to leave it undone. “Premises,” or “premisses,” are also things or statements sent beforehand ; thence, in logic, propositions laid down with a view to subsequent reasonings ; while in legal documents having reference to land or buildings, they are the first or earliest references to the adjuncts and appurtenances of the property. The property in its entirety is the important matter. Hence the word in course of time came to signify the whole, as in “these desirable premises,” “these premises to let.” Remote as it may seem, “miscreant” is yet another of this manifold group. Derived from the old French *mescreant*, Italian *miscredente*, a miscreant is literally one who refuses to believe what is right and true. He casts it, as it were, away and afar, thus identifying himself with falsehood, which soon translates into the utterly vile and detestable.

The prefix *mis*, so often found in the locality of a preposition, as in mis-take, mis-inform, mis-lead, mis-guide, mis-manage, mis-reckon, and always implying error, denial, or falsehood, is no doubt radically connected with *mittere*, though it has come into our vernacular through the northern stream. In Mæso-Gothic, which furnishes the oldest ascertainable form, and in which it denotes defect, it is *missa*. The consanguinity with *mittere* is easily perceived when we reflect how natural is the progression from the idea of *sending* to that of sending *astray*; for this is the figurative reading of all those words wherein the negative *mis* is met with, whether Scandinavian or Teutonic, or in part of Latin parentage. For example, to *mistake* is to send our arrow wide of the target, or "*miss* our mark." To *misinform*, *mislead*, and *misguide*, are in like manner to "*send astray*." The expression "*to act amiss*" is referable to the same origin. The first part of *mission*, *missionary*, *missive*, *missile*, *message*, *messenger*, and similar words, is from *mittere* in its primary sense, and simply denotes sending or a thing sent.

An inexhaustible supply of striking metaphors is furnished in the compounds which have for their first syllable the Latin preposition *per*. Etymologically, this word is congenerate with *πέρω*, to pierce or perforate, the antecedent of *pierce* itself, though the latter may perhaps be proximately the abbreviation of an old compound. A "*piercing shriek*" is one that in more homely terms is said to go "*through and through*" one. *Per*, therefore, means passage through, and thence, metaphorically, accomplishment, fulfilment, and completion. *Perfect*, derived from *per* and the Latin *facio*,

to do, denotes that which is thoroughly finished or effectuated, primarily in nature and art; secondly, in moral character. That which has a way through it is *pervious*; the contrary condition is *im-pervious*. That which endures indefinitely is *per-ennial*, the latter portion of the word being derived originally from *annus*, a year. To be *perplexed* is to be thoroughly entangled, *plecto* signifying to plait, knot, or weave, as expressed in the Greek word for a wicker-basket, *πλέκος*.

“ But their way
Lies through the *perplexed* paths of this drear wood.”

So to *per-secute*, *per sequor*, is to follow thoroughly, unabatingly, and hence annoyingly, cruelly, remorselessly. Through the French *pour-suivre* comes the nearly-allied “pursue,” which term is applied in Scotland to the action of the plaintiff in a court of law. The *sequor suivre* words form a very interesting set in themselves. Laterally connected with the first is to “seek,” as when we say we seek for information, *i.e.* follow up our inquiries. To *beseech* is to follow imploringly; to *forsake* is to cease from following. *Subsequent*, *consequence*, *obsequies*, *sequel*, *sequence*, are from the same root, as is likewise *second*, literally “that which follows.” Ovid uses *sequentia* to denote *listening*, *i.e.* following with the ears (Met. xi. 2). The days, the months, the years, as we all say, “follow” one another. Hence, with the ancient Romans, a lifetime was a *seculum*. In time the meaning changed a little, the word extending itself to an historical period or space, just as we ourselves speak of “an age,” and “the ages.”

“Aurea, quæ perhibent, illo sub rege fuerunt
Secula.”

(Under his reign was the golden *seculum* they delight to celebrate.)

Eventually the prescribed sense was that of a century, a term of a hundred years, and *secularis* denoted that which we should now perhaps call centennial. How strange the vicissitudes of some of the commonest of words! Secular to-day applies in no degree to time, being employed only as the antithesis of the spiritual.

From *ex sequor* come executor and *exequies*, the initial of the verb disappearing, as in exude from *ex sudo*, exile from *ex solum*, and exult from *ex salio*, literally to “leap out of.” The *suivre* words are specially sue, suit, and suite, a train of followers or attendants. A “suit” of clothes is one which in pattern and material follows step by step a given rule. A suitor, in love, is one who in his wooing perseveringly follows the object of his desire.

Similar *per* words in Latin, not adopted into English, are *percussus*, “sorely disquieted;” *perdoctus*, “very learned;” *perlucens*, “quite transparent;” *peraratus*, “ploughed all over.” In the same way, *pertento* is to “explore thoroughly;” figuratively, to occupy or take entire possession of; full knowledge, or intellectual possession, being the result of such a search. This last is beautifully illustrated by Virgil, when he says of Latona, “*pertentant gaudia pectus*”—“joys take possession of her bosom;” and of Æneas, “*gaudia pertentant mentem*”—“joys spread throughout his soul.” *Perlucens*, just now cited, is in English represented by pel-lucid, the *per* assimilating itself to the following consonant under the natural law of speech, flowing from the instinct of euphony, which is illustrated so plentifully in the

compounds of *ad*, *cum*, and one or two other prepositions. *Ad* undergoes the assimilation shown in *ac-cede*, *af-fix*, *ag-grieve*, *al-lure*, *an-nex*, *ap-pend*, *ar-range*, *at-tach*. *Cum* (usually changed into *con*) transforms itself in the manner indicated in *col-lapse*, *com-mingle*, *cor-roborate*, *co-operate*. We saw when dealing with the Latin *in* that this word has a twofold sense. Similarly, *per* sometimes implies deviation, a going athwart or across. *Perverto* is to turn aside, to render crooked or throw askew. Hence, metaphorically, or as applied to character and behaviour, to be perverse is to be froward or cross-grained. So with *per-fidy*, literally going away from one's faithful duty; and *per-jury*, which is either wilful and deliberate false swearing, or the violation of a solemn oath.

“ False, fleeting, perjured Clarence,
Who stabbed me in the field by Tewksbury.”

Very interesting, again, in their connection with the idea of metaphor, are the words which have for their first syllable the preposition *trans*, literally “across.” In Sanscrit this word exists in the shape of *tara*, to step or place beyond, as when a thing is taken across a river and deposited on the opposite bank. The Latin word preserves the original image in the completest manner, as when we say *trans-Atlantic*, *trans-Alpine*, *trans-portation*. “*Transports*,” in the navy, are the ships employed for conveying soldiers to a foreign country. Figuratively, to be transported is for the heart to be carried away by passion, pleasure, or enthusiasm. *Trans-lucent* describes perfect permeability by light; thence what is consummately intelligible, as when Quintilian speaks of “*trans-lucid eloquence*.” The “*transept*” of a cathedral is the

portion which crosses the nave at right angles, literally a "partition across," *septum* signifying that which divides. Transitory denotes that which crosses over very soon. To trans-gress is to go beyond the legitimate or authorized limits, hence to err morally, a figure familiar also in trespass and trespasser, which came to us proximately through the old French *transpasser*, just as "traffic," *trans facio*, is through the Italian *trafficare*. In tra-verse, literally turning or going across or athwart, the final letters of the *trans* are similarly omitted. Great interest attaches to *trans* irrespectively of its status as a preposition. In French it holds the shape of *très*, "very," the idea being that the thing spoken of goes beyond the ordinary and accustomed. "La vie, la mort, la richesse, la pauvreté, emeuvent très-fortement les hommes." It was the earliest and simplest form of the same word which in Greek became *τερ-ος*, the suffix by which the comparative is marked. Thus, *δεινός*, dreadful; *δεινότερος*, more dreadful; *σοφός*, wise; *σοφώτερος*, wiser. The comparative is similarly indicated in Sanscrit by *tara*. Hence, also, the value of *ter* as an emblematic denomination for the circumstances or conditions expressed in the Latin *al-ter*, *ali-ter*, *præ-ter*, *prop-ter*, *in-ter*, *u-ter*, *ul-ter*, *ul-tra*, and their abounding offspring, alternate, alteration, *præterea*, *præterit*, *intereo*, *interitus*, etc., all these words owing their existence to it, and being denotive of something "further," "beyond," or "additional." *Intro*, *retro*, *posterior*, *postreme*, are from the same source, and convey analogous meanings. Hence, also, eventually, in part, the English *introduce*, *intervene*, *interstice*, *interval*, *retrograde*, and their many collaterals. *Penetrare*, whence *penetrate*, is another descendant,

signifying literally to proceed or get further on. A man of "penetration" is one who is subtle, acute, sagacious, of exquisite discernment, his eyes "going beyond" those of his fellow-men, perceiving what lies on the opposite side of the river as well as that which is close beside him. Out of the classical Latin *alter* the French made their *autre*, *autrui*, and *outré*; and out of the mediæval *ultragium*, the now obsolete *oultrage*, the original form of "outrage." An outrage is thus etymologically as well as criminally, violence beyond measure. Etymologically connected with the Latin *alter* and *uter* are also our words *other* and *ei-ther*. "Whether" claims the same ancestry, being a contraction of "who either," corresponding with the Greek *κό-τερος* and the Sanscrit *ka-tara*, and signifying a looking beyond, or at something different from what was first noticed or possessed. By prefixing the negative *ne* we have "neuter" and "neither." In this ancient *tar* or *tara* we have the origin also of the various words which in the Aryan languages denote or imply *three*, and are represented in *τρεις*, *tres*, *ter*, *trois*, *thrice*, and their innumerable progeny, as ternary, ternate, threefold, thirty, trident, triplet, trinity, trilogy, tripod, trivial, the last a curious metaphor referring to the insignificant odds and ends ordinarily laid out for sale at the corners where several roads unite or cross, three such roads having with the Romans been *trivia*. That a word signifying "beyond" should be employed for this particular arithmetical purpose, seems at first sight a little strange. To understand it we need but think of the mental leap which after the simple and easy counting of one, two, is invariably taken to the perfection implied in

Three. There is no occasion to deal at length with the derivatives of *τρεις*, *tres*. Let it suffice to indicate that not even "trefoil," the honeyed clover of the meadows; nor even "trellis," the triple-twilled support in the garden for rose and woodbine;—is prettier in its way than "*tress*," literally, through the Italian *treccia* (the latter with a waft in it of *θριξ τριχος*), a plat of three long feminine locks, three, neither more nor fewer, thus altogether different from a curl, though often used as if signifying the same thing—

"Her yellowe hair was broidered in a tresse."

—*The Knight's Tale.*

Usually employed at the present day only in the plural, how beautiful the use made of this word by the poets when they personify trees, comparing the lithesome spray of such as the silver birch to depending ringlets—

"A wind-ruined tree,
Whose still green *tresses* dabbled mournfully
Into the stream which flowed o'er half its head."

Note, however, that in addition to the obvious derivatives of *tara* which are discoverable by permanence of the normal *trans*, there are many others in which it has become abraded. Such are traduce, tradition, treachery, treason, traitor, be-tray, travesty, tranquil, travel, travail, turmoil, tribe, tribunal, tribute, all of them figurative in high degree, and worthy of closest examination. The first named rest on the Latin verbs *duco*, *do*, *jacio*, etc. Tranquil is from *trans* used as an intensitive, and *quiescere* to keep quiet. Travel and travail take us to the northern Aryan languages, where they begin as *tra fael* = *tra mael*, "exceeding labour." Turmoil is the same, through transposition of the vowel. And what is a tribe?

The original "tribes" were the three classes of the Roman people, over each of which presided a tribune, occupying a "tribunal," and one of whose duties was to see to the due payment of their taxes or "tribute." Lastly, from the same root come *through* and *thorough*, which signify complete and successful passing over, thence the effectuation of designs in general.

The prefix *re*, which occurs so frequently in derivatives from the Latin, does not exist as an independent word. Signifying, in composition, "back," and "anew," it contributes, however, very largely to the language of metaphor, and becomes specially interesting when employed as an intensitive. A re-cluse, from *claudio*, *clausus*, is not simply one who lives retired from the world, but a devotee who keeps to his own particular cell. To bend, or turn, or throw back, is expressed by the word *flecto*. To *re*-flect is to bend once again, figuratively to ponder attentively and deeply. To *re*-frain is while riding to pull the bridle of one's horse somewhat vigorously, hence to put a check upon movement of any other kind. The phrase to "bridle one's tongue" is exactly parallel. "Respect" is literally "looking back upon." That which after passing we turn round to contemplate, is presumably something noble, worthy, and meritorious, no one who is in his right mind ever caring to look a second time at the mean and shameful. Hence when we say that we "respect" a person, we mean that we think him worthy of renewed observation. The same idea is expressed in "re-gard," from the French *regarder*, the latter part of which word, being congenerate with guard, ward and warden, embodies the still higher and richer sense of looking at with a view to kindly and generous

succour and protection in time of peril. "Respect" is paid to one who is comparatively a stranger; "regard" goes with love, sympathy, and friendship. Another interesting word of the class before us is "repair" in the sense of to go somewhere. To repair, in the sense of mending or restoring after injury, comes from the Latin *paro*, to shape, get ready, or put in order, the basis of *pre-pare*, and used in its simplest form when we speak of "paring" an apple, literally adapting it for eating. To "repair," on the other hand, as to one's home, with its balm and melody, or as a king to his palace, denotes literally return to one's fatherland or *patria*. We never speak of "repairing" to a scene of trouble or discomfort, only to one which attracts after the manner of a native country. The French form of the word, *repaire*, is used to denote the running of wild animals to their dens or coverts when pursued or frightened. Words resting upon *re*, in which it is partly effaced (as when *trans* becomes *tra*), are illustrated in ransom and the military term "to rally." Ransom, French *rançon*, is derived from *re-d-emptione*. Rally is from the French *re aller*, to go back, or perhaps from *re alligo*, to bind anew. That words similar in spelling should carry totally different senses has already been mentioned as one of the ordinary phenomena of the dictionary. In to "rally," as applied to good-natured banter or "raillery," we must not be surprised therefore to find not only no connection with the preceding, but the sense conveyed in the full and original Latin word of the Middle Ages, *ridiculare*, to laugh at.

Dis, like *re*, occurs only in composition. The words commencing with this particle carry the sense of physical

division or separation, and hence again illustrate metaphor in the most beautiful and diversified manner. *Dis-traction* is literally being "pulled asunder;" figuratively, or as applied to the mind, it signifies dislocation of the wits. "Distress" conveys precisely the same idea, and as unnatural drawing asunder must needs cause extreme pain, it becomes the name for profound grief. The literal sense occurs in Scripture: "Hungry and thirsty, their soul fainted in them. Then they cried unto the Lord in their trouble, and He delivered them out of their distresses. . . . He brought quails and satisfied them with the bread of heaven. He opened the rock, and the waters gushed out; they ran in the dry places like a river." In "dishevel" we have another curious example of the root of a word being almost effaced through altered spelling, the bases being the Latin *dis* and *capillus*, the latter changed by the French into *cheveux*, whence the old verb *descheveler*, literally to let the hair hang loose or in disorder. The slipshod use of noble words has been aptly termed the "dishevelled sublime." To "discern" is primarily to winnow, as when the chaff is removed by winnowing from the wheat; hence, metaphorically, to separate truth from error. Discernment is literally the sifting power of the mind; the discreet person, he who discriminates, is the one who is quick to perceive nice intellectual differences, then sorts and separates with accuracy, rejecting the chaff, retaining the grain. Precisely the same figure is embodied in the word "skill," from the Anglo-Saxon *skylan*, to separate. The "skilful" man, literally, sees on the instant what things consist of, then differentiates, duly appreciating the various worth, and employs them according to their worthiness.

Disdain, disgust, disgrace, present the *dis* more especially as a negative, "disdain" being the contrary of holding worthy or *dignus*; "disgust," a metaphor referring to that which offends the palate; and "disgrace," the reverse of being regarded with approbation. To-day grace is chiefly used to denote a certain sweet inborn comeliness of person or manner, as in the phrases "graceful deportment," "a graceful action." This is the meaning involved also in the name, adopted from the ancients, of the sister goddesses of perfect beauty, the charming trio, so familiar in sculpture, whose unclad condition denotes innocence and artlessness, the first essentials of the graceful, and whose joined hands represent the loveliness of friendship. In all our early English writers, "grace" stands quite as often for that of which *disgrace* is the contrary, namely, favour, goodwill, or disposition to be indulgent, suave, generous, or clement. Chaucer so employs it, as in the "Miller's Tale," 3071. Shakspeare also, frequently, as in "Much Ado," "He hath taken you newly into his grace." Scripture supplies about two hundred examples, though in the New Testament, where this word represents the Greek *χάρις*, it often denotes the gratitude which being regarded with favour and treated kindly excites in ourselves. To this department of meaning is referable the phrase "saying grace," as at meal-times. "Grace" is applied to original and unsophisticated beauty of manner, because *χάρις* supplies man with his most exquisite emotional or spiritual pleasures; he extends the name of one sweet thing to the other, once more obeying the great laws of correspondence or natural harmony. "Favour" is from the Latin *favere*. Perhaps this last is connected meta-

phorically with *favus*, a honeycomb, kindness and sweetness being convertible terms and ideas. If so, what fulness of meaning in the old poet's little summary of bee-life :—

“ Rura colunt : operique *favent*, in spemque laborant.”

(They haunt the fields, delight in work, and labour in hope—of enjoying their gathered honey.)

An interesting word of this section is “disguise,” literally change of one's way or manner, *guise* being the French form of *wise*, Old High German *wisô*, the concluding syllable of cross-wise, other-wise, like-wise, contrari-wise, edge-wise, etc., and retained also in the phrases “in this wise,” “in no wise.” The source of the word is to be looked for, in all likelihood, in connection with that of *video*, *visus*, the way in which a person demeans or conducts himself being the circumstances the eyes first notice. Then, as a man's clothing or apparel ordinarily supplies the means of identification, “disguise” passes on to dress designed to deceive. The curious permutation of the initial *g* and *w* is the same as in *guerre* and war, *guêpe* and wasp, *gages* and wages, *garde-robe* and wardrobe.

In illustration of compound words beginning with prepositions and prefixes purely Greek, take those which commence with εὖ, eulogy, euphony, etc., and those which commence with κατά, such as catechise, cataract, cathedral. The first mentioned is the adverbial form of εὖς (good, brave, fair, fortunate, prosperous, pre-eminent), and in Greek is one of the commonest of prefixes, whence its frequent appearance in the names of places and persons, as Euphrates (Hebrew פְּרַת, *Phrat*), Eubœa,

Euripus, the Euxine, Eutyclus, Euphrosyne, all of which are metaphorically descriptive. *Eugene* means well born, or of distinguished and honourable parentage; *Eudora* a lovely gift or present; *Euphemia* one of sweet and pleasant utterance. A "euphemism" is the figurative mode of speaking whereby soft and inoffensive words are substituted for such as would be rude and irritating, the idea conveyed remaining the same. Cheerfulness, liveliness of spirit and disposition, the ancient Greeks called *εὐφρασία*, from the verb *εὐφραίνω*, in Luke xii. 19 translated to "be merry," and in Acts ii. 26 to "rejoice." Power to promote cheerfulness was anciently attributed to the little wild-flower still called euphrasia; and as this good service was considered, and quite legitimately, to be effected through quickening the powers of observation, learning to see being the first and finest of the fine arts, euphrasia was translated into "eyebright," the common or English name of this charming little denizen of the sunny hillside. Milton abides by the classical name:—

" Then purged with euphrasy and rue
The visual nerve."

Modern botanists so delight in words formed etymologically like euphrasia, that there are more than 150 generic names which commence with the same syllable, as Eutaxia, Eucalyptus, Eucomis, Euosma, Eulalia, Eurybia, all, like the personal and the geographical appellations, beautiful descriptive metaphors. What a lovely word, again, is "euthanasia," literally calm and easy death, though not excelling "eucharist," the primitive sense of which is earnest and heartfelt thanksgiving. In Ephesians v. 4, eucharistia denotes decorous and improving conversa-

tion ; in Colossians iii. 15, the adjective is put for gentle and courteous. Sometimes, in these eu- words, the *u* changes for the sake of euphony to *v*, as in Evadne, Evander, and evangelist, literally the “bringer of good” tidings.

The preposition *κατὰ*, signifying “down,” and thence “under,” stands at the beginning of innumerable words in Greek ;—the equivalents of “downcast,” “downward,” “down-hearted,” and almost all other English terms which involve the idea of descent. Among those which have become naturalized in our own language, or to which certain English words are referable, may be mentioned “cataract” and “cathedral.” The former word is from *καταρῥάσσω*, literally to fall down with a dash, the verb being onomatopœtic, and would seem to have denoted originally, as it does to this day, the sonorous and alluring tumble of the waterfall.

“The sounding cataract
Haunted me like a passion.”

Shakspeare applies it to heavy and splashing rain :—

“Blow, wind, and crack your cheeks ! Rage ! blow !
You cataracts and hurricanes, shout
Till you have drenched our steeples, drowned the cocks.”

Livy gives it, figuratively, to a portcullis. Surgeons, by yet another figure, use it as a name for an organic affection of the eye, declared in a minute image of a white veil. “Cathedral” is derived, originally, from *κατὰ*, and *ἔδρα*, a seat, the same word which reappears in Sanhedrim, properly Sanhedrin, literally a sitting together, figuratively a council. Xenophon, four hundred years before the Christian era, used the word “cathedra” in

the "Cynegeticus" (the curious and entertaining country gentleman's book in which he treats of dogs, game, and hunting) to designate the resting-place of a hare when pursued by the sportsman. In due course it was extended to a seat or resting-place in general. Pliny, alluding to what we to-day call "easy-chairs," has "supinæ in deliciis cathedræ." Then we find it specialized as the seat or "chair" of a teacher or professor. Juvenal speaks of "sterilesque cathedræ." Eventually it passes on to the episcopal chair, and so to the building in which this is nominally contained,—the principal church of a diocese, the glorious Cathedral. Thus do words become consecrated; gifted in their old age with sweet power to make one's thoughts beautiful, since "Cathedral" means for the soul all that is lovely, aspiring, and tranquil. That the pillared scenery of a Plantagenet cathedral represents the calm arcades of a forest, has been remarked a thousand times. Hence on the lips of the poet the word becomes an epithet:—

" Here aged trees cathedral walks compose,
And mount the hill in venerable rows."

In composition, *κατὰ* also denotes "against," since when a thing falls or descends it must needs come into contact with or strike against something else. Hence the familiar metaphor to "catechise," literally to "sound against," "catechise" being derived from *κατηχέω*, which rests, in turn, upon *κατὰ* and *ἦχος*, which last is the same, essentially, as "echo." Figuratively or metaphorically, to catechise is to instruct by asking questions, listening to and correcting the replies, the sum of what is accomplished being the "catechism," now restricted,

conventionally, to question and answer in religious knowledge. "Echo," by a beautiful metaphor, signifies not only sound, but the reflection of sound, the repetition of words said by another. Being no more than a copy or imitation, Virgil calls Echo "*imago vocis*," the image, likeness, or portrait of the voice, a charming figure which occurs also in Horace, with whom Echo is "*imago jocosa*," "the sportive mimic." So in Ausonius :—

" Redit et nemorum vocalis imago."

—*Epist.* xxv. 10.

"Image" itself conveys much the same idea, meaning, primarily, the representation of an object in some material and solid substance, stone, brass, or marble; thence passing on to the shapes or forms which are moulded by the mind, including, very especially, those which are treasured in the memory :—

" The spirit of my stainless days of love
Awakens, and their images of joy
Which at thy voice started from blank oblivion,
Now glimmer on me in the lovely light
Which at thine age they wore."

Cicero applies the term "image" to the countenance, which he calls *imago animi*, "the picture of the mind." Statius gives it to the shadows in the water :—

" Fallax responsat *imago*

Frondebibus, et longas eadem fugit unda per umbras."

(The delusive image repeats the leaves, and the unchanged wave glides through the lengthened shadows.—*Silvarum*, I, 3. 18, 19.)

This last passage derives not a little of its beauty from the word *responsat*, which makes the foliage speak to the water, and the water give vocal answer, thus supplying an elegant example of Personification. Echo is accre-

dited with one of the most ingenious of inventions. "The playful Echo," said Amaryllis, "ever delights me, but when I call on thee, and thou hearest me not, then, in cruel mockery, when I say Lycidas ! Lycidas ! it only replies das ! das ! Thou seest the echo is irrational, for it never answers but by the last syllable.

" 'Ye gods !' exclaimed the enthusiastic Lycidas, 'who love the repeating accent of the echo, I can invent an echo. I will close my verses with a reverberating sound. Every line was now answered by an echoing line. Such was the origin of Rhyme.' " *

An Italian poet has the same fancy :—

" Tu sai pur, che l' imagin della voce
Che risponde da i sassi, ov Echo alberga,
Fu inventrice delle prime Rime."—*L' Api del Rucellai.*

(Thou knowest, nevertheless, that the image of the voice which replies, comes from the heights where Echo makes her dwelling,—Echo, inventress of the first rhyme.)

Every other preposition and prefix might be illustrated in the same manner, and to an indefinite extent. Figures innumerable exist in the compounds which begin with the Latin *ab, ad, ante, circum, ex, præ, pro, sub, super,* etc. A list of great length might also be made of those which begin with the Greek *an or a, anti, apo, dia, meta, para, syn or sym,* etc. ; and a third could be constructed quite as readily of compounds which commence with an Anglo-Saxon prefix, such as "fore," in *fore-see*, "out" in *out-live*, "under" in *under-go*. But it is time to proceed to the consideration of the Affixes, which in their turn, and in their own way, contribute boundlessly, and in the most picturesque manner, to the language of metaphor.

* Isaac D'Israeli, *Romances*, p. 300.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE affixes or final syllables of Compound words are, like the prefixes and prepositions, in no wise casual or meaningless. Their function is definite, their origin is usually historical, and ordinarily they allow of exact translation. When they have become much altered in form, under dialectic influences or by the attrition of ages, many of them being profoundly ancient, the exact etymological force is not always as plain as we could desire, and sometimes it is undiscoverable, but doubtless every one of them has a reason behind it, and was originally employed for some direct purpose. The evidence is all in favour of their having been originally in all cases integral and organic realities, not simply marking inflexions, number, or gender, but introducing new and enlarged significations, often highly figurative or poetical. To assume that they were chanceful, or had no particular sense or purpose, would involve the inconsistency of supposing that the framers of compound words aimed at anything rather than making themselves understood—a principle which of course applies to the original framing of words of every description, even the simplest. Terminations occur, no doubt, which are referable to accident, corruption, ignorance, and indolence, since an uncultivated

people, in adopting words which they have never before heard, naturally content themselves with the leading or accentuated sound, which usually occurs in the early part of the word, leaving the termination to take care of itself. To this same circumstance is of course attributable the absolute disappearance of the inflexional endings of innumerable words transplanted from Latin into the later languages of Western Europe. Difficult cases of the nature spoken of occur however but seldom, the great fact remaining that terminations, like roots and prefixes, have their own tales to tell.

Affixes often possess particular interest through illustrating, in the best manner, the origin of "abstract terms"—the terms or words employed to designate feelings, emotions, qualities, and attributes, such as the mind alone can apprehend. The phrase itself is a pure figure of speech. No word or term can be really and truly rendered "abstract," detached, that is to say, from the material world, and from a material sense. Every abstract term, so called, was primarily constructed, in obedience to the fundamental laws of the intellect, as the appellation of something physical, and this primary sense, in the very nature of things, it never really loses. Time alone it is which, by veiling the physical sense, has made them seem quasi-arbitrary and artificial. Emotions, sentiments, qualities apprehensible by the mind alone, cannot be described and spoken of except by a reference, more or less direct, to something in the material world. Neither is it possible to denominate or refer to any mental process or operation except by citing something objective, something which belongs to the outer world, and the contemplation of which assists materially, when

we come to reflect upon it, in the comprehension of the spiritual co-ordinate. No word ever originated in mere caprice. No word is metaphysical without having first been physical. There is not a single term in language that can be strictly called arbitrary. Man has no choice in the matter. He cannot do as he likes. He must talk by means of the correspondences which subsist between the visible world and the invisible, or he must remain dumb. A word, for instance, such as "apprehend," in the sense of "I apprehend your meaning," was never made or thought of till some one had perceived the correspondence between the "taking up" of an object with the hands and the reception of an idea by the intellect. In the plainer Saxon form we say, after precisely the same manner, that we "get hold" of a person's meaning. In the beginning, be it remembered, men's attention would be much more drawn to these correspondences than possibly may be the case to-day. To-day we have a vocabulary ready to our hands, and are not constrained to be on the alert for resemblances before we can say what we want to. Compare the word to "intend," literally to stretch out, figuratively to stretch the will in a particular direction, whence also *intent*, *intense*, *attend*, *attentive*, *attention*, all of which carry with them the idea of a cord in a state of "tension." To "long" is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon *lengian*, "to reach out," in its figurative sense a beautiful reminder of the stretching out of the arm when we would reach a blossom or a leaf from the too-distant spray, a water-lily too far upon the stream, or an apple from too high a branch. To "examine" is from *examen*, the beam of a balance, because to "examine" is to compare and judge,

as with a pair of scales. On the same correspondence rest the words to "deliberate" and to "ponder," literally to "weigh," as when we say we will *weigh* it in our minds. To "distinguish" comes from *tingo*, to tint or paint, and denotes that operation of the mind whereby it separates and sorts out things, as if by painting them different colours for contrast. To "concur" is to run in the same path. To "revolve" is to turn over and over again. To "hesitate" is to stick fast, being from *hæsus*, the past participle of *hæreo*, to stick in the briars. When a man "hesitates" he is literally "entangled in the hedge." To "comprehend," like "apprehend," is to take hold of; to "meditate" is to go into the middle; to "determine" is to mark out the boundaries or *termini*, and so decide upon them. To "consider" is to "sit down with," *i.e.* with our thoughts and judgment in private council. An obscurity here and there as to the derivation of an "abstract" term proves nothing. Obscurities and difficulties in etymology never prove anything; they are simply illustrations of personal ignorance. Taking language in the aggregate, every abstract term employed by man has its physical basis demonstrated *somewhere*. If there is darkness in one place, there is light in another, and the principle gets vindicated. Pursuing our inquiries, we are constantly reassured that no term, however occult, is a word only; on the contrary, we are perpetually reminded that all words are pictures of something cognizable by the bodily senses—the sole inlets of all secular knowledge, the media through which all ideas and thinking are projected—

" Fine steps whereby the Queenly Soul
Comes down from her bright throne to view the mass

She hath dominion over, and the things
Of her inheritance."

Take the word "idea" itself. "Idea" signifies literally the visible organic form or outline of a thing. The Greeks constantly employed it so. Pindar has *ιδέα τὸ καλόν*, "beautiful in shape" (Olymp. x. 22), and Aristophanes, *ἀθάναταις ἰδέαις*, "immortal forms" (Clouds, 289). Similarly, in St. Matthew's Gospel, the original of "His countenance shone like lightning" is *ἦν δὲ ἡ ἰδέα αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀστραπή*. His *idea* was like lightning. The possessions of the mind are called ideas because the eye is the organ especially of the intellect, as the ear is that of the affections; because we are more powerfully affected by what we see than by what we hear—a very ancient truism—and because the impressions received through the eye are of all which enter the soul the most enduring. Sounds, when melodious, are equally delightful, but it is only the well-trained musical ear that absorbs them, and only a vivid passion for music that retains them in their purity, indefinitely:—impressions received through the senses of taste, touch, and ^{smell} ~~feeling~~ belong to the lower or animal life, that portion of our nature which we share with the brutes, therefore are not to be placed in the same category. The pictures abiding in the mind of what has been *seen*, constitute that beautiful "memory of the eyes" which enables us at will to revisit the woodland, sheeted with bluebell and chaste anemone, the sea-beach, with its "crimson weeds," or the shaded pathway by the river, restoring to us, in the same moment, the countenances of the loved beings whose presence made the sunshine of the hour: the lapse of years effaces nothing of the pictures or "ideas"

then imprinted, and probably they will be carried even into the life to come. So with days of trouble and misfortune, though happily it has pleased God that our "ideas" of these shall resemble the epitaphs and inscriptions cut in pavements; passing feet at last wear them away entirely. Nothing in the Divine government is more delightful to contemplate than the crystallizing power of the mind in regard to the remembrance of what in the "lang syne" has been good and happy, and the solubility of our recollections of grief and pain. Nowhere, perhaps, in the whole range of literature, ancient and modern, is there a more exquisite allusion to the "memory of the eyes" than when poor deserted Phyllis, all her kindness and tender affection forgotten, exclaims so sorrowfully:—

" Illa meis oculis species abeuntis inhæret,
Cum premeret portus classis itura meos !"

Let not metaphysics be called, therefore, as by some, the "science of abstractions," which is equivalent to saying the science of phantoms. Metaphysics rest, really and truly, upon a right apprehension of the significance of words. "The human soul," says Herder, "is unintelligible, if we do not place language within and alongside of it." This doctrine had been already laid down by Locke. "There is so close a connection," he observes, "between ideas and words, and our abstract ideas and general words have so constant a relation to one another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge without first considering the nature, use, and signification of language." Certainly, if the metaphysician does not see clearly through the substance of his words, it is doubtful whether he will be

clear in the statement of his views and theories. Not that the study of etymology will convert a man into a metaphysician, or that acquaintance with etymology constitutes a metaphysician, but he who claims or desires to be one cannot move a step safely if indifferent to it.* Bearing immediately and directly upon the science of mind (not to mention the inestimable value of the study of language to the ethnologist), etymology becomes, like the love of field botany, a power to reinforce our lives. Etymology is not a mere pastime, innocuous, entertaining, and nothing besides. Rightly pursued, it is a means towards a dignifying end; it casts light at once upon the history of the intellect and upon the unity of man with nature. In either case it throws the sheen of poësy over the simple and common, a work which, in whatever way accomplished, is always benevolent and in good season; and though the etymologist may not himself see the result of his labours, they provide enjoyment for the generations to come, and the consciousness of this, as of the welfare to arise some day from the planting of fruit-trees, is to one who loves noble pleasures quite enough.

But it is time to proceed to the special subject of this chapter, the Affixes or terminations of compound words, those at least which are of the same nature as prefixes and prepositions.

* The word "metaphysics," it may be well to say, was not constructed purposely to denote what it means in our own day, "the science of mind." It is a simple abbreviation of the title given by the original editors of Aristotle, when his works were first printed, to those portions of them which they placed "after" the treatises upon physics, *μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ*, these deferred portions being his reasonings upon causes and first principles.

When wishful to express our meaning, we naturally associate and compare, illustrating through the medium of a simile. "It was as white as a snowdrop." Similes, more or less deliberate, apposite, and elegant, are the universal instrument of the descriptive and the interpreting faculties. They pertain to every department of language, from slang up to oratory; they are the resource alike of the learned and the untaught; with the wise they are opportunity, with the "otherwise" they are refuge: to open a book and meet at once with a striking, a graceful, or a fine comparison, is an assurance that we touch the shores of a fertile country. Elongated, they furnish poetry with its most captivating adjunct, then becoming allegories, apologues, and fables, and in sacred philosophy, parables. What more perfect than the portraiture of a happy and well-ordered state under the immortal similitude of the hive:—

" So work the honey-bees ;
 Creatures that by a rule in nature teach
 The act of order to a peopled kingdom.
 They have a king, and officers of sorts,
 Where some, like magistrates, correct at home ;
 Others, like merchants, venture trade abroad ;
 Others, like soldiers, armèd in their stings,
 Make boot upon the summer's velvet bnds,
 Which pillage they with merry march bring home
 To the tent-royal of their emperor,
 Who, busied in his majesty, surveys
 The singing masons building roofs of gold,
 The civil citizens kneading up the honey,
 The poor mechanic porters crowding in
 Their heavy burdens at the narrow gate."

Thrown many together, similes not only illustrate, but enrich and adorn in the most admirable manner :—

"Men, in whose words, to be read with many a heaving
 Of the heart, is a power like wind in rain ;
 Whose thoughts, like bars of sunshine in shut rooms,
 'Mid gloom, all glory, win the world to light,
 Who make their very follies like their souls,
 And like the young moon with a ragged edge,
 Still in their imperfection, beautiful ;
 Whose weaknesses are lovely as their strengths,
 Like the white nebulous matter between stars,
 Which, if not light, at least is likest light ;
 Men whose great thoughts possess us like a passion
 Through every limb, and the whole heart ; whose words
 Haunt us as eagles haunt the mountain air,
 Whose names are ever on the world's great tongue
 Like sound upon the falling of a force ;
 Whose words, if wingèd, are with angels' wings,
 Who play upon the heart as on a harp,
 And make our eyes bright as we speak of them."

What is done, colloquially, in oratory, and in poetry, Scripture on every page anticipates and approves. No book, in any language, or on any subject, more abounds with similes than the Word of God, nor does any book contain more tender and meaningful ones. "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him ; for He knoweth our frame, He remembereth that we are dust." "Whosoever heareth these sayings of Mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock."

Not surprising is it then that in English, among the most frequent of the affixes, we find "like," the compound becoming, through its presence, a condensed simile or comparison, as in *warlike*, *boylike*, *starlike*, though usually, for convenience or brevity' sake, shortened into *-ly*, as in *heavenly*, *womanly*, *lovely*, *manly*.

On page 45 we had the verb "to like," in the sense of to relish or prefer, the primary sense being that of gathering up or collecting. The present word is a different one, being derived from the Mæso-Gothic *leik*, the human frame or body, in Anglo-Saxon *lic*, in German *leich*. Where in the Authorized Version of the New Testament we read, "They took away His body," Ulphilas has *usnemun leik is*; the Anglo-Saxon rendering of the same text is *hys lic namon*. From this latter or secondary sense of the word, namely, a dead body or corpse, the porch at the entrance of a country churchyard received the still current name of the lich-gate, literally the place where the bearers rest their charge before proceeding to the grave. The north-country phrase, the "lich-wake," signifies the watch or wake held over the dead prior to interment; and if the tradition be authentic, the burial of certain Christians, when all around were pagans, gave name to the city of Lichfield. What more natural than to make the name of the body serve for the designation of resemblance or verisimilitude! To one's outward apprehensions, the organic framework of flesh and blood is the man himself, the human reality. The greater fact, that we *possess* bodies, not that we *are* bodies; and conversely, not that we *have* souls, but that we *are* souls, is of course not for the physical senses to realize, nor are we at the present moment concerned with it. The body of flesh and blood *appears* to be the real and immortal man, and that is all is needed to the metaphorical use of *leic*. Shakspeare, when he desires to intimate that the use of the drama is to present the exact likeness of things, to afford a perfect panorama of human life, says that it

is to "show the very age and *body* of the time, its form and pressure." When, accordingly, we say that one thing is "like" another, we say, figuratively, that it has a similar kind of body, a similar configuration and appearance. Next, on the old principle of metaphor which underlies all the "abstract" terms, the word passes on to the designation of resemblance in spiritual qualities, character, behaviour, and whatever else may furnish ground for legitimate comparison. The "like-minded" are those in whom the mental features are fashioned in the same way, correspondentially, that the physical ones are when people are alike in face. A very interesting parallel occurs in the Hebrew עֵצֶם, *ngètsem*, used in Lamentations iv. 7, for the human frame, "Her Nazarites were purer than snow, they were whiter than milk, they were more ruddy in *body* than rubies;"—in the wonderful vision spoken of in Exodus xxiv. 10, for celestial realities, "the body of heaven;" and in Genesis vii. 13, and elsewhere, for "self-same." "In the self-same day . . . entered the sons of Noah into the ark."

In old English literature, where to-day we should have *-ly*, the termination before is quite commonly the pure *lyk* or *lich*. Chaucer has—

"And tellen her *erliche* and late."

So again in Thomas Chestre's translation, *temp.* Henry VI., of the celebrated Breton romance "Sir Launfal"—

"The lady was brygt as blossome on breere,
With *eyenlich* gray, with *lovelich* chere."

In each of these two familiar words, *erliche*=early and *lovelich*=lovely, we have a beautiful illustration of the condensed simile "early," as mentioned under *aur* (p. 74),

being literally spring- or morning-*like*; while a "lovely" thing is one which affords the same kind of delight to the imagination as that which is cast into daily life by loving conduct. Compare "a lovely prospect," "a lovely child," "a lovely song."

How beautiful again the metaphor involved in quickly = quick*like*. The Anglo-Saxon *cwic*, from which this word has come, is identical, genealogically, with the Mæso-Gothic *-qvius*, thus with the Latin *vivus*, "living," the verb form of which last, *vivo*, corresponds with the Greek βίω and the Sanscrit *jiv*. From βίω and *vivo*, it is scarcely necessary to remark, have come innumerable words having reference to life, or to what pertains to life, as biography, biology, vivid, vivacious, vivacity, vivarium; the root at the same time supplying countless figures of its own. To live, metaphorically, is not merely to exist like a plant or a fish, but to live well, merrily, pleasantly; to be nourished, enlarged, kindled, strengthened, increased; while from *victus* comes *victualia*, victuals, literally that which is needful to life, provisions, nutriment, food, meat. "Quick," after the same manner, signifies, in the first instance, simply "living" or "alive," as in the old-fashioned phrase "the quick and the dead." A "quick-set" hedge, one constituted, as farmers say, of "quicks," is a living or hawthorn hedge, as opposed to a fence made of something inanimate. Hyle, in the "Art of Gardening," 1586, calls the former kind a "lively hedge."

The best sign and declaration of life being motion, "quick" then passes on to movement, as in the name of "quicksilver." In the time of Ælfric it was applied to the aspen-tree, in Anglo-Saxon the "cwic-beam," or the

ever-moving. Unfortunately, this capital name became transferred to the mountain-ash, which still bears it, in the alternative shape of "wicken," though without the slightest natural claim. The transfer arose no doubt from confusion, in a later age, of *wicken* with *wicce*, a witch, the mountain-ash having from time immemorial been associated with sorcery and witchcraft, as expressed in its other name, the rowan-tree, which takes us to the Gothic *runa*, incantation, anything employed in magical arts, the word from which came *runes* and *runic*. From simple motion it is but a step to the idea of the lively (or "lifelike"), the animated, the nimble, rapid, and speedy. On these follows the metaphor of readily moving or yielding to pressure, as in "quick-sands," and upon this ensues in turn the idea of exquisite sensitiveness, as in "quick-sighted," "the quick of the nail," and being "touched to the quick," in Cicero *ad vivum*. Abreast of these are the significations of to "quicken," which include to invigorate and cheer. The permutation of the initials in "quick" and "wick" corresponds with that of the Anglo-Saxon *cwacian* and *wagian*, the first of which has affinity with the Latin *quatio*, to quake or quaver, and is found in *quagmire*; while the other has given us the verb to "wag," literally to move to and fro, the act to which we are constrained, "laughter holding both its sides," by the man who being full of roguish merriment, overflowing with sportive humour, we thence call a "wag."

Many good old English words have become obsolete, and many others are obsolescent. Among them are two or three which possess the termination before us, and the history of which presents many points of interest.

“Kindly,” for instance, in the sense of according to a creature’s kind or nature, as when Spenser in the “Faery Queene” speaks of an animal’s “kindly rage.” Another is “gainly,” preserved in the negative “ungainly,” meaning “awkward.” “She laid her child as *gainly* as she could upon some leaves and fresh grass” (Dr. Henry More, *temp.* Charles II.). Another is “soothly,” equivalent to the modern truly, verily, in which sense the primitive Anglo-Saxon form is employed by King Alfred. The poets, the great conservators of all heirlooms, at all events will not let it die :—

“ And home returning, *soothly* swear,
Was never scene so sad and fair.”

—SCOTT, *Melrose Abbey*.

The body of the word dates from the remotest times, being found in the Sanscrit *sat*, the equivalent of the Latin *sens*, *sentis*, in *præsens*, or “the existing.” *Satya* or *santya*, in the same tongue, means, like our English word, “true,” and *a-sat*, signifies “nothing.” “In sooth” and “in good sooth” still signify “oh yes, quite truly.” “Forsooth” is a sort of protest on behalf of truth. A soothsayer is one who truthfully foretells future events.

“Goodly,” yet one more of these interesting relics, happily has an asylum in Scripture—goodly pearls, goodly cedars, a goodly heritage. Like soothly, it is kept alive also in poetry, occurring in Mr. Swinburne’s “Atalanta.” The passage is lengthy to transfer for the sake of a single word, but so extraordinarily beautiful that space may well be allowed. On the one hand stands the magnificent Greek warrior, armed for the strife. Confronting him is the mother to whom he

is almost a god, wild and fearful in her instinct that he is about to "kill her heart" by "following strange loves:"—

"My heart

Takes fire and trembles flamewise, O my son,
 O child, for thine head's sake :—mine eyes wax thick
 Turning towards thee, so goodly-a-weaponed ^aman,
 So glorious ; and for love of thine own eyes
 They are darkened, and tears burn them, fierce as fire ;
 And my lips pause, and my soul sinks with love.
 But by thine hand, by thy sweet life and eyes,
 By thy great heart, and these clasped knees, O son,
 I pray thee that thou slay me not with thee.
 For there was never a mother woman-born
 Loved her sons better ; and never a queen of men
 More perfect in her heart toward whom she loved.
 For what lies light on many, and they forget,
 Small things and transitory as a wind o' the sea,
 I forget never. I have seen thee all thine years
 A man in arms, strong, and a joy to men,
 Seeing thine head glitter, and thy hand burn its way
 Through a heavy and iron furrow of sundering spears ;
 But always as a flower of three suns old,
 The small one thing that lying drew down my life
 To lie with thee and feed thee, a child, and weak,
 Mine, a delight to no man, sweet to me.
 Who then sought to thee ? Who gat help ? who knew
 If thou wert goodly ? Nay, no man at all.
 Or what sea saw thee, or sounded with thine oar,
 Child ? or what strange land shone with war through thee ?
 But fair for me thou wert, O little life,
 Fruitless, the fruit of mine own flesh, and blind,
 More than much gold, ungrown, a foolish flower ;
 For silver, nor bright snow, nor feather of foam
 Was whiter, and no gold yellower than thine hair,
 O child, my child ; and now thou art lordlier grown,
 Not lovelier, nor a new thing in mine eyes,
 I charge thee by thy soul, and this my breast,
 Fear thou the gods, and me, and thine own heart,
 Lest all these turn against thee."

“Like” has not only undergone contraction into *-ly*; in a few cases it has been completely transformed. “Such,” in Mæso-Gothic *svalciks*, Anglo-Saxon *swilc*, from *swa lic*, and in old English, or transitionally, *swylke* and *swiche*, is “so-like.” “Which,” after the same manner, Anglo-Saxon *hwilc*, from *hwa lic*, and formerly spelt *whilk*, represents who- or what-like. “Each” is a contraction of the Anglo-Saxon words for one-like (predecessor of the modern “only”), the original letters partly surviving in *ilk* and *ilka* :—

“ And ilka bird sang o’ its love,
And fondly sae did I o’ mine.”

Every English word ending in *-ly* of course is not of this class, “sally,” for instance, “tally,” and “silly.” To sally, old French *saillir*, is from the Latin *salio*, to leap or spring, excellently employed in the Roman name for the willow-tree, *salix*, whence “sallow,” no tree being more remarkable for long and rapidly developed shoots. “The willows shall spring by the watercourses.” Employed in the language of war to denote a sudden rushing forth of troops to attack or “assault” besiegers, thence it passes on to a sudden outburst of wit or fancy. “Tally” is from the French *tailler*, to cut, and refers to the simple method practised in the by-gones by people unacquainted with arithmetical figures, in keeping their register of debits and credits. Notches were made in a lath, and when the number of notches had risen to twenty, either a notch of double size was made, a *scar*, whence the word “score,” as applied to twenty, or else the piece was “cut off” and preserved like a modern invoice. To say that things “tally” is thus to say metaphorically that the

trade accounts agree. "Silly," after the same manner, is from the Anglo-Saxon *selig*, blessed, happy, innocent, harmless, applying especially to the moral condition of a little child, in which sense the word is constantly employed by the older English writers. The childish state is one of mental destitution and simplicity; a "silly" person is thus one who has made no advance since the days of the cradle, though possibly enough still quite inoffensive, a negative attribute which *per se* never carries the slightest recommendation. Value and merit are predicable only where there is action.

A very large group of condensed similes is constituted of the words which end in *-id*, such as *cand-id*, *ac-id*, *sol-id*, *frig-id*, *tep-id*, *turb-id*, *ar-id*, *rap-id*, *ferv-id*. This interesting suffix entered the English language proximately, in part through the French, and in part by the direct adoption of Latin words, in which it abundantly exists as *-idus*. Essentially it is far older than the time of the Cæsars, being an Aryan word, congenerate with the Greek *εἶδος*, thus with the ancient verb *ἴδω* or *εἶδω*, to see, the same as *v-ideo*, derivatives and representatives of which, under innumerable forms, are diffused throughout the Aryan tongues, and have already been subjects of mention, "idea" quite recently. In the present place may be fittingly mentioned *εἰδάλιμος*, sightly, figuratively, "handsome;" its contrary, *εἰδεχθῆς*, "ugly;" and *εἰδήμων*, "intelligent." The root is one of the few which occur both in the Aryan and the Semitic or Syro-Arabian tongues, the Hebrew possessing it in the shape of *יָדַע*, *yádhang*, "to know," whence *יִדְּעוֹנִי*, *yiddengóni*, a "seer" or wizard. Sight and knowledge, especially when able to forecast, have always been convertible

terms. In the New Testament we have the interjectional imperative ἴδε, literally "see!" varying to ἰδοῦ, both usually translated behold, as in "Behold the Man!" "Then said the Jews, Behold how He loved him." Nothing could be more natural than to use the word εἶδος to signify likeness or resemblance. First we find it giving εἶδωλον, a representation, especially one of a spectral kind, as recognised in our modern derivations "idol" and "idolatry;"* then in the affix before us, *-idus* or *-id*. The Greek affixes of which these are representatives, were *-ειδής*, *-οειδής*, and *-ώδης*, and were employed in precisely the same way. The violet was ἴον, violet-like was ἰο-ειδής, just as to-day we call the aristocracy of flowers "orchids," because of their likeness in structure to the pretty orchis which in the meadows is the companion of the cowslip. Wasp-like, after the same manner, was σφηκ-ώδης; grove-like, ἄλσ-ώδης.

Take, to begin with, the familiar epithet "*candid*." Literally this denotes resemblance to *candor*, or shining whiteness; not the inanimate whiteness of chalk or wheaten flour, but bright and pearly whiteness, like that of clouds rendered lucid by sunshine, or of the petals of the *lilium candidum*, the Annunciation or Madonna lily, the lily *par excellence*, the flower intended by Chaucer:—

" His nekke was white as the *fleur-de-lis*."

Candor (the immediate parent also of *candour*) is derived

* Xenophon applies this interesting word to statues, the shape ordinarily given to "idols." Plato uses it to denote the "shade" or "ghost" of a departed mortal, as does Homer, in those famous lines on the spirit of Patroclus, at the beginning of the 23rd Iliad (ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις, κ.τ.λ. 103, 104). Longinus applies it to poetical ideas.

in turn from *candeo*, to glow like fire when at white heat, or as melted metal does when "incandescent." It is used as the metaphorical name for that which is frank, pure, fair, sincere, because whiteness is the natural emblem of such qualities (for *words* are emblematic or figurative because *things* are emblematic), and because the perfection of whiteness always implies lustre. "They shall walk with Me in white, for they are worthy." "And they that be wise shall shine." So with "lucid" itself, literally that which is like *lux*, *lucis*, figuratively bright, clear, plain, perspicuous. "Diana [the full moon] *lucidum cœli decus*." In "lucid" are involved also, metaphorically, perfect innocence and simplicity:—

"Think upon the time
When the clear depths of thy yet lucid soul
Were ruffled with the troublings of strange joy."

"Limpid" conveys the same idea, the root being *λάμπω*, to shine, whence, in addition, "lamp," primarily a torch, figuratively light for the soul, "Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path;" also the beautiful ancient name for the glowworm—*lampyrus*. *Splendid* is yet another of this noble company, coming from *splendeo*, to shine, to be very bright and glorious, like the sea trembling under the effulgence of the harvest-moon:—

"Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus."

Thoughtless exaggeration often applies this word to that which is simply neat, commendable, or excellent of its kind, as "a splendid pen," "splendid water-cresses." To test the rightfulness of any such epithet, employ one of the ordinary equivalents, such as, in the present instance, bright or shining. Then appears plainly how improper,

not to say senseless, are such expressions as those just quoted, expressions which have no real claim to be called figurative; they are metaphor travestied and caricatured.

On the same general principle of resemblance juices are called *acid* when the effect upon the palate is similar to that of an ἀκρίη, a thorn or prickle, upon the finger. In Saxon English we use the corresponding term "sharp" to denote both sourness and the pungency of thistle-spines. *Rig-id* conveys a comparison of the object spoken of to the stiffening produced by intense frost, *rigor*, as in the famous picture of the icicles hanging from the beard of snow-wrapped Atlas (*Æneid*, iv. 25). Rigid rules, rigorous discipline, thence mean strict, harsh, inflexible, severely exact. *Frig-id*, etymologically congenerate with the preceding, when applied to a person's manner, means what in Saxon English is "cold" and "chilly." In *vapid* there is a comparison to *vappa*, wine that has lost its strength and flavour. Hence the force of the epithet when applied to conversation, otherwise called flat, spiritless, uninteresting, *insipid*, which last is another capital metaphor, referring us to *sapor*, taste, whence, through another channel, savour and savoury. *Sapio*, the verb, is the parent of *sapientia*, literally "taste," figuratively wisdom, the man who possesses "sapientia" being the penetrating and judicious one, capable of appreciating and always intent upon the noble and pure, in spirit uprightly as well as delicately critical. Contrariwise the *sordid* one is no better, says the simile, than *sordes*, dirt, refuse, scavenger's sweepings; while the *stupid* one resembles *stupa*, the coarse and rejected portion of flax, that part of it which, instead of reappearing in beautiful fabrics, raiment in part perhaps for kings' daughters, is good for only the

meanest of purposes. *Tepid*, literally midway between warm and cold, was an epithet with the Romans for the idle and neglectful. *Lurid* denotes the gloomy complexion of the sky when it "lours" with the peculiar mixture of black and blue which always portends, and usually accompanies, something dismal:—

" The dawn is overcast, the morning *lours*,
And heavily in clouds brings on the day."

Figuratively it is passed on to hues and features ominous of evil, as when Linnæus called the deadly-nightshade plants the *Luridæ*.

Virgil, speaking of the beautiful crimson berries of the arbutus, describes their papillated surface under the epithet of *horridus*, simply intending "rough." How curious the variation of meaning produced by the lapse of eighteen centuries! Dreadful, hideous, that which makes one shudder—how has "horrid" come to denote these? *Horrere*, the verb, signified to shoot up long strong bristles like those of barley, thence called *hordeum*, to a field of which grain an admired passage in the *Æneid* compares the uprising of a thousand spears and unsheathed swords advancing to battle. Then it passed on to the behaviour of the thistle, "*carduus horreret in arvis*;" at last it settles on the frightful in the conduct of man.

Finally, in *solid* we have a reference to the earth upon which we live, considered in reference to its massiveness and impregnability, one of the names of "terra firma" with the ancients having been *solum*. While still current as a physical term, it was elegantly extended to minor things which give support, as to the atmosphere, which

is the realm of the birds, and to the sea, which bears up the ships :—

“Vastis fremit ictibus ærea puppis,
Subtrahiturque solum.”

The old poet gives it also to the rustic salvers off which the king and his attendants, reclining beneath the trees, eat their bread and fruit :—

“Et Cereale solum pomis agrestibus augent.”

“Soil,” in our own vernacular, means literally that on which the trees and plants rest or stand; the “sole” of the foot is that part of the body which serves as its foundation; at last comes the beautiful metaphor of “solid” as applied to the judgment, the character, the purpose, and conclusive arguments. To “consolidate” is literally to render sound, firm, and compact as the world itself.

CHAPTER XV.

THE compound words which have *-ic* for their termination are quite as numerous as those which end in *-id*, and again are condensed similes or comparisons. The root appears to be preserved in *εἰκὼν*, an image or likeness, a frequent New Testament word, as in "whose is this *εἰκὼν* and superscription? They say unto Him, Cæsar's." It is employed also in the sense of an exemplar or moral pattern, as in "the image and glory of God" (1 Cor. xi. 7). Drawings of plants made for botanical purposes are called *icones*; an image-breaker is an "iconoclast." Milton's celebrated tract called *Εἰκονοκλάστης* was written in reply (by command) to the *Εἰκὼν βασιλική*, or "kingly image" of the unfortunate Charles I. In regard to this affix we have, however, to be constantly upon our guard, seeing that the terminations of such words as *terrific*, *specific*, *pacific*, *beatific*, are referable to the Latin *facio*, to make or do. Genuine examples occur in *cynic*, *arctic*, *civic*, *heroic*, *classic*; and with the insertion of the euphonic *t* in *drama-t-ic*, *rus-t-ic*, *pathe-t-ic*.

In *cyn-ic*, *cynical*, for example, we have a comparison of the person or conduct spoken of to a dog, *κύων*, when surly and snarling. *Arctic* is a fine metaphor for the

part of the world which is turned towards the grand constellation called the Bear, ἄρκτος. Academic implies resemblance to the philosophy taught in the immortal garden near the banks of the Cephisus. *Lyric* signifies literally "pertaining to the lyre"—*i.e.* music and verses adapted to the most ancient and most poetical of instruments, the precursor of the harp, and representative of the particular emotions of the performer, cheerful or sad according to the time and conditions. "Bring hither the timbrels, the pleasant harp, with the psaltery." "The days of affliction have taken hold upon me; my harp also is turned to mourning."* *Classic*, now chiefly employed to denote the pre-eminently refined and chaste in style, meant originally that which pertained to the first or highest "class" of the Roman people, the patricians—a mode of expression exactly represented to day in our phrase "men of rank," meaning of the *highest* rank. *Rus-tic* implies resemblance to what is done in the country, *rus*, which being, in the olden times, devoid of the civilization of the town, was in its manners and customs unsuspecting and unadorned. *Politic*, on the contrary, means primarily that which pertains to cities; thence to the state, the government of which is managed in the metropolis, and as government is presumed to be well devised and judicious, we say figuratively, of action in general, that it is politic or impolitic. "According to the *rubric*" means in conformity with ecclesiastical rules. The origin of the word is found in the employment of

* Compare the beautiful lines in "Alcestis," 344-347, οὐ γὰρ ποτ', κ.τ.λ. "Neither can I evermore touch the lyre, nor lift up my heart to sing to the Libyan lute, for thou hast taken from me the joy of life."

red ink for the directions in the Prayer-book as to the sequence and mode of conducting the various portions of the service. "Roman-tic" takes us to the history of mediæval literature. The languages which sprang up in south-western Europe on the decline of the Roman power, and the reservation of pure Latin to the schoolmen and the priests, were all more or less based upon the Latin, and hence received, in time, the name of Romanic or Romanesque. These languages, mere dialects at first, had a literature of their own, consisting chiefly of marvellous tales both in prose and verse, love-stories predominating; and "romance," or a Romanesque story, at last became a synonym for any extravagant narrative, the incidents of which are never equalled in actual life. To-day "a romantic attachment" is one full of fervour and the chivalrous, but lacking in common sense.

A very interesting word of this class is "barbaric," as in Milton's "barbaric pearl and gold." The ancient Greeks considered their country the only civilized part of the world, and their language the only intelligible one. The speech of the nations beyond the frontiers was in their ears a mere jargon, a babble, a wild *bar bar*. This crude and meaningless sound they shaped into *βάρβαρος*, the repetition corresponding with that found in murmur and Aurora, and "barbarian," as we should now write it, signified outside, uncouth, rude, savage. Taken up in a later age by the Romans, Ovid, describing his wretched condition as an exile on the banks of the Danube, where *he* was the alien, exclaims—

"Barbarus hic ego sum quia non intelligor ulli."

(Here I am a barbarian, for I am understood by no one.)

From wild and rude the sense naturally passed on to unfeeling, cruel, and merciless, which meanings are now alone conveyed, "barbarians," unhappily, often speaking very good English. Barbarous and barbarian are well differentiated for the inhuman and pitiless, "barbaric" being thus left for the ostentatious attire and pageantry of the monarchs of uncivilized nations, the sense in which the word is employed in "Paradise Lost." A faulty or vulgar form of speech is well called a "barbarism." The "critic," to whose lot it falls to point out what is barbaric in speech, thence in literature and in art, owes his name to the Greek κρίνω, to sift or separate, thence to cull or select, the same word which through its Latin equivalent, *cerno*, has given us "discern" and "discernment," and reappears in *cribrum*, a sieve. The primary idea of criticism is searching for and collecting the worthy, the noble, and the beautiful, then unselfishly making it public. To no one in the world thus falls a more dignified duty than to the critic, whose own great pride should be to fulfil it with absolute faithfulness. It is his also to espouse the cause of the good and excellent, vindicating it when assailed by envy and ignorance. To-day it would seem as if many a man fancied that criticism consists in the contrary process, or looking, in the first place, for errors and blemishes; and not content with this, then treating them with sneers. Blemishes there are, of course, in all things. Every apple has its specks, every cowslip its ragged leaves. Irregularity is one of the all-pervading laws of nature. Without contrasts we should be unable to define the perfect: if there be nothing to give the impression of shadow, appreciation of the full glory of light is not

possible. In criticism, to whatever it may be addressed, let errors be pointed out, by all means; not to indicate them might be lenient, but would certainly be deceitful: a sensible man is always glad to be shown, in a kindly way, where he has made a mistake, so that in future he may go and do otherwise: the lamentable thing is the insisting upon the spots and failures, as if these were the all in all. The first essential to the exercise of sound criticism is that the man who assumes to criticise shall have qualified himself to recognise and discover the highest verities and the sweetest beauties contained in the work he proposes to judge. Secondly, he must approach his work in a *generous* spirit, remembering that men are men only, and not deities. If that which he proposes to criticise has involved long and patient toil, the critic is still unfit for his task until he has fairly estimated the difficulties which the producer, whether author or artist, had to contend with, and considered whether, in the face of these difficulties, he himself could have done any better, or as well. The critic is bound also to consider what were the *motives* of the author or artist. Nothing can be fairly judged till the aim and the design are taken into account, as well as the measure of success in the execution. Underlying all, there must be good taste, a just and delicate apprehension of fitness and harmony; and earnest care, at all times, not to make one's own stature the gauge of the noble and elevated, and one's personal bias, not to say prejudices, the standard of the good and the true. True criticism always begins with looking for the meritorious, and making the best of it. The merits may be few, but it insists upon taking these in the first place, deferring the blemishes

till all that is good has been set in its just and legitimate light—in the light the critic would himself wish to be set before the world, and no criticism is trustworthy which does not disclose plain proof of this having been done. Otherwise it is quite likely to be an illustration only of self-conceit, with leaven perhaps of worse things. When pointing out what he says are flaws and errors, the critic is bound also, for his own credit, to state what would have been right and proper. Failing to do this, he is naturally suspected of mere affectation of the superior knowledge which alone can determine what is faulty.

No man who values himself ever even looks at errors and ugly things oftener than he can help; much less does a man of sense keep on the alert for them. How can any one ever become refined, in his moral and intellectual nature, not to say great and wise, except by turning as quickly as possible from the false and deformed, and striving always to dwell in the contemplation of the noble and lovely? In *this* there is gain, positive and enduring; the other course is utterly profitless, with the danger always of involving irretrievable damage.

Other words of this class, very attractive to deal with, had we space, are *poetic*, *prosaic*, *prophetic*, *fantastic*, *electric*, *intrinsic*, *artistic*. "Catholic" must suffice—a beautiful word, compounded of *κατά*, used as an intensive, or in the sense of "throughout," and *ὅλος*, the whole, literally "all-embracing," figuratively liberality or breadth of view.

"Cynical," above cited, represents a small group in which a little more is preserved of the original ending, as in *logical*, *symmetrical*, *archæological*. One or two of

these are not, like all the remainder, of Greek or Latin extraction. “Whimsical” rests upon the Icelandic *hwim*, in Welsh represented by *chwim*, the Scandinavian and the Celtic alike signifying “quick movement,” therefore employed fittingly to designate capricious change. In Celtic is found the root also of “clerical,” which though not exactly conforming with the words under consideration, is here a welcome guest. The origin of this word, we are told by Mr. Charles Mackay, in *Notes and Queries* (September 21, 1878), “lies in the Celtic languages and the religion of the Druids, a religion which pervaded all western and middle Europe long before the establishment of the Roman Republic. There were three orders of the priesthood—the Druids, the Bards, and the Vates. It was the duty of the Bards to celebrate in poetical compositions, which they recited to the music of the harp, the great deeds of heroes, and to preserve by this means the history of bygone times, and impress its lessons upon the minds of their contemporaries. The name of the harp was *clar*, whence came *clarach* (the Latin *clericus*), pertaining to the harp, and *clarsair*, a bard or harper, which ultimately came to designate the priest who took part in the musical celebrations of the fane or temple. When the complimentary epithet of Beau-clerc was bestowed upon Henry I., it signified that he was a learned man, as learned as a *clericus*, which few kings of his time were.” A *clericus* was thus, originally, a bard, or poet and musician. Thence the transition was easy to scholar, a man of exceptional attainments, these, in the bygoner, not necessarily implying erudition, though the *clericus* was often immensely learned, but simply what to-day are called “literary” ones. As time moved on, *clericus* be-

came shortened into "clerk," with its adverb "clerkly," meaning scholar-like. The priests or clergy were the chief representatives of learning; they are still "clerks," just as their profession is still the "clerical," though not exactly the bardic. Simple ability to read and write once counted as an accomplishment of no trifling order. The ancient association endures, for though to be "clerk" in an office may in one sense imply inferiority of position, the clerk is still the man who is intrusted with the pen, as distinguished from the manipulation of the goods and wares, for which purpose animal bone and muscle suffice.

A very common affix in English words is *-ent*, usually representative of the Latin *-ens*, *-entis*, "being," *i.e.* existence, reality, immediate and unmistakable. Take as examples *ardent*, *lenient*, *patient*, *pungent*, *convenient*. It alters, with the "part of speech," into the forms represented in *clemency*, *fluency*, *transparency*, *innocence*, *convenience*; also, according to the variations of the Latin participle, into *-ant*, as in *brilliant*, *dormant*, *jubilant*, *vigilant*; whence, in succession, *brilliance*, *vigilance*, etc. There are many examples also of the introduction of a euphonic *m*, as in *content-m-ent*, *detri-m-ent*, *agree-m-ent*, *conceal-m-ent*. The *m*, that is to say, is no part of the root, or of the original affix, but is placed between them for the sake of establishing proper cohesion. In French we have the precisely similar *seule-m-ent*, *grande-m-ent*, and many more. Now and then, as in *com-ment*, the *m* exists where we find it, by birthright, the final syllable being referable to *mens*, *mentis*, the mind. Another set of the *-ens*, *-entis* words received when in construction a euphonic *l*, as *corpu-l-ent*, *escu-*

l-ent, opu-l-ent, succu-l-ent, viru-l-ent. From these, in turn, must be carefully distinguished those in which the *l* belongs to the formative *valeo*, as in benevolent, equivalent, prevalent. The idea universally intended to be expressed is the above-mentioned—positive existence. Contentment, from *con* and *teneo*, to hold together, denotes the pleasant condition represented in a bunch of grapes. “Fragments” imply that something has been “broken.” Detriment, primarily from *detero*, is the result, figuratively, of being unduly or persistently “rubbed.” The participle of *tero*, “*tritrus*,” has given the metaphor “trite,” literally something so rubbed and worn by long use that the novelty and interest have entirely passed away. To “try,” through the French *trier*, Italian *triare*, *tritare*, is from the same. Rubbing being the process by which the grain is separated from the chaff—“His disciples plucked the ears of corn, and did eat, rubbing them in their hands”—“trial” becomes a representative of careful examination, sifting, and extracting the good and the true. Thence it signifies, metaphorically, experiment and judicial inquiry, and finally, endeavour or attempt. “Trials,” in the sense of personal “tribulations” or troubles, are literally the winnowing of our fortitude and trust in Providence. “Contrite” means thoroughly and completely bruised. Thence we have the phrase a “contrite heart,” meaning, figuratively, one that has been rendered penitent by much rubbing. The idea expressed in “detriment” is represented also in the familiar metaphor to be “worn out,” the participle of “wear,” whence also “weary.” We say first that our clothing is worn out; then we apply the term to physical exhaustion; then to the fretting away of forbearance and patience.

Metaphorical signification inheres also in the last syllable of *acuteness*, *boldness*, *politeness*, and all similar words. Simple and unpoetical as it may appear, the etymological connection of this is with the Sanscrit *nâsâ* and the Latin *nasus* (no doubt a coeval term), in English the "nose." The origin of the word was in all likelihood onomatopœtic; allusion to the sounds made through the nose being the most natural mode of naming this organ. To sneeze, or "neese," as in Job xli. 18, the German *niesen*, the Danish *snuse*, and the Lithuanian *snusi*, to fall asleep, all point in this direction. The projection of the nose could not but suggest it as a fitting appellation for long drawn-out and conspicuous headlands or promontories. Hence in Anglo-Saxon such headlands or forelands were called *sæ-nesses*, as in "Beowulf," 444 (A.D. 700-750). Hence too the frequent occurrence in the maritime geography of northern Europe of such names as the Naze, Caithness, Furness, Stromness, Dungeness. Imitated in France, we there find Cape *Grisnez*. Metaphorically the word passed on to well-marked developments connected with inorganic nature, then to similar utterances in human character and action, as, in the first instance, *blackness*, *darkness*, *suppleness*; and secondly, in the crowd of expressive figures which includes *carefulness*, *nobleness*, *kindness*, *joyfulness*, *gladness*, *devotedness*, *faithfulness*, *gentleness*, *forgiveness*, *fearlessness*, *comeliness*, all denoting that the property or quality adverted to stands out plainly and prominently. An exception occurs in the word "business," which is from the old French *besogne*, in the plural *besoignes*, and appears to signify not simply being occupied, but attention to what is proper, appointed by rational custom, prescribed by conscience

as obligatory on human society. The modern French phrase *Faites votre besogne* means "Do your duty," just as in English "He has no business here" means "his being here is wrong."

The termination *-ship*, as in friendship, fellowship, courtship, corresponds, etymologically, with "shape," in German *schaft*. Our word "lordship" is in German represented by *herrschaft*. The Dutch form of the word is *schap*, as in *landschap*, literally, with Dutchmen, the shape or figure of a portion of country, as viewed from some commanding vantage, then poetically extended to all the details of the view; and, taken up by the painters of scenery, at last becomes the name of the picture which represents them. Adopted into English, each of these is a "landscape." "Shape" is used in the denomination of friendship—a metaphor, like all other names of human attributes—because it is in the "form" of a thing that its best qualities reside. The substantial, enduring, and inalienable in merit and truthfulness are always looked for in the configuration. Colour is good, flavour is good, odour is good, but these are only auxiliary. Not only would a rose, called by any other name, "smell as sweet," exchange a white one for a red, a red one for a white, the rose is there still, satisfying the idea of perfection. Compare the numerous words which instead of "shape" employ "form." To *inform* is to apprise as to shapes or outlines. *Information* is that which enables the mind's eye to make for itself a picture. So with *conform*, *reform*, *perform*, *transform*, all expressive metaphors conveying ideas connected with shape. Compare also the metaphorical use of the word "figure," derived primarily from *fungo*, to mould,

frame, or fashion things, as in the account of the artist—

“Bis conatus erat casus effingere in auro”

(Twice he essayed to figure the disastrous story in gold);

and as used, literally, in such phrases as “a woman of good figure.” “Courtship” begins with a very prosaic word—the ordinary name for an enclosed piece of ground. Passing on to enclosures devoted to some distinguished purpose, at one time “court” implied consecration: “Enter into His gates with thanksgiving, and into His courts with praise;” thence it came to signify the establishment of a temporal monarch, as the “Court of St. James’;” giving “courtly” as the appellation of suave and prince-like dignity of carriage, and “courtesy,” the life-blood of good manners. Then as the idea of a king, temporal as well as spiritual, implies authority, the maintenance of order, the vindication of truth and virtue, we have the Courts of Law and the Courts of Justice. In these men prefer their suits, seeking fulfilment of the heart’s desire, and at last, to “court” means to woo a maiden to become a wife.

In the termination *-fy*, so common to verbs, we have another relic or representative of the Latin *facio*, though proximately these verbs came into English through the French forms in *-fier*. In every instance the signification is that of doing, making, constructing, or enacting. To “edify” is literally to build a house. In Chapman’s Homer we have “where men have edified a lofty temple.” Hence the figurative expression the “edifice of the state;” and “edifying” and “edification,” as metaphors for progress in things moral and intellectual. To “petrify” is to convert into the similitude of a stone or

rock, *petra*. When rendered mute by excessive astonishment, people say that they too are "petrified." To "rectify" is literally to make straight, *rectus*; thence, figuratively, to purify, amend, improve, restore. The foundation of this comprehensive metaphor is obvious. Straightness corresponds to what is good and just. Truth, like the rays of the sun, always moves in straight lines. Crookedness, on the contrary, represents that which is evil and deceitful. Shakspeare speaks of

"Envy and *crooked malice* ;"

Marlowe, in "Tamburlaine," of one

"Of stature tall, and straightly fashioned
Like his desire, lift upward and divine."

Hence again, in the prophet, "The crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain." Compare the *direct* way, which means the true way, and "to direct" a person, which is to enable him to go that way. He who acts truthfully is called a "straightforward" man; his contrary is a "crooked fellow." Parallel figures are supplied by all words of similar physical sense, and in the languages of all nations. "Depraved" and "depravity" come from the Latin *pravus*, crooked. "Wrong" is congenerate with "wrench," literally to force aside by violence, thence figuratively to do what is unfair or unkind, both words belonging to the little group the parent of which is the Anglo-Saxon *wringan*, to twist. Compare again perverse and perversity, which mean a turning out of the right or straight path; thence misapplication, error, and corruption; and *foible*, which, through feeble and the French *faible*, takes us to *flexibilis*, the easily bent, the weak and irresolute.

The family connections of "rectify" are so numerous, and so worthy of detailed mention, that the general subject of Affixes may here give way to them. They furnish another excellent example of the fecundity of the ancient Aryan roots. That ability to "rectify," to put things straight, implies *power*, needs no argument. Not surprising is it then that we at once find ourselves face to face with *rego*, to govern, rule, or command; with *rex*, a king, and *regina*, a queen; the correlatives in Latin, which so constantly take us to primæval India, of the profoundly ancient Sanscrit *râg*, *râgân*, *rajnî*, and *râjatâ*, royalty. To this day a native Indian prince is a "rajah." Derived from these are *regnum*, a kingdom, *regalis*, regal, regalia, regent; and in French, by softening of the *g* into a *j*, and by omitting it, *royaume*, *le roi*, *la reine*. Realm and region literally denote the territories of a king; and so long as the lands remain under his authority, he "reigns."* Authority and control imply the institution of order. Hence from *rego* next come regulate, regular, rule, ruler, the last carried on by a simple and easy metaphor to the instrument by which straight lines are obtained with the pencil. The "unruly" are those who persist in being vagabonds; the incorrigible, those who are beyond reform. Here too we have the root of régime, regimen (a prescribed order of diet or medical treatment), and regiment, a body of soldiers subject to strict rule and discipline. Where there is power to keep things in order, wealth usually accrues. Hence, in the next place, "rich" and "riches," the former signifying resemblance

* Compare the termination *-ric*, as found in *bishopric*, and in many old names of men, intended to convey the idea of power or dominion, as *Frederic*, *Henricus*, *Richard*, *Alaric*.

to a king, and the latter being the analogue of his kingdom. No word in our language is employed with finer effect, metaphorically. To be "rich" is less frequently to own much money than to be fertile, full of agreeable or nutritive qualities, bright in colour, ambrosial in odour, alluring in flavour, exquisitely harmonious, sumptuous in aspect, consummately beautiful, abounding in delightful imagery :—

" But knowledge to their eyes her ample page,
Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll."

"The earth," says the Psalmist, "is full of Thy riches : so is this great and-wide sea." Hence again the familiar figures, "richly endowed," "a rich heart," "a wealthy soul." Metaphor uses the contrary state of things with equal effect, speaking of a poor companion, poverty of imagination. From the Latin participle *rectus* come very many words, "rectify," with which we commenced, leading the way. In this group are found "erect," that which stands up straight; "correct," to make things straight, thence, metaphorically, to amend in conduct, to chastise an ill-behaved child, also rectitude, the rector, the rectory. From the same source, altered by the vicissitudes so commonly undergone by words, comes *right*, which in reality is only another spelling of *rectus*. Hence "aright," "the right hand," upright, downright, right-minded, righteous, and righteously, originally, as by Wiclif, written "rightwisely." The change would seem to have crept in under the influence of such forms as bounteous and plenteous : it is to be observed also that the common expression "richly deserved" is a corruption of "*rightwisely* deserved." From *di-rectus*, through the old French *droict*, we have the expressive metaphor *adroit*,

literally apt or ready for anything requiring skill and ingenuity to put it straight. From *ad-directus*, in turn, through the French *adresser*, comes *address*, the primary sense of which word is propriety of manners and conduct, the first essential in "addressing" those we speak to. The infinitive *ad-dirigere*, in Italian became *drizzare*, from which is derived "dress," literally to render straight, thence to put in order, according to a prescribed rule; and in a subordinate degree, to trim and make tidy. Adam was placed in the garden of Eden "to dress and to keep it." Troops are said to "dress" when placed in even line. Food, by another metaphor, is rendered eatable by "dressing" it, and the table on which it is prepared is the "dresser." Eventually the word passes on to apparel, because without clothing a human being is incomplete. The lunatic, when restored to reason, "in his right mind," was seen "sitting, and *clothed*." "Apparel" itself is a metaphor, being derived through the French *appareiller*, from the Latin *ad* and *par* "equal." The literal signification is that of joining like to like, such a fitting and adjusting of the dress that when all is finished there shall be perfect accord between the wearer and the worn. Compare the choice word "array," as in "Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these," *i.e.* these flowers of the field. Through the Italian *arredare*, old French *arroyer*, *arr'cer*, array comes from the self-same old root, *rego*, to govern, thence to set in order, thence to adorn and decorate. Both "dress" and "apparel" thus imply much more than simple habiliments, and in "dressing," in its inmost or highest sense, consists much more than the mere putting on of clothes. "Dress" carries with it orderliness, precision, ideas of

perfect rectitude ; it implies the exercise of taste, a sense of right and wrong, the perception of what is graceful and harmonious. Hence it is that ladies speak of dressing for the *soirée*, dressing for the promenade, each place demanding its own particular symmetries, though not more than the parlour ; and in every instance it is not to be overlooked that taste in dress is ordinarily a certain indication of a fair sense of the becoming in private and domestic concerns in general. In similar spontaneous deference to the innate meaning of the word, however multiform and multifarious may be the articles constituting a lady's attire, she designates the all-encircling one emphatically her "dress." Seeing what is meant figuratively by dress, the sense of "re-dress" becomes evident, *i.e.*, the straightening of that which has been disordered.

Very beautiful, regarded from the poet's point of view, is the way in which the ideas of clothing and dress are extended to external nature. Milton, describing the final scene of the six days' work, says—

" Earth, in her rich attire,
Consummate, lovely, smiled."

Cicero speaks of the mountains being "clothed with woods," and of the fields with flowers, though of the text, "If God so clothe the grass of the field," he knew nothing. In familiar colloquy, which is often far more poetical than we think, we talk of "spring's green mantle." In winter the trees are said to be "denuded," also to be "naked," as in the sweet little old melody—

" When the leaves had forsaken the trees,
And the forests were chilly and bare."

Shelley speaks of the hills in winter as "robed in snow."

How charming again the picture in Virgil, when describing the fruitfulness of the old man's garden, he says—

“ Illi tiliæ, atque uberrima pinus :
 Quotque in flore novo pomis se fertilis arbos
Induerat, totidem autumno matura, tenebat.”

(He had linden bloom and fir-cones* in profusion ; and as many fruits as the fertile tree had been clothed with in early blossom, so many it retained in autumn.)

Passed on to human character and disposition, nothing is commoner in poetic language than the use of “dress” and its equivalents for what the Platonists termed the “vestments of the mind.” Homer has “clad in courage,” “in fortitude,” and “in valour.” Shakspeare has “attired in wonder,” “clothed in forced consent,” and above all, the famous lines which speak of “clothing naked villany”

“In old odd ends, stolen forth from holy writ.”

While the clothing of vice in this way tends to bring new disgrace, the clothing given by virtue adorns and defends. Innocence, mildness, and forbearance are used, accordingly, to denote the *protection* afforded to those who practise them. In “Comus” the elder brother calms the younger one's fears for their sister's safety by reminding him of her chastity :—

“She that has that is clothed in complete steel,
 And like a quivered nymph, with arrows keen,
 May trace huge forests, and unharboured heaths,
 Infamous hills, and sandy, perilous wilds.”

* The produce of the *Pinus Pinea*. The seeds are still used as food in Italy, and occasionally brought to England as a dessert fruit. The lindens supplied honey for his bees.

Horace proposes to teach the same substantial truth when he tells us that it was through the innocence and integrity of his life that he was preserved from the jaws of a wolf which one day approached his farm.

Nothing could more finely allegorize the efficiency and heavenly excellence of the "Peace Principle," when regarded as to its true idea, which is not the disbanding of armies, and the denouncement of war, but to "overcome evil with good." Physical force may be good, but moral force is infinitely better. War may win battles, but love and generosity win the greater victories.

The idea of being "clothed with fortitude" is expressed by another author, Tacitus, in a singularly fine manner—*induere diem*, "to put on a day;" that is, take patiently whatever events it may produce. Ossian says of "blue-eyed Dardulena, the love of heroes," that she was "clothed in the beauty of youth." Forecasting cheerful events, we say that all "wears" a promising appearance.

Scripture repeatedly illustrates these forms of figurative speech. In the 132nd Psalm it is promised that the priests of Zion shall be "clothed with salvation" and "their enemies with shame." In the 93rd it is said that the Lord is "clothed with majesty and strength;" in Ezekiel that "the princes of Tyre shall clothe themselves with trembling;" Peter exhorts us to "be clothed with humility." The quality or bias of the human will, in particular, is continually spoken of in this manner, because man prepares himself for the future, not so much by what he may learn about God and religion, as by what, with faith in God's help, he *wills to do* in reference to it. "It is one thing," says Bishop Wilson, "for a man to fill his understanding and memory with truths; it is

another to nourish his heart with them." It is the will that shapes man's real life; and it is by what he has done in obedience to its dictates, and not by the contents of his understanding, that he will be judged at the last day. Hence it is said that it is not the *hearers* of the law who shall be justified before God, but the *doers* of it, and that *their works shall follow them*; God "rendering unto every man according to his *deeds*."

This great fact supplies the clue to the meaning of the Biblical passages wherein we are exhorted to "change our garments," and to the ground of the promise of heavenly joy to those who "keep their garments," and "who have not defiled their garments"—none of which texts have any weight as to moral and personal influence, if taken literally; that is, as having reference simply to the material dresses which we wear during life: though when seen to bear upon the will and the conduct, they become full of instruction. They have precisely the same purport as the colloquial warning to leave off "bad habits," and to seek to acquire good and clean habits, which are also matters for the will to determine upon; and in all of which the figure is drawn from the natural correspondence which every man perceives these things to hold with the clothes or habits worn upon the body. The two sets of phrases are in fact identical; for the "bad habits" of man are but another name for the "filthy garments" in which the immoral are said to be clothed, and which must be exchanged for clean ones, before their wearers can enter life. These are Christian virtues and graces, innocence, purity, and the love and fulfilment of truth, which are "good habits" in man's language, and "clean garments" in God's. Hence, too, in Isaiah, Jerusalem

is called on to "awake," and put on her "beautiful garments;" that is, forsake evil, love God, and do His will. In this spiritual clothing with new and clean garments is thus implied the attaining a new and improved character; just as in the material world, the scene of our present or time life, new and clean apparel is always associated with amended secular conditions, and indicative of them: it is being "dressed" in the highest and most genuine sense; carrying with it the capital fact in addition, that while the more we wear a material dress, the sooner it wears out, the longer we wear a spiritual one, the more enduring it becomes, and if of the kind that is recommended, so much the more beautiful. Many other familiar expressions rest upon the correspondence of dress with attributes. To "invest" is literally to "surround with clothing," as when we say, "invested with a new charm," invested with interest, invested with authority. To "divest" is to strip it off, as in "divested of error."

CHAPTER XVI.



THE foundation of the whole superstructure of metaphor rests, as already said, upon the analogies, agreements, and resemblances which subsist between the various objects and phenomena of nature; and between these, in turn, and human life, man's moral and intellectual powers most particularly. Analogies and resemblances resolve, however, into two distinct classes. Some are superficial, nothing more than bubbles when compared with the stream itself, and serve only for casual comparisons. Others, incomparably more numerous, form an integral part of the constitution of the world, mankind included, and these it is which supply the permanent material, the warp and woof, of human language. The genuine or natural analogies are those which Lord Bacon refers to in a phrase already two or three times cited—the “respondences,” or, as he calls them in another place, the “correspondences” of nature. Often confounded, the difference between the two kinds, as to principle, is absolute. Comparisons, though often very elegant, and well adapted, when employed by skilful hands, to illustrate and embellish, do not by any means involve correspondence, though respondences may

be, and no doubt are, very frequently resorted to for them. Comparisons not founded upon correspondence must needs be arbitrary; they are often loose, and even foolish, meaningless, and inconsistent. Nor is this all. Comparison is quite capable of becoming treacherous, often betraying men into the belief that they have found an argument, when in reality they have got no more than a will-o'-the-wisp. Respondence, on the other hand, carries with it, in its totality, the rationale of all existence. The Divine Ruler of the realm of spirit is the sustainer also of the material world in which we dwell. The maintenance of each is governed, so we are taught in His most Holy Word, by the same laws. Therefore they harmonize at all points, and nature is a representative and counterpart of the invisible, and an attestation of it. In language, Max Muller himself tells us, "there is, no doubt, a transition from the material to the spiritual; the raw material of language belongs to nature, but the form of language, that which really makes language, belongs to the spirit."* Perhaps the relation in which the two realms of being, the spiritual and the material, really stand to one another, is equivalent to that of Cause and Effect, just as spoken words are the out-birth of thoughts and feelings; since nothing, we may be sure, has been ordained except with a view to its being in some way operative and productive, and since everything objective must needs be a Result. "Everything," said the ancients, "that is in the kingdom of the earth, in earthly form, is found also in the kingdom of heaven, in heavenly form." "The invisible things of God," says St. Paul, reminding one of Bezaleel and the ^{tabernacle} temple, "are

* Chips from a German Workshop, iv. 234.

clearly seen by the things that are made." Lord Bacon's words are only a varied reading of this meaningful text. "Neither," says he, "are those [respondences] of which we have spoken, and others of like nature, mere resemblances (as men of narrow observation may possibly imagine,) but one and the very same seals of nature, impressed upon various subjects and objects. . . . Hitherto this branch of science hath not been cultivated as it ought, . . . though of such consequence as materially to conduce to the understanding of the Unity of Nature, which latter we conceive to be the office and use of PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA." The study of the various departments of nature as separate and distinct entities, and as to their peculiarities rather than their common properties, which formerly was the only method pursued by men of science, is doubtless, up to a certain point, a right and profitable course, and will always be so. Men of science, in order to be exact, must needs fix and concentrate their attention on specific classes of facts. But the higher philosophy of nature contemplates its elements as to their mutual relations, and most particularly as to their relations with mankind. No portion of nature becomes really intelligible until the concord of its parts and principles with the laws and truths of the spiritual has been looked for and considered earnestly. A man may be a very good chemist, as regards acquaintance with salts and acids: he may be a very good geologist, as regards strata and fossils; or a very good botanist, as regards species and "natural orders." Resting in this, he is still, however, only a savant, a scientific sectarian; he is not a philosopher till his mind has quickened to the interweaving of the physical facts with the truths which

pertain to the invisible or spiritual.* Perhaps it would not be too much to assert that the converse of this is equally true; namely, that in order to lift theology and metaphysics out of the accustomed sectarian groove, each must be placed in the light of external nature, and most particularly of external living nature. To the philologist, for the same reason, nature is an indispensable instructress. Quitting our chairs, and walking out into the sweet scenery of God's creation, language ceases to be a mere matter of "words, words, words." Here is soon discovered how great is the difference between Comparison and Correspondence, and how much reason there is to look upon language with reverence, if we would revere and honour the Creator. Daily use makes language seem only like the atmosphere. Every one breathes it every moment: few reflect, fewer still conceive, how sublime a thing it is. It is a far more sublime thing than even the profoundest student is able fully to appreciate. Resting, as it does, upon correspondence, the introduction to all that is most precious to possess, who can help thanking God for the munificence which has placed at our command realities so exquisite, and so readily adapted to use? How worthy, then, of our study! To men in general, unhappily—

"The world in vain unbosometh her beauty."

The daily returns of the same objects to our view, render them familiar to us; and we are all of us too little inclined to admire or search into the causes of what we are always

* It is scarcely necessary to say that no reference is here made to the disorderly profanities which in our own day have acquired the current name of "spiritualism."

conversant with ; as if the novelty, rather than the greatness and excellence of things, ought to incite us to investigate their history.*

The entire purpose of this volume is to show the dependence of language upon correspondences ; and the illustrations of etymology and of the original meanings of words hitherto given, have in the main been designed to further that purpose. For clearness' sake, it may be well at this point to place in strong contrast the difference between Comparison which belongs to the surface, and metaphors such as are founded upon Respondence, or the original and inalienable harmonies of things. Fanciful metaphors, similar in origin and fabric to superficial comparisons, and which form no integral part of the universal language of mankind, of course do not come in for present notice. Under the first of these two heads, Artificial Comparisons, fall the greater number of the elaborate similes found in the poets, though similar ones occur in choice prose in equal profusion. How purely superficial, for instance, though extremely beautiful as an image, is the comparison in Apollonius, when describing Medea, in the profound stillness of midnight, sleepless in her tender anxiety on account of Jason, she alone of all things in nature awake, he likens the throbbing of her heart, tossed by alternate hopes and fears, to the dancing of the light reflected from a bowl of water upon the walls and ceiling. How beautiful again, though the circumstances are devoid of the least natural connection, the picture in the modern novelist : " The waves swirling among the peaks of rock, and playing with the seaweed tangle, as a strong man with the glistening tresses

* Cicero, De Nat. Deor.

of the wife of his heart." Compare the well-known lines—

"The bridegroom sea
Is toying with his wedded spouse, the shore,
He decorates her tawny brow with shells,
Retires a space, to see how fair she looks,
Then proud, runs up to kiss her."

Compare again the grand Shakspearean image—

"Yea, this man's brow, like to a tittle-leaf,
Foretells the nature of a tragic volume—
So looks the strond, whereon the imperious flood
Hath left a witnessed usurpation."

The characters in Shakspeare, says one of his German commentators, are like watches with crystal dials: they not only tell the hour, as others do, but, as with no others, you can see the inside mechanism. Life, says an eminent Frenchman, is like a game of chess, ourselves being the pieces. There are kings, queens, knights, and pawns—all are of the same substance, and at last all are thrown into the same box.

How different from any of the above is the giving to knowledge, truth, reason, understanding, the name of Light. Here we have a Correspondence, not a simple comparison. Light was not *chosen* by man as a designation for these things. Desiring to speak of them figuratively, he cannot do otherwise than call them Light. Expressions founded on this great natural harmony constitute part of every known language, ancient and modern. We hear, almost hourly, of the light of reason, the light of science, enlightening the mind, casting new light on the matter. "When we look at ourselves," says Emerson, "in the light of thought, we discover that life

is embosomed in beauty." "Whatsoever doth make manifest," the apostle tells us, "is *light*." So with the beautiful verse in Luke, "The Dayspring from on high hath visited us, to give light to them that sit in darkness." For the same reason our Lord is designated the True Light, and in pictures is represented with an aureole, or outflow of golden rays, around His head. By metonymy, in Scripture, Truth, or that which enlightens the mind, is often called a "lamp." Hence the earnest exhortation to keep our lamps burning, which means, let all that is possessed of revealed truth be kept uppermost in memory and foremost in practice. When, in Ecclesiastes, we are similarly exhorted to "remember our Creator . . . before . . . the golden bowl is broken, and the silver cord is loosed," there is no allusion, as very commonly fancied, to the skull and the spinal marrow, the "golden bowl" being the self-same "lamp," and the "silver cord" the chain by which it is suspended. Should the chain give way, as quite possibly will be the case if it is never looked to, the lamp will fall to the ground, the oil be spilled, and the light extinguished. Then what shall a man do? How beautiful a symbol! Metaphors founded in resemblance are truly a language within language; *imperium in imperio*. Do not postpone remembering, the Preacher means, till the faculties are enfeebled by age or broken by infirmity of body. Equivalent Latinisms are lucid, elucidate, luminous, illuminate, irradiate, all of which denote physical illumination in the first place, and thence the qualities or operation of the light of the mind. Thus, a "lucid description," to "elucidate a history," a luminous essay, to illuminate the understanding. The inmates of asylums for the

insane are said, for the same reason, to have "lucid intervals." Pellucid, ordinarily employed in English only in its primary or physical sense, as when said of crystals, is applied by Cicero to a man of honesty and frankness. Illustrate, illustration, illustrative, are metaphors of precisely the same substance, being also derived originally from *lux*, *lucis*, or light. With the ancient Greeks the simple word for "to speak" was founded upon that one for "to shine," in the way of sunlight. Compare, etymologically, *φάω*, *φῶς*, and *φημί*, the second extant in "phosphorus," and the last in "prophet" and "prophecy." "Fame," from *φημί*, means primarily "very much put in the light," thence very much spoken of.

From denoting that which the intellect is specially qualified to appreciate, Light naturally passes on to that which moves and gratifies the affections. In this extended use there is nothing inconsistent or incompatible with the original relation of Light to truth and knowledge. None of the constituents of nature have a solitary sense and meaning; all by lateral harmony are competent to become metaphors of one another. Hence it is that while the human vocabulary, the simple catalogue of names of things, is kept within easy limits, and is at the command of every memory, Language is multiplied tenfold. There is a lateral harmony, for instance, between certain sounds and certain colours, whence the artist speaks of the "harmony" of colours and of the "tone" of a picture, and the musician of his "chromatic" scale, *chroma* being the Greek word for colour. Hence too music has been well called Light to the blind. One of the poets has "a rainbow of sweet sounds." As the mediate supporter of all animal and vegetable life, and

& The last word is to be removed. (where the sign is made)
 The Chromatic Scale is so called because the scale is
 of the same nature as light.

the secret source of all physical comfort and enjoyment, Light is naturally identified with the agreeable, the valuable, and the health-giving. In the world of nature, under its influence, the flowers expand and the birds begin to carol. Listen, in early morning, to their song in the trees, never so sweet and plentiful as then: no one knows what rock-roses are, the mouse-ears, the lapsanas, or the wild convolvuluses, who has not seen them before the dew is off the grass. These lovely things, the birds and the early flowers, are in material nature representatives of the human affections—so, at least, Scripture and the great poets say; and that Light fitly denotes whatever stirs and cheers the latter, is again borne out by its use for this purpose in every language, ancient and modern, of which there is knowledge. In Esther viii. it is said that the Jews “had joy, and honour, and light, and gladness.” In Psalm xcvi. we are told that “light is sown for the righteous, and gladness for the upright in heart.” Elsewhere it is promised that “in the evening there shall be light,” the evening here referred to being the period of our little time-life which corresponds with the close of the temporal or solar day. At all times “unto the upright there ariseth light in darkness,” which words, very obviously, do not apply to the light of the physical sun, for this is given all the year round to the worst of men as well as the best: “God maketh His sun to rise on the *evil* and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.” The secular poets abound with examples. Ajax having achieved some great and auspicious deed, Homer says that he “gave light to his companions,” φῶς δ’ ἐτάροισιν ἔθηκεν. So, leaping little less than thirty centuries, in the Laureate:—

“ The small bright head,
 A light of healing, glanced about the couch,
 And through the parted silks the tender face
 Peeped, shining in upon the wounded man,
 With flush and smile, a medicine in themselves.”

Compare that often-quoted expression “the light of other days,” and the fine though mournful passage in Joanna Baillie :—

“ Thus it is true, from the sad years of life
 We sometimes do short hours, yea minutes, strike,
 Keen, blissful, bright, never to be forgotten ;
 Which through the dreary gloom of time o'erpast,
 Shine like fair sunny spots on a wide waste.
 But few they are, as few the heaven-fired souls
 Whose magic power creates them.”

Need they be “few”? Depend upon it, the best working faith for mankind is optimism, or that which, through its incomparable alchemy, will transmute the plain into the glorious, and though the day be sometimes, as it must needs be, “dark and dreary,” is always alive to a reassuring iris in the skies.

Lord Byron's use of this image to describe the devotion of Kaled to Lara gives to it an inexpressible pathos. Lara is dying on the field of battle, his head supported by Kaled—

“ Who nothing fears, nor feels, nor heeds, nor sees,
 Save that damp brow which rests upon his knees ;
 Save that pale aspect, where the eye, though dim,
 Held all the light that shone on earth for him.”

Compare, again, that matchless verse in Moore—

“ 'Twas whispered balm, 'twas sunshine spoken !”

That other, too, in the “Faëry Queene,” which reminds one how in time of despondency faithful affection can

“make a sunshine in the shady place;” and yet again Dickens’ beautiful sentence, “She came into the darkness of my life, and made it bright.” In the “Odyssey,” Telemachus is frequently addressed as *γλυκερόν φάος*, Sweet light! Ovid, in the “Tristia,” exclaims, *mea lux!* —“my light, my heart’s joy!” In “Ion” we have—

“A life
Made by thy love a cloudless holiday.”

Such passages abundantly prove that the poets, in their writings, do no more than obey, very earnestly and delicately, the great laws which cover at once both nature and man. The true poet is not creative, as some have said. His distinctive characteristic consists simply in power to see further and to feel more deeply than other men. Hence it follows, almost as a corollary, that all great and true poetry serves as a key to the hieroglyphics of nature, and that the poets, rightfully so called, are the prime instructors of mankind. For their work is not simply to delineate the picturesque, and to narrate engaging stories; nor does it end in incorporating with these the enforcement of truth and virtue. Proceeding thus far, they fulfil their noble functions of Painter and Priest. It yet remains to fulfil the exalted duty of Interpreter, which is to elucidate the universal harmonies of things, and to show us what they signify. Well, therefore, were the poets anciently called, not only the “finders,” but “the wise,” *οἱ σοφοί*, as in Pindar, *μελέταν δὲ σοφισταῖς* (Isth. v. 36). This was their title before the name of “philosopher” was invented. Mark, especially in regard to the above-quoted and all similar passages, that great poets are always seen at their best when they address

themselves to simple and common things, putting to a noble and beautiful purpose, and usually a novel one, the oldest occurrences and the most familiar appearances, and showing us what loveliness inheres in these by birthright. Startling, sensational, sentimental, and fantastic things they leave to their inferiors, just as the thoughtful and cultivated leave what is weak and silly to the mob. Every one has seen snow fall upon water ; what is there more common or commonplace? The poet, one, say rather, of the poets whose verses wrap round the world, gives it life :—

“Like a snowflake on the river,
A moment white, then gone for ever!”

Such passages are emphatic also, in illustration of the great truth that the beauty and sublimity of things depend, not upon material or physical qualities, however earnestly our bodily sight and hearing may try to persuade us to the contrary, but upon their concord with human nature, and with the phenomena of man's emotional and intellectual existence. Everything given to man by God is, like Himself, omnipresent. This, indeed, is a large part of the true idea of the Divine omnipresence. Beauty and sublimity count with the most benevolent of the Divine gifts. The life and reality of these so-called “attributes” consist essentially in the sweet and deep-seated concords of man's heart and mind with what he sees around him in nature. The sublime and beautiful in nature, reside, in other words, in the emblematic and representative character of all that exists. Hence there is no place which is wanting in the sublime and beautiful. One little saying sums up the whole

matter : "If you dig at the foot of the rainbow, you will find a pot of gold." Assuredly you shall. The rainbow spans the sky wherever the sunbeams are intercepted by a descending shower ; therefore belongs, taking the year round, to the whole world, every rood of which is at one time or another the rainbow's "foot," and the "pot of gold" is the reward of all who have learned how to seek and how to find, corn to the industrious, beauty and sublimity to the heart that is open to perceive and enjoy.

"As he who southward sails, beholds, each night,
New constellations rise, all clear and fair ;
So o'er the waters of the world, as we
Reach the mid zone of life, or go beyond,
Beauty and bounty still beset our course."

Were it not for these primitive relations of man with external nature, he would have no affection either for the sublimities of the sea, or of the swelling mountains ; none for the solemn and silent woods, filled with solitude as with a presence ; none even for such simple things as pure air and the green fields. But the love of such is universal. It may fill the soul as a yearning passion, or may exist as but one among many feelings : still it is an integral part of man's being, and is continually productive of new and refreshing enjoyments. One mind is most charmed by flowers, another by birds ; one delights most in the view of a well-ordered farm, another in rocks and waterfalls ; one most loves sweet sounds, another the stars, another the trees, another the human form, and so on, infinitely. In every different and particular case, no matter how unlike, all this comes primarily of specific and original concord between man's own individual inmost nature and the thing which he

admires. That which he loves best, is that which he most nearly accords with, and this to him is the beautiful. Thus are we brought round to the universality of the beautiful—man's name for that which arises from the intimate consociation of his intellectual and emotional nature, or of some particular ingredient of it, with such elements or phenomena of the external world as he is in closest "respon-
dence" with.

" How can the beauty of material things
So win the heart, and work upon the mind,
Unless like-natured with them ? "

George Herbert recognises this great principle in another connection ; not perhaps quite so " poetical," though a more dulcet and faithful poet never lived, but a connection, nevertheless, that there is no gainsaying :—

" Herbs gladly cure our flesh because that they
Find their acquaintance there."

The simple truth of the whole matter is that the universe is to man a magnificent mirror, in which, whenever he lifts himself from the occupations of his merely animal life, he sees himself reflected. No two persons ever see precisely the same kind of reflection in a mirror made of glass and quicksilver, though they may see similar ones ; every man sees the image of *himself*.

Designating, in the first place, the quality of *forms*, as estimated by virtue of these harmonies, " beauty " then passes on to the figurative denomination of ideas and impressions of every kind that excite pleasure, through whatever medium they may be received. We speak of beautiful sounds, a beautiful poem, a beautiful scientific experiment. Compare the Latin *conveniens*, literally

drawing near together, or approaching ; figuratively that which is so pertinently described in English as “meet” and “becoming.” Scripture preserves for us the good old sense in Ephesians v., where senseless jesting, profane and dirty talk, the conclusive signs of a vulgar imbecile, are said to be “not convenient.” “Comely” and “comeliness” convey precisely the same idea as *conveniens*.

Although such harmony exists between man and external nature, it does not follow that individuals are vividly conscious of it. The awakening occurs when introduced to scenes which, giving supreme and absolutely novel delight, excite new trains of thought and emotion. Then it is as with Eve when she first saw her countenance reflected in the water. Everything she beheld she had possessed during the whole period of her existence, but unknowingly—

“ As I bent down to look, just opposite
 A shape within the watery gleam appeared,
 Bending to look on me : I started back ;
 It started back ; but pleased, I soon returned ;
 Pleased it returned as soon, with answering looks
 Of sympathy and love.”

There is a little more yet to be said about the correspondence of Light. From representing truth as perceived by the intellect, and the satisfactions of the heart, Light again naturally passes on to the denomination of that which the dignity of truth always underlies, namely, perfection, honour, glory, and renown. From the Latin *luceo*, to give light, or *lux*, *lucis*, have come lustre, lustrous, and illustrious, all three commonly applied to the very noble. So with brilliant and brilliancy, as when we speak of a brilliant afternoon, meaning a sunny one,

then of brilliant talents and brilliant conversation. A musical performance is also said to be brilliant when it vindicates the highest principles belonging to the "concord of sweet sounds." The Saxon "shine" is used in the same manner, as when we speak of "shining virtues." A consummately handsome figure receives the same epithet. Sophocles applies the equivalent Greek epithet *λαμπρός* to the noble and graceful bearing of Orestes, when he entered the lists at the Delphic games, the admiration of every eye. The similar meaning and figurative sense of "splendid," from *splendeo*, to shine, have already been dealt with (p. 189). Compare, also, "bright," derived from a root signifying to burn (thus conforming with the etymological history of "aurora"), as when we speak of a bright fire, then applied to what is luminous, then employed in the beautiful metaphors, bright smiles, honour bright, brightening up, bright days, meaning happy ones. While these are still in the future, there are "gleams" and "rays" of hope. Similar in primitive sense is the word "fair," applied first to a fine day, then to grace and loveliness as told of in the "Legend of Fair Women," then extended by courtesy to women in general, "the fair sex," then to what is upright and honest in conduct and business. A charming analogue to all of these is found in the Greek *γέλα*, sunshine, and *γελάω*, to laugh. How beautiful again the illustration supplied in the long list of Aryan words which, beginning with application to brightness and shining, as of the sun, the Sanscrit *div* signifying "to shine," comprises, on the one hand, the Latin *dies*, the Anglo-Saxon *dæg*, and our own "day" and "dawn;" and on the other, the most ancient name of the Supreme Being, of

whom the sun is the material image and representative. In this latter series we find the old Aryan word for God—*deva*, the Latin *deus*, and the equivalent, though rather differently developed, Greek *θεός*. “Deity” and “Divine” are thus metaphors of “sunshine.” Theology is literally the science of that which gives light; the name of the superb Himalayan tree called the *Deodara* means the “gift of God,” who is called by Philo Judæus, ὁ νοητὸς ἥλιος, the sun of the mind. Day connects itself with other terms, retaining all the while its intrinsic sense, as in day-dream, day-lily, day-spring, “The Dayspring from on high hath visited us.” Through curious permutation of *d* and *j*, many other examples of which occur, in modern times *dies* has become the *jour* of the French, whence *ournée*, a journey, that which we accomplish between sunrise and sunset, and “journal,” the written record of the day’s experience. Lastly, in the connection before us we have “glory” and its adjective “glorious.” The exact lineage of these is undetermined. The dictionaries refer them to the Sanscrit root *clu*, preserved in the Greek κλύω and the Latin *clueo*. It seems very probable, at the same time, that they are congenerate with the Greek γλάυσσω, “to shine,” and with the large company of Aryan words represented in the Latin *clarus*, whence “clear,” *clair*, and the first part of *clerestory*, the portion of the cathedral, above the nave, through the windows of which the light enters. To “clarify” is used by old English authors where now we write “glorify,” as in Wiclif: “And now, Fadir, *clarifie* thou me at thi self with the *clerensse* that I hadde at thee bifore the worlde was maad.” Many beautiful metaphors have arisen upon *clarus*, which with the Romans signified noble, honour-

able, and heroic, as *claritas*, renown, and our own "declare," literally to place in the light of day. Clearness passes on to the denomination of that which is translucent, as when we speak of "clear water," and figuratively of a "clear exposition" and of "clear proof." On the beautiful analogy of *sound* with light, above indicated, rests the name of the musical instrument called the "clarion," with its diminutive the "clarinet." By a change similar to that of *clamare* into *chiamare*, in Italian *clarus* becomes the first part of *chiar' oscuro*. The *gl-* series is also copiously represented, as in the German *gleissen*, to shine, figuratively to throw light upon, or "explain." The "gloss" of woven silk is its brightness; "glossy" things are shining ones; to "glow" is to shine with light, like a "glowing" fire; to "glance" is to look at a thing after the manner of a sunbeam that suddenly comes and suddenly goes; a "glade" is a part of the forest where, through scantiness of trees, the sunshine enters freely. Compare *glaze*, *glass*, *glacies*, *glacier*, *glisten*, *glint*, *glitter*, *glimmer*, *glare*, all which words are related, etymologically, to the root of *gloria*, and refer, more or less immediately, to light or translucency.

Dealt with in all its aspects by a poet, other beautiful concords of light with the circumstances of human life would not escape notice. As light is compounded of three essential colours, which the prism separates, and to which all others are reducible, as their bases; so, for instance, true philosophy shows the enjoyment of existence to lie in the trinity in unity of moral purpose, intellect, and the external senses. To "mean well" is of little practical value unless there be sound sense to guide—intellect without moral purpose, is cold and

heartless ; the full, but properly ordered enjoyment of the pleasures of sense is one of man's prime duties, for God bestowed them to that end. "Use the world," without abusing, is Christ's own doctrine. Further, as the loveliness of the day is caused not by single flashes, but by the steady serenity of the beams which create it, so happiness in life depends not on great and extraordinary pleasures, but on the ever-flowing current of small enjoyments, very real and very delightful, which it is in every man's power to secure, and by wisely making the most of which he sustains this grand and beautiful concord.

" For things we make no compt of, have in them
The seeds of life, use, beauty, like the cores
Of apples that we fling away."

Unfortunately, people in general are too apt to overlook the bright things of life, and to rest on its days of cloud. There are more sundials in the world than those of brass and wood. Instead of counting the hours by the sunlight of prosperity and happiness, men are too ready to let the shadows mark the time.

The reverse of light is *darkness*. Hence language uses darkness, with equal uniformity, to designate ignorance, falsehood, ugliness, misfortune, sorrow, and whatever else is in natural antagonism to the things which are symbolized in light. The mind cannot help doing this. To do otherwise, or simply to abstain from doing it, would be to forsake its own nature. Hence there is more in J. P. Richter's remark that "no nation ever called truth darkness or error light," than the statement of a simple historical fact. While no nation ever did call error light, it is equally certain that no nation ever will do so.

The colloquial use of this figure is illustrated in the expressions the Dark Ages, the benighted heathen. Passed on from the general to the individual, we apply it to personal experience, as in "gloomy forebodings." That Scripture abounds with passages which can only be interpreted by thus recognising the representative character of darkness, hardly requires mention :—

"They shall behold trouble and *darkness*, faintness and anguish;
And they shall be *darkened* with distress."—*Isaiah* viii. 22.

"The counsel of the froward is brought to confusion;
By day they meet with *darkness*,
And grope at noonday as in the night."—*Job* v. 13, 14.

"Woe unto those who call evil good, and good evil;
Who put darkness for light, and light for darkness;
Who put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!"
—*Isaiah* v. 20.

So in secular poetry, as when Fingal exclaims, in allusion to the loss of his children, "Fingal begins to be alone; darkness gathers on the last of his days." That also is in the true spirit of poetry, and deeply pathetic, when it is said, "In Clono's narrow vale, where bend the trees above the stream, *dark in his grief* stood Duthno's silent son."

Darkness, however, by the law of "opposites," is not inevitably and invariably significant of evil. It may denote that which is merely mysterious; the darkness which constitutes night being the concealer of what is in reality excellent and picturesque. Hence the "dark words" and "dark sayings" of Numbers xii. 8, and of the Psalms (xlix. 4, lxxviii. 2, etc.), by which are meant those seemingly enigmatical phrases and histories which require to be "spiritually discerned." Mysterious, in

its true sense, does not mean unintelligible or inscrutable, but simply veiled from common, careless, superficial view. In the New Testament, "mystery" denotes the secrets of God therein revealed to mankind. "To you it is given to *know* the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven." Examined strictly, well observes Carlyle, mysticism will in most cases turn out to be simply *not understood*, the understanding of a thing requiring two conditions, intelligibility and intelligence. It is not always the dark place that shrouds, but the dim eye that fails to perceive; every new perception narrows the domain of the mysterious.

The sun being not only the prime source of physical light, but that of the warmth which is so closely identified with the idea of life, light and darkness have as it were for their partners, heat and cold. Warmth, the colleague of light in the production of summer, and in the ripening of all fruits, expresses itself, however, in a different way: in nature it represents the play of the affections as distinguished from the operations of the intellect. Here again we have a consummately beautiful illustration of a Respondence, warmth discoursing primarily of whatever is genial and pleasant to the heart, just as Light represents in the first place that which touches the understanding. Warmth, like love, expands things; brings them to maturity: like love also it is the greatest and most sure and complete of purifiers. Hence that grand phrase in the Epistle, "Our God is a consuming fire;" *our* God, our own loving God, elsewhere called the Refiner and Purifier; the sense of these solemn words being not that He will burn to destruction, but that He will remove all dross. The correspondences

of heat have already been adverted to at sufficient length for the general purpose of this volume (pp. 76-78). All that need be added is a reference to the use of fire in ancient times as a symbol. "Fire-worship," in the beginning, was unquestionably a representative rite. With the Hebrews the fire upon the altar was sedulously kept burning, never allowed to be extinguished, because representative of the fire of love and holiness enjoined to be always kept burning upon the altar of the heart. The fire maintained by the Vestal Virgins was of similar import.

Cold, in its various degrees, corresponds with apathy, lifelessness, and misery. Hence a person is said to behave "coldly" when he receives us without a welcome.

"Nimirum hic homines *frigent*."

"Men here meet with but a *cold* reception."

—TERENCE, *Eunuchus*, ii. 2.

For the same reason people are said to be "cool" towards one another, and to be of "frigid" demeanour. Hence too the pathos of the immortal verse in "As You Like It"—

"Blow, blow, thou winter wind,
Thou art not so unkind
As man's ingratitude."

As with light and darkness, heat and cold, so is it everywhere else with Responses. There is very little in the use of them in language that can be called preferential. Caprice, fancy, scholarship, taste, concert of opinion as to what is best or prettiest, have nothing to do with the metaphors which rest upon them. Comparisons, as said at first, when artificial, often fail; or

to be followed, require education; Respondences are understood instantaneously. In genuine or poetic metonyms, moreover, there is always something higher and far more exquisite than is ever suggested by mere rhyme or echo. Metaphors resting upon correspondence could not possibly convey the significance they do, were there not something within them independent of time and space, of country, and teachers, and human will. This is the underlying reality of the relation between the material and the spiritual; that which poetry shows to be an integral part of nature, and to the establishment of which all true philosophy tends. Note here that nothing vulgar, impure, or vicious is identified with correspondence. Everything in figure and metaphor that is slangy and foul has been laid upon language by the debased part of mankind. A man's comparisons and epithets always exactly and infallibly declare his moral character and intellectual status. Absurd and unsuitable ones of course are not blameworthy: they simply awaken compassion. But if unclean or profane, no phrenologist is needed to tell the rest.

That such a system of correspondence exists, extending to every part of the material creation, and linking it to mankind at every point, is shown by the absolute *necessity* there is that language should be essentially the same to one mind as to another, for without this there could be no intellectual intercourse. Language *is* the same to one mind as to another. Do not confound language with *speech*. Speech varies with era, circumstances, and geographical position. Language is uniform and immutable. Strictly, the whole human race is as much of one language to-day as if Babel had never been.

Dialects innumerable have arisen in course of time, but language has remained intact. The old original vocabulary, laid out before the earliest of mankind, has never been altered, and never will be; and whatever changes may yet arise in dialects, whether it be in the "tongues" of angels or of men, the last of mankind will assuredly employ the same language as the first.

CHAPTER XVII.

FEW correspondences have more largely contributed to language than those which comprise the relations of man to the lower animals. For the relations in question are innumerable, man being *mundi epitome*, "the abridgment of the world," and containing within him every principle of existence. Nothing can be detected in the animal kingdom not already known as a portion of *human* nature; and in man there is no quality, attribute, power, or property that is not more or less distinctly presignified in some quadruped, reptile, insect, bird, or fish. "Animals," says Victor Hugo, "are nothing else than the figures of our virtues and vices, wandering before our eyes, the visible phantoms of our souls. God shows us these in order to make us reflect."*

Hence it is that in regarding the animal creation, the observant eye finds itself beset by emblems of human nature; and that from the earliest times, and in all countries, the names of animals and their actions have been spontaneously used as appellations for human characters and human acts. There has never been anything arbitrary or conventional about it. The same

* *Les Misérables*, chap. xli.

objects have uniformly been chosen by those acquainted with them to designate the same things, and at last, the names of the various creatures have become part of the current vocabulary, no one disputing or misunderstanding, though stronger metaphors it would be impossible to find. With every one, to-day, a bold and generous man, even if not powerful in body, is called a lion; a dangerous and crafty one, a serpent; a cunning one, a fox. A playful and mischievous boy is "a monkey;" idlers are "drones," diligent people are "bees;" the rude and ungracious are "bears;" a talkative girl is a "magpie," a mild and amiable one is a "dove." How beautiful the epitaph founded on this correspondence, upon the little shining one that in this present life was not to grow to womanhood: "The dove found no rest for the sole of her foot, so she returned unto Him in the Ark." Similarly, to flirt is in French called *papillonner*, literally "to butterfly." The appellation bestowed on the "coquette" is from *coqueter*, to call to the hens, as chanticleer does in the yard at the farm, clucking and swaggering, the primary idea passing on to women who lay themselves out to the admiration of "gallants," an appellation of analogous meaning as well as etymology.*

Similarly, again, the cruel and destructive are termed "wolves," as in Shakspeare—

" Oh my poor country, sick with civil blows !—
When that my care could not withhold thy riots,

* To find a word of originally inodorous character acquiring an honourable significance, is always pleasing. Denoting, in their first upward move in civilization, devotedness and politeness to ladies, gallant and gallantry are now used in the sense of chivalrous intrepidity without the slightest reference to the feminine gender.

What wilt thou do, when riot is thy care?
 Oh, thou wilt be a wilderness again,
 Peopled with wolves, thine old inhabitants !”

—2 *Henry IV.*, Act iv. Scene 4.

Horace has the same figure in Epode 16—*ferisque rursus*, “the wild beasts will come back.” From this word *fera* come our “fierce” and “ferocious,” literally wild-beast-like. Other such terms are asinine, sheepish, waspish, hare-brained, lynx-eyed, capricious, the last from *caper*, a goat, this animal being noted for its hither-and-thitherness. Cynical, as before said, refers to the behaviour of a surly and ill-natured dog. In some of the southern European and other countries homeless dogs quite infest the towns. Hence the metaphor which describes the impure and vicious vulgar of the streets as the *canaille*. The dog is remarkable also for its tenacious following of any one. Hence the metaphors “dogged resolution,” and “to dog one’s footsteps.” Fine singers are called “nightingales.” Callimachus, in his elegiac on Heraclitus, extends the name to sweet verses, tastefully saying, as he ends his lament, that though Heraclitus be dead, yet his “nightingales will live” (*αἱ δὲ τῆαι ζῶουσιν ἀηδόνες*). “Congruity” comes primarily from *grus*, a crane, this bird being remarkable for its love of associating with its kind. “Incongruity” is that which is “unlike the cranes.” *Gregarious*, *congregate*, *congregation*, *aggregate*, *segregate*, *egregious*, are from *grex*, *gregis*, a flock, and convey the idea, according to their prefix, either of assembling like a flock of sheep under their shepherd, or of being separated from it. “Egregious” is now restricted to the designation of the unusually silly or foolish, as when we speak of “egregious folly.” But

originally it denoted anything selected from the flock either for its particularly bad or particularly good qualities. In Virgil, Æneas speaks of Creüsa as *conjux egregia*, "my incomparable wife." There are metaphors also which though not immediately founded upon the name of the animal, are of congenerate derivation, and of exactly parallel intent. Thus, from the Anglo-Saxon *snæcan*, to crawl meanly and stealthily, we have the name both of the reptile notorious for creeping among the grass, "anguis in herbâ," the snake; and that of the unspeakably despicable human animal, the "sneak."

The great law of expression above illustrated declares itself with equal force in the symbolical or representative language of Scripture, which scarcely ever mentions a living creature of any kind except in direct regard to its significance. Using it, accordingly, as our Ariadne's clue, we are enabled to ascertain the meaning of many passages wherein animals are alluded to, which otherwise are dark and uninstrucive. The references in which the meaning is plain, are exceedingly numerous. For instance, "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard lie down with the kid." Homer (*Iliad*, xxii. 263) and Horace (*Epode* iv. 1), imitated by Tasso (*Ger. Lib.* x. 51), use this figure to typify an *impossibility*, which in the literal, zoological reading it is; but by the light of correspondence, we see it rise into a depiction of the concord of the Redeemer's kingdom, thence of the peace which reposes in the hearts of individual men, where bad passions are in subjugation. "Cast not your pearls before swine," is an admonition in correspondences not to throw among the foul and scoffing the higher truths and insights which the love of God may grant us. So with

the much-disputed history of the temptation by the serpent. Here is figured, for all time, in the name of the creature so remarkable for its subtilty and venom, the craft, and pertinacity, and terrible destructiveness, when unresisted, of the lower principles of our nature. For the serpent is still alive, and solicits every one in turn. We have not to go back to Eden for it. With every man there dwells by the wayside not only a Sphinx, perpetually vexing him with enigmas, and devouring his days and hours, and which surrenders only to Œdipus; within him there dwells a serpent that never forgets to talk to the Eve also living within, and that always begins with the self-same old insidious question, "*Hath* God said, Ye shall not eat?" first suggesting doubt, then enticing to disobedience.

" Every man is the first man to himself,
And Eves are quite as plentiful as apples."

To those who with God's help try to repel the invitation, it is promised that they "shall tread upon the lion and the adder." To the same it is elsewhere promised that "they shall take up serpents," *i.e.* without hurt. Such power would be a very useless gift to the people of England, if the words meant literally and actually what they appear to mean. For in England there are no zoological lions, except in well-barred cages, and so few adders that not one person in a million is in danger of being bitten. Compare Luke x. 19, "I give you power to tread upon serpents and *scorpions*." By the light of correspondence all these otherwise quite empty and altogether superfluous statements—superfluous as regards countries where the creatures do not exist—translate into

inestimable promises, addressed personally to every man in the world, and showing once more how munificent is the God who gave them.

The absolute contrary of the serpent is the eagle. Hence, in all ages, the enmity of these two, absolutely irreconcilable, has been a favourite subject with the poets and illustrators. There is a fine passage in the *Iliad* (xiii. 201), another in the "Choephoroi" of Æschylus, another in Horace (*Odes*, 4. iv.). Taken up in the *Æneid* (xi. 751) the simile which it supplies is one of the finest in the poem. Founded upon this correspondence is the custom with those who love to introduce symbolism and representatives into churches of using a carved image of an eagle for the lectern, or desk upon which the Bible is placed, the outspread wings conveying at the same time their own special significance.

The scriptural promise that those who seek it shall have power given them to tread not only upon the adder and the scorpion, but upon the *lion*, seems at first sight to involve an inconsistency, the lion being representative of the noble, the magnanimous, and the kingly, and cited as such in the phrase, among many similar ones, "the Lion of Judah." But, as particularly mentioned on a former page, all the noble objects of nature, man included, have their dark, their weak, or even their hurtful side; and all the ignoble and inferior ones, their bright, or at all events their better side, which last, all sound philosophy, and all common-sense and considerateness, and fair and consistent dealing, most concerns itself to discover: hence both the noble and the ignoble may at times become representative of the reverse of what is usual. There is never the slightest

difficulty in determining in which of the two senses an object may be figuratively cited, whether in familiar converse or in Scripture, the context always telling which is intended.

Scriptural references to animals, and similar ones in the secular poets, which are *not*, as in the case of the lion and the serpent, quite plain and palpable in sense, are interpreted, in part by comparing them with the mythology of remote ages; in part by the reciprocal illustration furnished by the various passages wherein the allusions occur; and in part by careful observation of the creature's natural habits: when, for example, we have references, in the Old Testament, to "the moles and the bats," to the raven, to birds in general, and to the horse. The employment of the last named as a symbol is very striking both in its frequency and uniformity; and only by regarding the references to this noble animal as representative have they any sense for us. Comparing the various passages in the prophets, and those again in the Apocalypse, it becomes evident that in Scripture the old, old classical myths which employ the horse, one of the most intelligent as well as noblest and most useful to man of all quadrupeds, as the symbol of the human intellect or understanding, do but reappear in a more exalted connection, and with a loftier because sacred significance. The stories of Neptune's famous gift, of Pegasus, of Apollo and the chariot of the Sun, prepare us for such apparently singular, not to say unintelligible statements, as that the horses shall be "smitten with astonishment." Now too we may gather what is meant by the warning addressed to those who, rejecting the idea and the Word of God, trust purely to

their own human reason, when it is said in reference to such that "the riders on horses shall be confounded." Conversely, the patient study of these inspired passages shows the way to the interpretation of the classical myths. How fine again the use of this figure in the text of our everyday reading. "God," says the Psalmist, "delighteth not in the strength of the horse." No; on the contrary, "He taketh pleasure," he proceeds to say, "in them that fear Him, in those that hope in His mercy;" meaning that the personal practice of what is prescribed as wise and good in Matthew vi., is more agreeable to the Almighty than even the proudest intellectual command, and the resting therein, as if it were all-sufficient to be mentally acquainted with orthodox doctrine. To address one's-self to these wonderful metaphors as employed in the Word of God is unhappily too often thought a useless occupation, not to say visionary and fantastic. Surely that habit and system of approaching and interrogating them must be the best which most opens the meaning of Scripture, and most clearly shows it to have reference, in every part, to our daily life and duty. Except for the significance, not only of the individual metaphors, but of the narratives, all of which partake of the nature of parables, they would be of no greater service to man, in regard to his spiritual welfare (the sole object of their insertion), than the metaphors in Pindar, or the tales told in the *Odyssey*. Placed in the light of correspondence, that which before was inanimate moves with life, and that which was silent begins to speak. The significance is not brought out, be it remembered, by the wild and specious process so often resorted to by those who, like the water-beetles, just

play upon the surface, and which is popularly called "spiritualizing." "Spiritualizing" is only a form of that will-o'-the-wisp, comparison. Correspondence interprets upon fixed principles, and altogether forbids everything that savours of the arbitrary. Having referred so definitely to the scriptural mention of the horse, it may not be without use to indicate the very curious instance of metonymy in the Song of Solomon i. 9, "I have compared thee, O my love, to a company of horses in Pharaoh's chariots." The name of the animal is here put for its gay caparisons. The royal equipage was famed for its brilliancy, and we are to understand that the bride's apparel was of equal lustre.

It was the perception of these correspondences, and their general use, in primæval times, in the language of moral teaching, which originated the phraseology of the incidents catalogued by Ovid in the *Metamorphoses*. No mere "fancy" invented the transformations of Progne into a swallow, Halcyone into a kingfisher, and Macareus into a pig. Nor is there anything purely fictitious in the records of animals speaking and talking. The letter of Scripture several times adverts to the same thing, as in the case, to mention it again, of Eve and the serpent, from which of itself we may learn that the "speaking" of an animal, when the latter is used as the symbol of a mental affection, signifies the persuasion sought to be wrought by that affection upon our *will*. Every one of the transformations recorded by Ovid doubtless refers to something in history, and is probably the broken and traditionary remnant of a real biography, which had been put into the symbolic form so congenial to antiquity. In course of time the image became mistaken for the thing

itself, and was still further removed from the truth by the embellishing fancy of some imaginative Greek. Romance and poetry never gather round anything but *fact*. As spirit is the central essence of all matter, so fact is the nucleus of all fiction.

Cicero and Horace frequently speak of the narratives of the Græco-Latin mythology as parables. Thus,

“ Sylvestres homines sacer interpretsque Deorum
 Cædibus et victu fædo deterruit Orpheus ;
 Dictus *ob hoc* lenire tigres rabidosque leones.
 Dictus et Amphion, Thebanæ conditor arcis,
 Saxa movere sono testudinis, et prece blandâ
 Ducere quo vellet.”

—*De Arte Poet.* 391-396.

(Orpheus, that sacred interpreter of the will of the gods, rescued through his music the first men from bloodshed and a savage life. It was for *this* he was said to have tamed tigers and raging lions. So has it been said of Amphion, who built the towers of Thebes, that his harmonious lyre moved stones, and by gentle persuasion raised them to their several stations.)

Such, indeed, has ever been the conviction of all students of mythology who have inquired for causes as well as for appearances. Lord Bacon furnishes a noble example in his “Wisdom of the Ancients.” Warburton, in the “Divine Legation of Moses” (iii. 2), calls the *Metamorphoses* “a popular history of Providence, as methodical as the graces of poetry would allow.” Payne Knight’s learned essay on the emblematic nature of ancient poetry and sculpture supports it by direct and abundant evidence. A host of other writers might be cited as contributors to the true explanation, in similar manner, of one of the most captivating of all the records and relics of the intellectual activity of ancient times.

Because of these selfsame correspondences animals were so largely used, in ancient times, in *sacrifices*. They were representative, that is to say, of the human affections. Our Lord, while upon earth, abrogated the use of the symbols, superseding them with the law of personal self-surrender or self-sacrifice to His will, whence some of our most familiar uses of the word "sacrifice," which to-day is a purely figurative expression. The imagery of the idols set up by the ancients, including those of India, some of which are still in use, similarly rested upon correspondences, being figurative description put into an objective form; and addressing the mind through the medium of the eye, just as the equivalent spoken language addresses it through the ear. The original intent of idols (literally "representations") had nothing whatever in it of the blasphemous or wicked. They were the material and emblematic depictions of the divinity received and worshipped in the mind. Idol-worship, commonly so called, was an after-growth; and sprang from the inveterate tendency of the human heart, in every direction that it bends itself, to worship the image instead of the reality. Throughout life, its attachment to the outward senses is ardent and inviolable. These it at all times pets and favours, and till their very deceitfulness seems truth. The idolatry which deified the sun, moon, stars, and fire, was doubtless of similar beginning—the expression of a yearning and grateful piety of spirit, combined with intense and childlike admiration.

By regarding their symbolic quality, correspondence also enables us to perceive the meaning of the curious compound animals described in mythology, as the Sphinx, the Chimæra, and the Sirens; which in principle

are exactly analogous to those which have their place in Scripture. The same with the idols of the Hindus, their many arms reminding us of the plentiful ascription of eyes, horns, and wings to those alluded to in Holy Writ. Scripture supplies the key to every one of them.

Nothing was ever more accurately set forth in representatives than the idea of universal nature, as expressed in the image of the mythological god Pan, the upper part of whose body was the *beau idéal* of the masculine, the handsome, the courteous, the intellectual, all perfection, the sweetest of musical utterance superadded; this last represented in the immemorial "pipes;" while the lower half was the shaggy counterpart of a goat's, at all points in antithesis to the upper one. Totally misapprehending the original significance, in some degree perhaps justified by the degradation of the old idea, it was upon this that the early Christian fathers based their teaching of the form of Satan. The popular, current, utterly vulgar ascription to the "prince of darkness" so called, of cloven hoofs, etc., is simply and purely a result of the device employed by those pious men to make it appear that the gods of the heathen were only demons.

As with the lower animals in their relation to man, so with the vegetable kingdom. Every plant that grows corresponds laterally with something in human nature. The sap-vessels, leaves and flowers, with their stamens and pistils, repeat our bodily structure—with no more variation than is needed to adapt them to the humbler quality of their life: their vital acts, as feeding, assimilation, and reproduction, are those of the animal economy, performed in a simpler manner. They differ only in wanting the powers and attributes which in animals result

from the possession of a nervous system. So far as the plant structure reaches, the parallelism is complete, and forms a striking and admirable proof of the Divine unity of design. It is from this fine and conspicuous harmony that in all ages, trees, plants, and flowers have been regarded as emblems of mortal existence; the birth from the seed, the gradual growth, the blossoming, fruiting, and decay, being in exact duplication of a human lifetime. In poetry there are no passages more numerous or charming than those which describe the brevity of human life under the similitude of fading flowers. In ordinary converse there are no figures more exact and expressive than those which rest on the counterparts of human activities performed in the gardens, woods, and fields. Growing children are said to sprout and to shoot up; a girl is said to bud into womanhood, and to be in her midsummer; the aged fall into "the sere and yellow leaf."

Plants cannot represent man as to his physical nature without at the same time representing his emotions and passions. Hence it is that all people look on the vegetable world with delight and interest. The most ordinary mind admires the trees, the green fields, and the flowers by the wayside. To the incurious these things are no more than insensate forms of matter, mere stems and leaves. To the observant or intellectual sight they are a repetition of ourselves. We may not be quick to the consciousness of it. All men, nevertheless, acknowledge the *fact*, by going to plants for expressions wherewith to delineate human qualities, and to describe emotions and human actions. Illustrations have already been given (p. 133) of the employment

of the words bloom, blossom, and flower, in the figurative or metaphorical sense. On the same general principle we speak of the germination of ideas, of immature opinions, ripened judgment, the fruit of experience, the fruit of our exertions. In Hebrews xiii. 15, thanksgiving to God is called *καρπὸν χειλέων*, "the fruit of the lips," in reference to which correspondence, in Isaiah lvii. 19, we have "the Creator of the fruit of the lips." A "neophyte" is literally a new or young plant, one from which we must not yet expect too much. Affection is said to "twine" round the heart, and to have "tendrils," expressions presenting to the mind's eye most sweet pictures of the woodbine and the green clasping fingers of the pea-flowers. From similar agreements the mind is said to "expand," as a flower does; the imagination to be "luxuriant," or like a plant fed by rich soil, and cherished by the sunshine. The central essence of a matter is called its "pith;" if a comprehensive one, it is said to "branch out," and to "ramify," literally "make many boughs," as does an umbrageous oak or chestnut. Painting is the "rosy art." To be annoyed is to be "nettled;" the worthless are "chaff." We say, too, that prejudice is "deep-rooted" and "ineradicable." The tending of plants in gardens has given the figures to weed out errors, to prune an essay, to train up a child, to graft new thoughts upon old ones.

On these original and perennial relations rests the "Language of Flowers," which though greatly confused and brought into ridicule by the indiscretion of some of those who have sought to expound and arrange it, is in principle unimpeachable. A few only of the more obvious correspondences are adverted to in our daily

speech ; those of corn, the lily, the rose, the oak, the bramble, for example. In Scripture, on the other hand, the language of flowers, to call the matter by its simplest name, is recognised on every page. The vine, the olive, the fig, the palm-tree, the pomegranate, the cedar, the fir, are there introduced, not as mere decorative comparisons, but by reason of their special and eternal correspondences with things divine. Through the reciprocal illustration afforded by the different texts, abundance of lofty truth, which but for their pleasing light would be utterly hidden from the understanding, is brought into view. So with the thistle, the hyssop, tares, grass, the willow, the reed, and even vegetable products, as myrrh, aloes, cassia, balsam. Trees in general, groves, corn-fields, have also their special meaning. Conversant with the natures of plants, thus indicated in the true "Scripture Botany," and thence reading in them the manifold expressions of Divine wisdom, how far lovelier to the rightly-ordered soul must needs become the emerald woods, the odorous meadows, the blossoms shining in the gardens.

CHAPTER XVIII.

QUITE as wonderful as the correspondences of creatures and plants with man's body and attributes, are those of his own physical frame with the animating spirit or soul. "The mind hath features as the body hath."

On what other ground does Shakspeare speak of the "mind's eye"? If there were not eyes in the soul answering to those of the body, how could it take cognizance of the truths presented to its view? The soul, like the body, can act and observe only through the medium of a set of organs and senses of its own; and these stand in precisely the same relation to morals and intellectualities that the bodily ones do to physical objects. People live so entirely in and for the body, that they are prone to think the body everything, and the soul a mere adjunct or appendage. The reverse is the real case. The organs and senses of the soul are as truly organs and senses as those of the external body: they are more than that—they are as much nobler, quicker, and more delicate as spirit is in relation to matter. The grand fact recognised in the expression "the mind's eye," is acknowledged in innumerable congenerate metaphors—those already adverted to when speaking of *video*, "see," and "idea," and

which render it unnecessary to give further illustrations in the present chapter. Hearing, and its organic instrument the ear, are representative, after the same manner, of attention. "Incline thine ear, and come unto Me : hear, and thy soul shall live." Touch is adverted to, in its correspondential character, in the capital metaphor "tact"—that delicate, just, and subtle decision of the mind which, anticipating reflection, acts like the finger of the blind man.

Touch is the foundation also of the familiar figure under which we speak of our "feelings ;" and very interesting is it to observe how the sensations produced by roughness, smoothness, hardness, softness, all take their own places in the great vocabulary of spiritual metaphor, as when we speak of "soft" influence, and a "hard" heart. Hence also a grievance is called a *hardship*, and a man who becomes insensible to good is said to be "hardened." Harsh conduct, harsh language, asperity of speech, the asperities of vicissitude, proceed upon the same relations, and thus instruct us as to the qualities of the things they designate, by pointing to what is coarse, unyielding, or astringent, in the physical world. So, to "exasperate" is literally to *roughen*, just as in Saxon-English we speak of our temper being "ruffled." The Romans used "asper" to denote warlike, terrible, and severe, as when Virgil styles the amazon Camilla, *aspera virgo*, "the fierce virgin." *Endure*, *endurance*, *obduracy*, are from the Latin *durare*, "to harden," and thus denote emotional states or capacities corresponding with the physical circumstances which we name *duration*, *durable*, and *durability*. In the phrases "coarse behaviour," "a rugged disposition," there exists the same expressive

imagery, there being, in fact, no other way of describing these things. Compare the phrases in which we speak of being pained, wounded by unkindness, cut to the heart, and pierced with sorrow. Sorrow is literally "soreness." Hence also we speak of being upon thorns, of having a thorn in the side, and of being emotionally hurt, nettled, and stung. To be "piqued" is literally to be pricked. "Compunction" is of similar sense, as in Macbeth—

" Stop up the access and passage to remorse,
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose."

Words are called "cutting" when they affect our souls with the cruelty of an incision in the flesh. Hence also a man grievously afflicted* is said to be "quite cut up." Hence again "sharp words." Sophocles makes fine use of this last when the unfortunate king says that the bracelet points with which he tore out his eyes were yet less agonizing than his remorse (Æd. Tyr. 1317). "Remorse" itself contains a correspondence not unlike, being derived from *re-mordeo*, to bite again, or continually. Take, finally, the immortal lines in Lear:—

" How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is
To have a thankless child !"

Essentially similar to the preceding is the metaphorical use of "taste," literally, the recognition of physical flavours ;

* To "afflict" means literally to dash violently against the ground, so as to break and injure, especially as in the case of ships dashed by the sea against the rocks. Cæsar says of his vessels, when driven from their anchors by a storm, "*tempestas afflictabat*" (De Bello Gallico, iv. 29).

figuratively, intellectual appreciation of the best and noblest qualities of things. Taste, truly so called, is a far loftier faculty than mere fancy, opinion, or connoisseurship. Properly speaking, moreover, there are no such things as "good taste," "indifferent taste," and "bad taste." The distinction is simply and finally that of taste and want of taste. The former, the one only positive thing, proceeds not upon the arbitrary and technical rules of Art, but upon a native perception in the mind of the original laws of purity and harmony. Dating from the soul's own birth, it is, like the heart of the poet, "born, not made." Teaching can only *improve* it. True taste, moreover, includes a delicate sensibility to the relations which the objects of its regard bear, on the one hand, towards the moral and intellectual graces of humanity, and on the other, towards the qualities of the Divine; and perhaps the most certain sign of it is perennial aptitude to discern the hand of God wherever there is beauty and loveliness. In several ancient languages the same word is used both for taste and for wisdom. The Hebrew טַעַם (*tàngam*) designates at one time physical flavour, as in Job vi. 6; at other times "discretion," as in Proverbs xi. 22. So in Latin, physical taste is *sapor*, to taste with the tongue is *sapio*, wisdom is *sapientia*. The French, following the Latin, has *savoir* and *savant*. Ignorant folly is called by Cicero *insipientia*. Hence, too, our own word *insipid*, which we apply to an uninteresting book as well as to a flavourless food.

The particular or individual correspondences of physical flavours with spiritual qualities are recognised in the expressions a "sour temper," "acrimony of

speech," a "tart reply," a "crabbed disposition;" the latter referring to the harsh and ill-natured wild apple. It is saying literally, "you taste like a crab-apple." In Horace sour or acid is a figure for the incongenial:—

“ Quid dem? quid non dem? renuis tu quod jubet alter :
Quod petis, id sanè est invisum *acidumque* duobus.”

(What shall I give? or what shall I not give? *You* refuse what another calls for, and what you desire is unwelcome and acid to the other two.)

No word of this class is more remarkable, however, than "sweet," no term occurring in so large a variety of figurative application, with the exception, perhaps, of "beautiful." With some authors, as Pindar, Theocritus, and Shakspere, it is of all metaphors the most abundant, frequently recurring many times on the same page, and with uniformly agreeable effect. In familiar colloquy repetition of common epithets is allowable, but in literature it is thought a blemish. How is it, then, that instead of impatience and offence, repetition is received in the present instance with positive enjoyment and approval? Because every mind perceives the agreement on which the usage rests, namely, the natural harmonies of whatever is pleasing to the soul with what is sweet to the external palate, and derives from that perception genuine and lasting enjoyment. Jermyn is wrong, when in his "English Epithets" he ascribes the frequent use of this metaphor to poverty of language. Still more so when he condemns it as puerile and meaningless. Such words as "sweet," by virtue of correspondence, cease to be of mere private relation, and acquire territory, every part of which is rightfully their own. So far from indicating "poverty" in language, these it is which render

it so admirably efficient, 10,000 words of figurative or poetical comprehensiveness serving, practically, the purpose of 100,000.

The exact etymology of "sweet" is lost in antiquity. Its proximate parent is the Anglo-Saxon *swæt*, which is the same as the German *süss*,* the Latin *suavis*, the Greek ἡδύς, and the Sanscrit *suadu*. These, however, are but cognate and transitional forms, standing midway between the current English word, and the primitive term from which all are descended, and which was doubtless onomatopœtic. The Hebrew word for sweetness, מֶתֶק (*mètheg*), is strictly so, being from a term denoting "to suck," which is founded in turn on the smacking sound naturally attendant on the eating of sweet foods, and familiarly called "smacking the lips." The Greeks had a second word for sweet, γλυκύς, which in the Latin language reappears as *dulcis*. A fragment of it exists also in the word *liquorice*, which is a remote corruption of γλυκῦρριζα, literally "sweet-root."

As with all other natural metaphors, the word "sweet" is used in precisely the same ways in ordinary conversation, and in the language of the orator and the poet. None of its applications are peculiar either to the learned or to the unlettered man. "Sweet sleep" and "sweet slumbers" are accustomed phrases with the multitude; they are likewise the expressions of Shakspeare. The equivalent ἡδύς ὕπνος and γλυκὺς ὕπνος, *dulcis somnus* and *dulcis quies*, are no less frequent with the poets of Greece and Rome. With Homer, in particular,

* The exchange of *s* for *t* is frequent in German-English words. The English *hot* is in German *heiss*, nut is *nuss*, white *weiss*, foot *fuss*, shot *schuss*, etc. etc.

these figures are incessant. Similarly in the Old Testament we find the promise to those who "love wisdom," that "their sleep shall be *sweet*." The image is itself used metaphorically, by the charming process of personification, which applies it to perfect and serene repose in external nature:—

"How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!"

Hence again, while we speak in daily converse of "sweet dreams," Euripides makes Admetus say of his beloved Alcestis, that by visiting him in his dreams she will still gladden him, for "it is *sweet* to behold a friend in the stillness of the night:—"

————— ἐν δ' ὄνειρασι
 φοιτῶσα μ' εὐφραίνεις ἄν' ἡδὺ γὰρ φίλος
 κὰν νυκτὶ λεύσσειν.—(355, 356.)

So in "Festus"—

"I love night more than day—she is so lovely;
 But I love night the most because she brings
 My love to me in dreams which scarcely lie."

The expressions "sweet words" and "honeyed words" illustrate the same fact, namely, that the language of common life and of poetry are one in essence. When, for instance, a tender mother speaks of her child's "sweet prattle," it is but the English vestment of what in Moschus is ἀδὺν λάλημα (Idyll. i. 8). Homer's verses descriptive of old Nestor's "honey-sweeter eloquence," are familiar to every lover of true poetry, as are Milton's on the "accent sweet" of Eve. Scriptural examples of the figure are frequent. Thus, "pleasant words are as an honeycomb; *sweet* to the soul" and

καὶ μ' οὔτι μελιγλώσσοις πειθοῦς
ἐπαοιδάσω θέλξει.

(And he shall never soothe me by the *honey-tongued* charms of persuasion.)

The classic fables of bees depositing honey on the lips of Plato, Pindar, and other eloquent celebrities of the olden time, as they lay in their cradles, owe their poetry to the same relation.

All other sounds that fall pleasantly on the ear, whether accompanied or not by articulate utterances, are likewise correspondent with sweetness. This is why we speak of "sweet singing," "sweet music," and "sweet laughter," as Pindar of γέλωσ γλυκύς. Hence, too, the matchless Shakspearean "touches of sweet harmony," and "concord of sweet sounds." Hence also we bestow the name of "sweet" on the sounds even of uncultivated nature, whenever these are of an agreeable and grateful character. Theocritus applies it to the whispering of the wind among the trees, to the gurgle of running water, to the lowing of cows, and to the singing of birds. So in the beautiful description of the Lernean fountain, the stream descending from it, and winding through the meadows:—

"Sive per flores novos
Fugiente *dulcis* murmurat rivo *sonus*."
—SENECA, *Hippolytus*, 513.

Compare—

"The current that with gentle murmur glides,
Thou know'st, being stopped, impatiently doth rage;
But when his fair course is not hindered,
He makes *sweet music* to the enamelled stones."

Anacreon, describing the cheerful note of the tettix,

calls this pretty little creature "sweet prophesier of the summer."

From designating sounds, it is quite natural that the epithet "sweet" should pass on to aspects. This is why we speak of a sweet face, sweet looks, sweet eyes :—

" Heaven bless thee !
Thou hast the *sweetest* face I ever looked on."

" She did but look upon him, and his blood
Blushed deeper even from his inmost heart ;
For at each glance of those *sweet eyes* a soul
Looked forth as from the azure gates of heaven."

" *Interea dulces* pendent circum oscula *nati*."

(Meanwhile the *sweet babes* twine round their parent's neck.)

In Æneid, v. 214, Virgil extends the word, with infinite delicacy, to the young birds in a nest, calling them their mother's *dulces nidi*, "darling young." So in Georgic i. 414, *dulcesque nidos*, "darling nests," a phrase in no wise different in spirit from our own beautiful "Home, *sweet* home."

From the circumstances of human life and feeling, and from living things in general, the metaphorical use of this word passes on quite as naturally to inanimate forms and conditions when delightful. Milton applies it to the mild radiance of the setting sun, after a day checkered by storms, to the "gems of heaven," and to the "sweet hour of morning." Hence, too, in Ecclesiastes, "Truly the light is *sweet*." For the same reason we speak in familiar converse of a "sweet afternoon," and a "sweet evening." Compare "the sweet-faced hours."

"Sweet" is applied also, and with equal fitness, to things purely of the soul. Thus, "sweet love," "sweet

influence," "a sweet disposition." "Delight" the Greeks called ἡδός, as in Iliad, i. 576. The charm of innumerable passages in Shakspeare, relating to the affections, rests very especially upon its presence in them, as in the now household phrases, "the music of sweet news," "the sweet uses of adversity," "sweet sorrow," and "sweet melancholy." So with Milton's "sweet retired solitude," and "the sweet peace that goodness bosoms ever." Hence the poetry also of Cicero's beautiful phrase "dulce nomen Libertatis"—"the sweet name of LIBERTY." Hence also that Horace describes the tranquil solitudes of his country-house as "hæ latebræ dulces,"—"these sweet retreats"—and that Ovid calls an affectionate daughter "lenimen dulce senectæ"—"the sweet solace of old age." His countrymen had for a saying, when anything particularly pleased them, "*mel mihi videor lingere*"—"it seems to me to taste of honey!" This is the origin also of the period immediately succeeding marriage being called the *honeymoon*.

The correspondences of sweetness are expressed in the Aryan languages not only by the word "sweet" itself, but by various collateral terms, as *suave* and *suavity*, which denote an agreeable or sweet demeanour, and represent the Latin *suavis*. The Romans used *suavis* in the same senses. Derived from it they also had *suavium*, a kiss. To "persuade" is another of these words, being derived proximately from *suadeo*, which bears the same relation to *suavis* that *claudio* does to *clavis*. *Persuasive* and *persuasion*, translated, mean literally "sweet influence," "sweet power;" to be "persuaded" is to be *sweetened* into compliance. To *assuage* also means to *sweeten*, as when we speak of *assuaging*

care or labour, which are synonymously said to be *sweetened*. To "assuage grief" is to overcome the bitter by its opposite. *Dulcis*, the Latin word, reappears in to "indulge," literally to bestow something sweet or agreeable. The same is the parent of "dulcet :"—

"Seated on a rock,
Uttering such dulcet and harmonious breath
That the rude sea grew civil at her song."

In that delightful essay, the "Somnium Scipionis"—"Scipio's Dream"—the word "sweet" is figuratively applied to the singing of the stars, or, as it is more commonly called, "the music of the spheres." The design of the fable, as so frequently with Cicero, is to supply an exposition of the encouragement a man may receive in the pursuit of virtue, from considering the nature of the gods, of the universe, and of our future state of being. Abounding with elevated philosophy and sincere piety, it is an essay which no one can peruse and not be filled with astonishment and satisfaction. The scenery and circumstances of the dream are laid in the altitudes of space, whither Scipio seems to himself to be conveyed by a spirit. After contemplating for awhile the planets, circling through the ether in their vast and stately courses, he hears the music said by Pythagoras to be produced by their movements, and "quis est?" he inquires, "quis est, qui complet aures meas tantus, et *tam dulcis sonus?*"—"and what now, I pray you, is this delicious sound which fills and engrosses all my hearing?" His spirit-friend informs him whence it arises, and that it is the celestial type of the musical scale in use upon the earth. It is inappreciable below, he further tells him, because of its overpowering volume and

sublimity, just as the noise of the great cataracts of the Nile, though it falls continually on the ears of those who live beside them, is nevertheless unheard, by reason of its intensity and unceasingness.

In order to gather the sense of all this, we must remember that every such fiction has for its inmost heart some great and incontestable reality. The poets, in every age, have given currency to the idea, for they have perceived in their souls that it is the symbolic rendering of a truth which perhaps no other words would declare as well.

Σοὶ μὲν χορὸς εὐδίας ἀστερων
κατ' Ὀλυμπον ἀνακτα χορεύει,
ἀνετον μέλος αἰὲν ἀείδων,
Φοιβῆϊδι τέρπομενος λύρα.

“For thee, serene, move on in solemn dance, the heavenly spheres ; singing eternally, as they circle round Olympus, strains accordant with thy lyre !”—*Dionysius Iambus*.

So in the immortal passage in the “Merchant of Venice :”—

“Sit, Jessica. Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold !
There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold’st
But in his motion like an angel sings ;
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubim ;
Such harmony is in immortal souls.
But whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.”

Great poets, the pledged high priests of truth, would not gravely set forth such a doctrine, were there not something in it superior to mere fancy. Not one of them teaches it as a literal occurrence. Pythagoras most certainly did not say so, any more than he said or intended his disciples to believe that the souls of men

literally migrated into beans. A very common error in every age has been the reception as literal of what was written and always intended to be understood symbolically. This is even more conspicuous in the history of Biblical than of poetical interpretation. The key to the doctrine of the sphere-music is found in correspondence; and proximately in that resplendent verse, "When the morning stars *sang* together." What is signified, in the language of symbolism, by the stars, has already been mentioned (pp. 106-108), and the Scriptural passage last quoted supplies another illustration, so much the more valuable because of its profound antiquity. For the Book of Job is one of the oldest writings in the world, a kind of conspectus of sacred wisdom, declared in figurative form. Quoted in the most solemn services of the English Church, Lord Bacon had his eye upon it very specially when he says so truly that "in the first ages, all things were full of parables and figures, whereby it was sought to lay open knowledge, not to hide and conceal it; for as hieroglyphics preceded letters, so parables were more ancient than arguments." Singing, artless and spontaneous singing, is the natural outbirth and emblem of joy, peace, and content—*animi felicia læti argumenta*, "the joyful token of a happy mind." "The pastures are clothed with flocks; the valleys also are covered over with corn; they shout for joy; they also *sing*." By the morning stars "singing together" is meant accordingly the institution of the great verities of God's kingdom, and the sweet harmony and concord which at once marks and unites them. The *morning* stars, it is hardly necessary to say, after what has been exemplified above, are revealed truths such as relate especially to innocence and

the immaculate; and as whatever is instituted by the Creator, in spiritual form, is set forth likewise in material representatives, the verse in question covers also the establishment of the whole system and mechanism of the visible universe, which is the outbirth of the invisible one, and therefore order and harmony throughout. The "morning stars" sing together for mankind to-day just as they did in the beginning. Every morning, when we rise from our sleep, and cast our eyes upon the glory and beauty of God's world, it is the Creation over again for us. In this beautiful little piece, Cicero thus gives opportunity for new effort in genuine philosophy, which is not to accept appearances as the all in all, but to strive to translate them rightly:—

"To unbind the charms that round slight fables lie,
And show that truth is truest poësy."

All disclosures worth having, let us never forget, are made not to the looker-on and to the idle, but to the patient who in industry never slacken.

"Bitter," which denotes the physical contrary of sweet, is applied, by reason of its analogous agreements, to what is painful and distressing. The use of this figure is much more limited, however, than that of "sweet," since the things which grieve and afflict are much more easily defined than those which please. Happiness and enjoyment consist, like a tree, of innumerable little particles; whereas evil, suffering, and mortification usually have a margin only too well marked. The ordinary metaphorical application is illustrated in "bitter sorrow," "bitter grief," "bitter tears," "a bitter fate." Peter, it is said, "went out, and wept *bitterly*." So when Esau found that Jacob had cheated him of his birthright, "he cried with a great

and *exceeding bitter cry*." In the Proverbs it is said that "the heart knoweth his own bitterness;" in Exodus, that the "Egyptians made the children of Israel to serve with rigour, and made their lives *bitter* with hard bondage." Similar to this is the familiar phrase, "to *embitter* one's existence." The Greeks, fully alive to the correspondence, called an unhappy marriage *πικρόγαμος*, a *bitter* one. With their poets *πικρὸς* likewise signifies odious, offensive, peevish, spiteful, and malicious. Like ourselves, they also spoke of "bitter words," as in that terrible passage in the "Seven before Thebes:"—

τέκνοις δ' ἀραίας
ἔφῆκεν ἐπικότους τροφὰς,
αἰᾶι, πικρογλώσσους ἀρὰς.

(And because of his scanty food, he hurled upon his children execrating curses, very passionate; alas, bitterly-tongued!)

In the Psalms, David prays to be protected from the wicked, "who bend their bows to shoot their arrows, even *bitter words*."

English poetry abounds with such examples:—

"Hope did not quit me, as if still
Her precious pearl in sorrow's cup
Unmelted at the bottom lay,
To shine again when all drunk up,
The bitterness should pass away."

In "Troilus and Cressida" Shakspeare puts it for "unfriendly;" in "Cymbeline" as an epithet for severe bodily pain. Milton alludes to the conscience of a fallen man

"Waking the *bitter* memory
Of what he was."

Compare the colloquial expressions "galling" and being

“galled,” which are metaphors founded on the bitterness of the animal secretion called the *gall*.

The bodily powers denoted by the terms sight, hearing, taste, etc., are collectively called the “senses.” Hence the corresponding powers of the soul are called “sense,” which word, though often limited to a certain kind of intellectual sharpness, properly intends the synthesis of man’s entire spiritual nature—quick-sightedness for the beautiful in form; a lively interest in the hearing of God’s law; sympathy with all that is generous and tender; taste to discover and relish all that savours of the best and truest.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE parts and organs of the body take their place in the language of metaphor precisely after the same manner as the physical powers and faculties. The head represents the intellect, and thence what is derived from its activities. A clever man is said to have a large head, and a silly person a weak one. As the organ of the intellect, the head further becomes the name for all such attitudes of pre-eminence as correspond to the mind's noble quality. Hence the phrases, the head of the government, the head of the house, the head of the table. The Latin form of "head" is *caput*. Hence the words "capital" and "captain." The French changed *caput* into *chef*. Hence "chief," "chieftain," and "achieve," in Saxon-English to "make head against." The forepart of the head ultimates the noblest constituents of the intellect; its insight, hearing, taste, and "sagacity," or quick scent, which appear there as the eyes, ears, nose, etc. As organs merely of the animal senses, these parts make up the *face*. As instruments of the mind, they are the framework of the *countenance*. The face is the total of the features; the countenance is the aggregate of the looks; the face is purely organic, the countenance is the offspring of the soul. Both men

and brutes possess *faces*; the *countenance* is the exclusive possession of human nature. This is why we call mental approval "giving our countenance." This is the ground also of the numerous beautiful allusions in Scripture to the countenance of the Lord, and the light of His countenance, as "O Lord, show us the light of Thy countenance, and we shall be whole." When configuration only, or physical aspect, is alluded to, we say *face*, as in the "face of the earth," the "face of the deep." To *discountenance* is to forbid or disapprove from some interior and thoughtful motive. Insolent defiance, on the other hand, which partakes more of the brutish than the intellectual, is called "facing it out."

When language would refer, metaphorically, to the contrary of pre-eminence—the figurative language of Scripture most particularly—it employs, for its symbol, the *feet*. With *pes*, *pedis* for example, (familiar in the root of *pedestrian*), are congenerate the Latin terms for worse and worst, *pejus* and *pessimus*, whence the name of that very unenviable disposition or tendency—*pessimism*. From the comparative *pejor* came the old French *empirer*, whence our own verb to *impair*, literally to make as if trodden upon, and thus damaged. For a Scriptural illustration take the narrative of the New Testament. The *acts* of our Lord while upon earth, like His words, had in every case a symbolic import. It is this which renders their teaching power universal, and fits it for all time. Hence the otherwise unintelligible washing of the disciples' feet, which was representative of His will to purify our animal or non-intellectual desires and tendencies, and a lesson that it is *here* the cleansing must begin. For if these be purified, our higher

tendencies become pure also. He ended accordingly by saying, "If I wash not thy *feet*, thou hast no part with Me;" and "it needeth not save to wash thy *feet*." Everything that our Lord did for His disciples, He must also do spiritually for *us*. It was to foreshadow and guarantee this that these things were both performed and put on record.

The ideas metaphorically rendered by head and foot are further represented by the figurative use of the nearly related *high* and *low*. Whatever in nature is elevated suggests nobleness, dignity, and excellence. What is low down, agrees with error, poverty, and meanness. Hence the phrases heard every day—lofty sentiments, exalted piety, an eminent character, high reputation, low amusements, a base action. Compare being "above" deceit, "under" a mistake, "beneath" contempt, *undervalued*, *over-esteemed*. The words apply also to the emotional life, as when we speak of "high" spirits, and "low" spirits, of our being "depressed," "elated," and "down-hearted." On the same analogy rest likewise the fine expressions, the zenith of glory, the acme of fame, the summit of perfection, the depths of iniquity.

Superior and inferior, as in the expressions "a superior mind," "an inferior capacity," are terms proceeding on the same relation, being the comparatives of the Latin *superus* and *inferus*. Hence also "superb," literally "lofty." "Superb" actions are those which are *above* all others. From *superus* (through *superanus*, the French *souverain*, and the old English *soveran*), comes likewise "sovereign," the title of the king or queen. Princes, in like manner, are styled "your Highness," and magistrates "your Eminence." And as "sovereign" is properly an

adjective, we speak of “a *sovereign* remedy.” To “soar” is a contraction of *supero*, literally to ascend on high. “Sublime” is of the same physical purport, meaning literally that which is remote from, or “above” the *limus*, or mud, with especial reference to its tenacious and clogging properties, the *super* being changed into *sub* for euphony :—

“ Est via *sublimis*, cœlo manifesto sereno,
Lactea nomen habet, candere notabilis ipso.”

(There is a path in the altitudes, easy to be seen when the sky is clear, and being remarkable for its shining whiteness, known by the name of the milky way.)

“Sublimity,” therefore, is that which “*soars* aloft.” We apply the word to immensity, eternity, omnipresence, etc., because these are things to which our intellectual vision cannot rise; and to the grand in material nature, because it accords to our perceptions with what is morally and intellectually so.

Superus furnished the Romans with their name for pride—*superbia*, literally that which is “high up,” just as we speak in English of “holding one’s-self high,” and of being “haughty,” which last comes either through the French *haut*, from the Latin *altus* (like *altus*, *enhausser*, *enhance*), or direct from “high,” like *slay*, *slaughter*. There is nothing inconsistent in this name, for pride is not necessarily a vicious sentiment. There is “*honest* pride”—that generous elation of spirit which makes us “proud of our country,” “proud of our Queen.” A twofold meaning, such as here seen, implies, ordinarily, an earlier and more general one, which in course of time has divaricated into particular ones. There are many such twofold meanings. To “prevent” occurs in the

Church of England Liturgy, in the sense of *assist*. The primary meaning is to "go before," and thus either obstruct or help. *Spero* in Latin, and ἐλπίζω in Greek, signify both to hope and to fear, the primary sense being to *expect*. So in English we "expect" both good and evil, the original sense being "to look out for." Τίω in Greek means both to honour and punish, the primitive sense being to pay what is due; just as in our own tongue it is said that God shall *reward* both the evil and the good. The extraordinary verse in Job, "Curse God and die," may as well be translated "Bless God and die," the Hebrew term meaning primarily to "invoke." So in Latin, *sacer* is both holy and accursed, whence in turn the opposite meanings of the French *sacre*. Φάρμακον is Greek both for medicine and poison. Primarily it is that which is "potent." Λόγος signifies both reason and speech, because speech is thought outwardly projected, and thought a private conversation with one's-self. The words let, cleave, nervous, are other familiar examples belonging to our own colloquial.

The etymology of "pride" itself illustrates this law, and at the same time develops a natural synonymy with the *superbia* of the Romans. Pride and proud are radically connected with *prozw*, the forepart of a ship; *brow*, as in eyebrow and the brow of a hill; πρῶν, a summit or peak; πρωῖ, early in the morning; *probus*, brave or foremost; *probo*, to prove; probity; to brag; and a multitude of other words denoting forwardness and elevation, either good or perverted. Their ultimate and common root is the same as that of *pro*, *præ*, etc.

From *superus*, again, through its superlative *supremus*, come "supreme" and "supremacy," both of which

excellently vindicate the correspondence between physical altitude and moral goodness. *Supremus*, by contraction, yields *summus*, the highest, and *summa*, the top, whence "summit." Hence "*summum bonum*," "the highest good." Hence, too, in the language of arithmetic, the word "sum" is used to denote the aggregate of added quantities; for that number which includes *all* must of necessity be the "highest." So with "summary." *Consummate* is from the same source, meaning that which is finished or completed.

The adjectives *superus* and *inferus* further gave to the Romans their names for the gods respectively of heaven and hell, namely, *Superi* and *Inferi*, literally the above and the below. These designations were framed in accordance with the popular theory of all ages and nations as to the invisible world, and the scenes of future reward and punishment. Hell, with its king and occupants, has always been placed beneath the feet: the abode of benignant deity, or "heaven," overhead, the latter being measureless in altitude, and supposed to be in some remote region of the sky. Homer, placing the residence of the gods above the fixed stars, represents the fall of Vulcan to the island of Lemnos, when thrust out by Jupiter, as continuing a whole day. Milton, treating of the similar fall of Lucifer, makes it last for nine days!

Scripture itself refers to heaven as a place above us, and to the residence of the wicked as a place to be descended to; and so long as we remain in the letter, it is a doctrinal topography which can neither be disputed nor misconceived. But it is easy to see that these descriptions are the metaphorical setting forth of a

spiritual truth, which cannot otherwise be conveyed, and of which they are the natural and appropriate expression: and hence again that the current phraseology and teachings are but so many consistent though unsuspected figures, inevitable to the very nature of things. Before man becomes acquainted with spiritual things, he sees their symbols in nature, and naturally frames his first conceptions and expressions in conformity with their appearance. There is nothing in Scripture, when spiritually read, and nothing in nature, in its scientific elucidation, whereon to establish the belief that heaven and hell are anywhere in space, as they must be, if literally above and below. Moreover, the sky that is above our heads during one portion of the twenty-four hours is below us at another. So that by interpreting the doctrine physically, we actually make heaven and hell exchange places with every revolution of the earth! Correspondence, and Scripture teaching generally, clearly show that by "above" and "below;" by "on high" and "the pit," are meant those spiritual states or conditions which physical height and depth answer to and represent. "The kingdom of heaven," it tells us, is "within you," thereby meaning that we are not to look for heaven in the air, or in the sky, but in *the state of our own souls*. The soul of man has been "fearfully and wonderfully" fitted to be the residence of God. It is there that He has promised to "come in and sup," provided the door be opened to Him. Spiritual existence, of its very nature, can know nothing whatever of *space*, for space is a contingent of *matter*, and therefore pertains exclusively to our time-life.

By reason of the same correspondence, moral declen-

sion is uniformly described in language under the symbol of *falling*, while advance and improvement are called *rising*. We "fall" into error, "fall" into a mistake, and "ascend" to higher views; we speak also of a fallen character, our fallen nature, and of rising or falling in esteem. Hence, too, high moral influence is called "ascendancy." A person who commits a mean act is said to "stoop" or "descend" to it. Hence, again, darkness, as the symbol of evil, is instinctively described as *falling* to the earth, as when we speak of nightfall, and the fall of evening. "Night" means falling or declension, being cognate with *nod*, *nuto*, and *νεύω*, to bend down, with which last is connected its Greek synonym, *νῆξι*, *νυκτὸς*. In reference to the emotional life, we speak for the same general reason, of our hopes being "raised," of our spirits "rising," and of their "sinking."

Let us return, however, to the figurative employment of the appellations of the bodily organs, the arms, the hands, the bosom, and other principal parts. Language often speaks of the "hands" of the soul:—

"Still in thy *right hand* carry gentle peace."

—*Henry VIII.*, Act iii. Scene 2.

"Non bene cœlestes impia dextra colit."

"A wicked *right hand* ill befits the worship of the heavenly powers."—*Dido Æneæ*, 130.

The shortest and most satisfactory mode of determining what such allusions mean, is once again, to interrogate Scripture, since no figurative expression occurs in common language that is not used or foreshadowed in the Word of God. It is well to remember this for another reason,

namely, that denial of the correspondences used in our daily converse, involves, as a necessary consequence, the denial and rejection of the phraseology selected by Inspiration. In Exodus we read, "Thy right hand, O Lord, is become glorious in power: Thy right hand, O Lord, hath dashed in pieces the enemy." In Isaiah, "I the Lord thy God will hold thy right hand, saying unto thee, Fear not, I will help thee." In Psalm cxliv., "The right hand of the wicked is a right hand of falsehood." These, and innumerable passages of the same kind, plainly show that the right hand corresponds to the *activities of the will*, and when used in reference to the Almighty, to the Divine Omnipotence. Accepting the expression in this, its true sense, the above Shakspearean line acquires a high and definite meaning; otherwise it has none whatever.

The Scriptural and colloquial allusions to the *left* hand are alone intelligible through a similar mode of interpretation. The former then become full of fine instruction. "A wise man's heart is at his *right* hand, but a fool's heart is at his *left*."

It is because of the same general correspondence that *clean* hands are so often spoken of. "The Lord rewarded me according to my righteousness; according to the *clean-ness of my hands* hath He recompensed me." "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? He that hath *clean hands* and a pure heart." This also is why the ancients were so strict as to cleanliness of hands in sacrifices; sacrifices being symbolical of the "hidden worship of the heart."

Very beautiful in their expressiveness are the metaphors which allude to the bosom, the physical bosom

being the seat and scene of the manifestation of the warmest attachment. In the parting, for example, of Hector and Andromache, one of the loveliest pictures ever drawn: "Then she received him in her fragrant bosom, smiling through her tears." Because of this we speak of a "bosom friend," and of the "wife of one's bosom." The latter is a Scriptural, and therefore truly correspondential expression, occurring in Deut. xiii. 6, and xxviii. 54. The literal translation is "the wife *who is in thy bosom.*" From the same circumstance is derived the imagery of Lazarus resting upon Abraham's bosom; and of the prophetic promise that the Lord shall carry the righteous "in His bosom." Compare the line in the seventh *Æneid* :—

"Nec Trojam Ausonios gremio excepisse pigebit."

(Nor shall the Ausonians rejoice that they received Troy into their bosom.)

Nothing is more sacred than a pure and faithful attachment. The bosom, accordingly, becomes the natural emblem of a sanctuary. Virgil illustrates this again :—

"Quæcumque mihi fortuna fidesque est,
In vestris pono gremiis."

(Whatever my credit or my fortune, I repose it in your bosoms.)

So in Shakspeare :—

"Into her bosom I'll unclasp my heart."

To "unbosom," is to speak of our most private and precious affections. To "embosom," is to shelter and protect, in the way that love does. Hence Milton's beautiful line—

"And the sweet peace that goodness *bosoms* ever."

What the head or brain is to the intellectual powers the heart is representatively to the affections. Hence, in referring to these, the innumerable colloquial expressions which include, among their commonest, the hard, the soft, the tender, and the flinty heart; the cold, the warm, the light, and the heavy heart. We speak also of the heart bleeding, breaking, weeping, and rejoicing; of our heart failing us, of loving with all our heart, and of having the heartache. Hence too "a hearty welcome." So in Scripture, "The whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint;" *i.e.* the sense of truth utterly perverted, and the love of virtue cold and indifferent. *Cor*, the Latin word for the heart, has given cordial and cordiality. Through the French *cœur* we have courage, encourage, and discourage; *i.e.* to "give heart," and to "dishearten." So with concord, discord, accord, record. Of the same race is *carus*, dear or beloved. To caress and to cherish are literally to give our heart to. *Caritas*, whence "charity," is the heart in full play.

Carread
wisk for smallhead

CHAPTER XX.

RESTING on no casual or artificial circumstances, but on the original and immutable harmonies of things, it follows that the metaphorical terms procured from the material world wherewith to express thoughts and feelings, will in return be found to be the truest and most graceful wherein we can speak of nature itself. Language undesignedly repays to nature all that it borrows, and with interest.

The forms of expression in which this is done constitute the department of figurative or metaphorical language called *Personification*. Usually this name is restricted to that favourite usage of the poets wherein they attribute to inanimate nature acts, properties, and qualities conspicuously belonging to man. In all ages the morning has been personified in verse as a lovely goddess, "rosy-fingered," "saffron-robed," and by name Aurora. In all ages, the sea, by reason of its destructiveness to ships and sailors, has been called cruel, avaricious, and remorseless; and when quiet, has been said to "sleep" and to "repose." But Personification in reality embraces a far wider range. For as man, for his part, is a microcosm, so nature, for her part, is man expanded

and displayed.* Every term and expression in which we speak of natural objects is essentially a metaphor of something human, and thus a true personification. That those very terms were derived from nature in the first place involves no inconsistency. They are *reflections of her own gifts*. The vocal things of nature supply the basis of language, by uttering sounds which serve for names, first for themselves, and then, by correspondence, for the non-vocal. These sounds are then adapted by man into words delineating *himself* and his constitutional phenomena. Then they are returned to nature by Personification; children, originally, of the wilderness, cultivated and polished, rendered comely and meaningful by living awhile with men.

Personification, therefore, instead of being a custom purely of literary art, pertains everywhere to common speech, many of the usages of which prove by their inexpressible beauty that the best part of all language is actual poetry—the gods walking upon the earth. What more frequent than to hear of the sighing of the wind, the dancing of the waves, the smiling looks of nature—unless of the green lap of the earth, and the face of the sky? We say again that the spring “awakes,” that brooks of water “sing,” that plants and blossoms “love” the sunshine. Æschylus, Pindar, Virgil, Milton, Shakspeare, Byron, Shelley—all the great poets abound with language of precisely the same character, and in forms so profusely varied, that to illustrate every separate kind

* Not in mere *imitation* of man's frame, but because the same spiritual causative essences underlie all things; expressing themselves in the forms of external nature on the one hand, in the constitution of man upon the other.

would be to quote all their most admired and familiar passages. That beautiful personification, for instance, by which the sea is spoken of as laughing, smiling, and dimpling, occurs in countless places, especially in ancient verse, old Æschylus' inexpressibly rich and lovely allusion to "the unnumbered smiles of ocean's waves" leading the way. Compare Milton—

"Cheered by the grateful smell, old Ocean smiles."

And Campbell—

"Hail to thy face and odours, glorious Sea!
'Twere thanklessness in me to bless thee not,
Great, beauteous being, in whose breath and smile
My heart beats calmer, and my very mind
Inhales salubrious thoughts."

Not less poetic are the familiar expressions—it *threatens* to rain, it *promises* to be fine, to be *enticed* out. So when we call the weather "inclement," it is saying literally that it has no *clemency* or mildness about it. Ovid puts clemency for the smoothness of a deeply running stream:

"Qua sit clementissimus amnis."

(Where the river glides with mildest current.)

If anxious to discover the particulars of some past event, we say, still in the language of true poetry, that we *trace* it out, literally "track its footsteps." "To investigate" is of the same meaning, being from the Latin *vestigium*, a footprint. "Vestiges," properly, are the footprints left by something that has passed that way before. "Investigation" is the searching for them. The old-fashioned English word to "speer" or inquire for (Anglo-Saxon *spirian*, German *spüren*) is exactly similar in sense, being radically connected with the Anglo-Saxon *spor* (German *spur*), a footstep:—

Spur: scent of animal's footprint

“ With joy unfeigned, brothers and sisters meet,
And each for other’s welfare kindly *spiers*.”

—*Cotter’s Saturday Night*.

Compare again the grand personifications whereby the sun is called the lord of the day, and the moon the “queen of night.” Fire, it has been said, after the same manner, is “greedier than avarice, more relentless than Time.” To “injure” a thing is literally to act illegally towards it; the word implying that the object spoken of, tree, garden, river-bank, or whatever it may be, has its rights the same as men have. The Greeks used the synonymous ἀδικέω in precisely the same way, as in the expressive phrase in Thucydides, τὴν γῆν τὴν Πλαταΐδα μὴ ἀδικεῖν—“to do no damage to the territory of Plataea.”

On p. 182, among the examples of condensed similes, was cited “lovely,” in full “lovelike.” How beautifully, yet once more, is this epithet transferred by Personification to things which in themselves contain not the slightest capacity for love. Nonsense, from the literal point of view, no figure, at the same time, in the whole vocabulary, is more just. Love, when rightly directed, is the spring of all delight, joy, peace, gladness, and consolation. Straightway, accordingly, whatever in external nature awakens sprightly and pleasing emotions, we at once compare to love, and describe as lovelike. Thus, a lovely evening, a lovely flower, a lovely breeze. Homer has ῥέεθρα ἐρατεινὰ, lovely streams; Ἡμαθίην ἐρατεινὴν, the lovely country of Emathia. Pindar speaks of “the lovely light of the beautiful-eyed moon.” “Amiable fruit,” in *Paradise Lost*, reminds us of the Scriptural “How *amiable* are Thy tabernacles!”

Envy, charity, etc., are ascribed to nature in precisely the same manner. Milton's "envious darkness," "courteous echo," and "kind hospitable woods" (alluding to their wild fruits and nuts) are remarkably beautiful instances. That also is fine in Ovid, when, describing a terrible tumult produced by the sudden incursion of enemies, he says it is like the sea:—

"Quod sæva quietum
Ventorum rabies motis *exasperat* undis."

"Which, when smooth, an impetuous storm of winds *exasperates* by the commotion of its waves."—*Met.* v. 6, 7.

The finest piece of sustained personification in any language, ancient or modern, is probably the following passage in the *Cenci*:—

"Two miles on this side of the fort, the road
Crosses a deep ravine; 'tis rough and narrow,
And winds with short turns down the precipice;
And in its depth there is a mighty rock
Which has, from unimaginable years,
Sustained itself with terror and with toil
Over the gulf, and with the agony
With which it clings, seems slowly coming down;
Even as a wretched soul, hour after hour,
Clings to the mass of life, and clinging, leans,
And leaning, makes more dark the dread abyss
In which it fears to fall;—beneath this crag,
Huge as despair, as if in weariness
The melancholy mountain yawns; below
You hear but see not an impetuous torrent
Raging among the caverns; and a bridge
Crosses the chasm; and high above there grow,
With intersecting trunks, from crag to crag,
Cedars, and yews, and pines, whose tangled hair
Is matted in one solid roof of shade
By the dark ivy's twine. At noonday here
'Tis twilight, and at sunset, blackest night."

The ancients' personifications of the powers and energies of nature as gods and goddesses rested on the same general principles. This, however, is a subject distinct from language, except as regards the epithets applied to the various deities, and which enter largely into classical poetry. Hence until we obtain a clue to the principles of their application, half the charm of ancient verse is veiled. Thetis, the fabled goddess of the sea, is styled the "blue-robed" and the "silver-footed." The former epithet refers to the colour of the sea, which is the mantle of the goddess; the latter is an exquisite allusion to the white foam and spray produced by the dashing of the waves upon the beach, the sea being here at its extreme border, and thus equivalent to her feet.

There is yet another department of personification, namely, that which comprises the appeals which men address to the objects of nature, speaking to them as if they were sentient and listening beings like themselves. Such appeals are extremely frequent in old classical verse, which they strikingly embellish. They are not infrequent also in the compositions of many of the most tasteful English poets. Scripture gives examples in the 148th Psalm, and in the Canticle of the Three Children, "O all ye works of the Lord, bless ye the Lord!" There is nothing whimsical in it. Men at all periods of life find in nature friendship, sympathy, and welcome. When wearied with cares, or preyed upon by melancholy; when whispered to by hope, or animated by unexpected happiness and good fortune, they still spontaneously seek the sweet influences of nature; finding in the woods, and green fields, on the slopes of the sunny hills, or amid the garden lilies, balm for their wounds,

congenialities with their gladness. However listless, either in mind or body, in the presence of nature all again becomes buoyant and refreshed. Even if sullen and discontented, the blue sky looks down reprovngly, and drives away the tempter. Homer describes Achilles, when aggrieved by the injustice of Agamemnon, going down to the sea-shore, and there playing on his harp to the waves, so that their united voices may give him rest ! Feeling how intense and lovely is the friendship of nature, the minds of men accustomed to seek her for her own sweet sake, become insensibly attuned to gratitude, expressing it either in the eloquence of oft-repeated visits, or if gifted with the poet's tongue, in the utterance of spoken thanks and invocations. If troubled, they speak to her as they would to the amiable and generous of their own species ; if animated by a lively piety, they spontaneously call on her to join in praising God. So long however as the material world endures, so long will it be unnecessary for man to call upon nature to lift up her voice to the Creator of all, for it is she who sets him the example. When the wind, and the sea, and the waterfalls become silent, then first will it be needful for man to invite them to their duty.



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